FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUMMER 1993

The Clash of Civilizations?

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

Should Ukraine Stay Nuclear?

A Debate: JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER AND STEVEN E. MILLER

Serbia's Milošević: *A Profile*

ALEKSA DJILAS

Also on the Balkans

A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing
The Case for War Crimes Trials
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUMMER 1993
VOLUME 72, NUMBER 3

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A Common Discontent, *Stephen R. Graubard* 2

Britain and Germany are beginning to have the sinking feeling that their once-promising *zeitgeists*—innovative Thatcherism and harmonious unification—have lost faith, energy and momentum. Revelations of Stasi sympathizers in Germany and star-crossed royalty in England are not helping.

Lessons of Chernobyl, *Sergei P. Kapitza* 7

The lessons of the Chernobyl disaster must go beyond the usual technical analyses and focus on the fundamental cause of the accident: that the Soviet nuclear energy program was permeated by an atmosphere of corruption and patronage. Only a scientific culture of openness and professionalism can avert future nuclear disasters.

The Post-Cold War Press, *Henry A. Grunwald* 12

The tumult of the post–Cold War world has disoriented not only politicians, but journalists as well. Reporters must learn anew the geography, history and political philosophy of emerging nations and coalitions.

Reining in the U.N., *Ernest W. Lefever* 17

The United Nations is only an instrument of sovereign states occasionally useful in specific crises. When used hastily or inappropriately, it risks internationalizing and prolonging local conflicts.

(*continued*)

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and

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Essays

The Clash of Civilizations?, *Samuel P. Huntington* 22

World politics is entering a new phase, in which the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of international conflict will be cultural. Civilizations—the highest cultural groupings of people—are differentiated from each other by religion, history, language and tradition. These divisions are deep and increasing in importance. From Yugoslavia to the Middle East to Central Asia, the fault lines of civilizations are the battle lines of the future. In this emerging era of cultural conflict the United States must forge alliances with similar cultures and spread its values wherever possible. With alien civilizations the West must be accommodating if possible, but confrontational if necessary. In the final analysis, however, all civilizations will have to learn to tolerate each other.

The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, *John J. Mearsheimer* 50

Conventional wisdom argues that Ukraine should be forced to give up its nuclear weapons to ensure peace and stability in Europe. This is quite wrong. As soon as Ukraine declared its independence, Washington should have encouraged Kiev to fashion its own secure nuclear deterrent. The dangers of Russian-Ukrainian rivalry bode poorly for peace. If Ukraine is forced to maintain a large conventional army to deter potential Russian expansion, the danger of war is much greater than if it maintains a nuclear capability. U.S. policy should recognize that Ukraine, come what may, will keep its nuclear weapons.

The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, *Steven E. Miller* 67

Nuclear weapons are not always destabilizing, but for Ukraine to retain its vast arsenal of ICBMs would be highly dangerous. The circumstances that made the nuclear arms race stable during the Cold War are all absent in the Russian-Ukranian relationship. The nuclear balance between Russia and Ukraine will never be stable and, even if possible, the process of developing a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent is fraught with conflicts over custody, control and targeting. Accidents happen. In the uncertain environment of the former Soviet Union, allowing Ukraine to keep nuclear weapons is not worth the cost.

A Profile of Slobodan Milošević, *Aleksa Djilas* 81

Slobodan Milošević catapulted from the ranks of communist functionaries to become the most popular Serbian leader of the century by embracing and promoting nationalism through dramatic mass demonstrations and simplistic propaganda. Adept in the use of patronage and organization-building, he supplanted his mentor as president of Serbia, won the allegiance of the Yugoslav army and manipulated intellectuals and the masses with a "politics of fear." Faced with slipping popularity because of economic sanctions and afraid of Western military intervention, Milošević is now ready for compromises, but the forces he created may be uncontrollable.

(*continued*)

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Invitation to War, *William Pfaff* 97

War in the Balkans stems not from mysterious and unresolvable ancient hatreds but from forces and events of recent times—nineteenth-century romanticism, the emergence of nation states and the breakup of empires. The idea of an ethnic nation, based on political imagination rather than the European reality of racial intermixture, is a permanent provocation to war. Yugoslavia's war is about political values, specifically separatism versus secular, nonethnic democracy. Without NATO guarantees against forcible border changes and a Western willingness to intervene, ethnic conflict will dominate the course of events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for years to come.

A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, *Andrew Bell-Fialkoff* 110

Serbian efforts to force Bosnian Muslims from cities and villages throughout the Balkans have only recently lodged ethnic cleansing in the public mind. But in the annals of history such atrocities are far from new. From ancient Assyria to modern Serbia, campaigns to homogenize populations within inviolate borders have been carried out variously in the name of God, nation or ideology. Yet ethnic cleansing remains difficult to define. Less understood is the compulsion for national "purity" at such horrific costs. The most likely outcome of the Balkan war is a patchwork of ethnically distinct regions, with few minority populations. Perhaps then the violence will end.

The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, *Theodor Meron* 122

Gross human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia—rape, torture, summary execution and mass internment—cannot go uncensured by the international community. A war crimes tribunal is a moral imperative and would go far toward deterring future criminals and defusing ethnic tensions in the Balkans. Although prosecution will be difficult, the alternative—doing nothing—is unacceptable. To abandon the process now, after the United Nations has already called for a tribunal, would make a mockery of international law. The moral legacy of the Nuremberg trials is at stake.

The Next Great Arms Race, *Michael T. Klare* 136

Fueled by dramatic economic growth, the nations of East and Southeast Asia are engaged in an arms race that shows every sign of accelerating. These countries are importing not only complex weapon systems but, more important, the technology with which to manufacture them. Since longstanding territorial and border disputes remain (most notably in the South China Sea) and the twin threats of China and Japan loom large, the potential for conflict is great. Without arms control and regional security measures, the Pacific Rim could one day be the site of a major conflagration.

The Plutonium Genie, *George Perkovich* 153

If nation states continue to make and use plutonium, they risk nuclear weapons proliferation, environmental devastation and lost lives. Through the International Atomic Energy Agency or a new institution, a regime should be set up to manage storage, reduction and disposal of this costly carcinogen. Pressure to

(continued)

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join the regime could come from tightening the purse-strings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But a new regime would also require precedent-setting behavior and support from the United States and Russia.

Superpower Without a Sword, *Alan Tonelson* 166

America's leaders still cling to a superpower role. President Clinton himself has paid at least rhetorical support to spearheading a democratic world order. But his administration's proposed defense budget would strip the nation of the power needed to carry out those ambitions. A mismatch of financial means and political ends looms on the nation's horizon. The way to close the gap is not to build up defense, but to build down U.S. foreign policy goals.

Reviews

Clinton's Emerging Trade Policy, *Jeffrey Garten* 182

President Clinton is getting jostled by the grousing of U.S. trading partners and critics of his economic policy. Yet his trade policy assumes—correctly—that the costs of inaction are too high. A trio of books details the stakes.

The Stain of Vietnam, *Douglas Brinkley* 190

In *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara*, the former secretary of defense emerges as a man who, despite decades of public service, is unable to out the damned spot of Vietnam.

Recent Books on International Relations 194

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R. Scott Appleby; Russell Warren Howe; Robert G. Torricelli; Jorge I. Domínguez; Flora Lewis; Walter D.Connor.

The articles in Foreign Affairs *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* Foreign Affairs *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.*

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Editor's Note

A New Look for *Foreign Affairs*

In this issue of *Foreign Affairs* the editors complete a set of changes begun last winter in content, formatting and design. The purpose is to make *Foreign Affairs* more engaging and accessible while maintaining its depth and authority. In content, we are supplementing the main essays with comments, interviews, profiles, debates and book review essays. In typography and layout, we are enhancing the clarity and elegance of our presentation with the invaluable assistance of noted designer Roger Black and his associate Paul Barnes.

The changes start with the cover. It is a lighter gray, closer to the journal's original cover, to make the titles of articles more legible. The titles themselves are larger and some of them sport a lively red ink. Both on the cover and inside, the typefaces return *Foreign Affairs* to Caslon, the first great Roman typeface of the English-speaking world. For text, *Foreign Affairs* is using Adobe Caslon, designed by Carol Twombly, and, for titles, a strong, digital rendition of Caslon by Matthew Carter. These typefaces adapt well to the desktop technology now used to produce the magazine while maintaining Caslon's established legibility, warmth and timelessness.

The new logotype on the cover is also based on the original design of *Foreign Affairs*. The logo is the creation of Ann Pomeroy, who collaborated on new logos for *Time* and *Esquire* magazines last year.

To assist readers, there is an explanatory table of contents and frontispieces for each of the magazine's three main sections. Within articles, subtitles replace roman numerals and enlarged quotes seek to interest browsers.

Lastly, we are working closely with our authors to assure that articles are lucid, tightly organized, and free of jargon. As a rule, we aim to present essays of 4,000 to 5,000 words and comments of under 2,500 words. Where a subject's breadth requires greater length, we will, of course, devote the necessary space, as illustrated in this issue by Samuel P. Huntington's wide-ranging examination of the potentials for conflict between civilizations.

With this issue, we welcome several new regular contributors. Ib Ohlsson, an accomplished cartographer and artist, is providing maps, charts and illustrations to illuminate the text. And joining our roster of regular book reviewers are three distinguished scholars, economist Richard N. Cooper of Harvard University, political scientist Eliot A. Cohen of Johns Hopkins' Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and historian Stephen E. Ambrose of the University of New Orleans.

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Comments

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Briquette factory in Bitterfeld, Germany

"To spend time in
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is to become aware of levels of discontent
unimaginable four years ago."

STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD *A Common Discontent* 2

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A Common Discontent

Revisiting Britain and Germany

Stephen R. Graubard

To spend time in the United Kingdom and Germany in early 1993 is to become aware of levels of discontent unimaginable four years ago. Superficially, the disappointments appear to be linked to the worldwide economic recession, with levels of unemployment exceeding what democratically elected governments are supposed to tolerate. Except for those with a professional interest in arguing that the moment of recovery is at hand, there is little expectation that the happy days of 1989—minus the Soviet Union of course—are scheduled for an early return. Folk wisdom tells ordinary people that something more than an economic slowdown has occurred in what was once seen as a group of self-confident democracies on the road to making a new Europe.

This is not to suggest that the recession has not been serious, for Britain even more than for Germany. To have three million men and women unemployed out of a total population of some 57 million in the United Kingdom, with a million having had no work for a year or longer, is to experience the tragedy Margaret Thatcher imagined she had permanently overcome by her drastic and presumably effective free enterprise policies. The failure to make British industry competitive, productive and lithe, and its working population industrious, has deflated the most ambitious of the Tory Party's many well-advertised ideologies. The results of the recession are conspicuous, not only in the nineteenth-century industrial cities of northern England, but also in the home counties, in London itself: boarded-up, empty storefronts of a thousand high streets, homeless men and women sleeping in doorways off Fleet Street and along the Strand, widespread unemployment and underemployment spoken of in all social strata. It is particularly painful for the young, including many who are university

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Stephen R. Graubard is a historian, author and editor of over a dozen books on foreign policy, science and international affairs, and since 1961 the editor of *Daedalus*, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

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graduates, and it generates a pessimism that is palpable. For the middle class the collapse of the real estate market has been an especially hard blow, made more serious by the fact that so great a part of a family's purported wealth is in its house and garden. In Britain the talk of "decline" is more pervasive than it has ever been, and not merely because of a devalued pound.

The situation in Germany is not nearly so serious. Only at the end of 1992, for example, did the Bundesbank feel obliged to acknowledge that the country was in recession. The evidence of prosperity remains conspicuous: in Bonn, where construction derricks fill the skies and building crews work to create more office space, the proposition that a once somnolent Rhine city is likely soon to be seriously diminished by the movement of Germany's capital to Berlin seems unlikely. In Düsseldorf, a city not famous for its hordes of tourists, the shop windows display merchandise of such luxury and expense that one can only believe that consumer confidence remains high, at least among well-paid executives. In Munich and Berlin, Hamburg and Mannheim, the solid comfort of yesterday is much in evidence. Yet German unemployment statistics tell a story constantly repeated by the mass media: almost three and a half million Germans are currently unemployed. Some 7.5 percent of the labor force in the former Federal Republic of Germany is out of work; in the former German Democratic Republic the number rises to 14.5 percent. While urban renewal in Dresden and Leipzig, in East Berlin and Potsdam, suggests that Bonn authorities are beginning to cope with the problems of underdevelopment in the newly incorporated eastern states, there is still much talk of economic hardship, created in great part, it is believed, by the high costs of reunification.

It is not only the financial dailies that speak of pounds and marks. These are the principal currencies of much of the political dialogue not wholly consumed by the more popular media themes: murder and mayhem, crime and punishment. In these circumstances, it is easy to forget that the Germans and the British have had very different economic and political experiences in this century and remain more suspicious of each other—perhaps even more resentful—than either is prepared to admit.

BRITAIN'S BLUES

If Great Britain suffers today from a single social and political malady, it is that of regret—not to be confused with nostalgia. Few in Britain believe that the way back to societal health is through a reversion to Victorian ways. Yet the century has clearly not turned out to be what its politicians or social, economic or intellectual elites expected it to be. Disappointment with the slow growth of the economy conceals a deeper dismay, with a society that remains sharply divided between the very rich and the very poor, with a much expanded middle class, admittedly, but with many having fewer opportunities at home and abroad. The violence of the cities, now recognized to exist also in towns and villages, refutes the reputation for public safety established more than a century and a half ago with the creation of an unarmed national police. The old established institutions, except for the military, are seriously diminished both in their reputation and prestige.

Beside all the evidence of discontent and grievance lies a more parochial disappointment. While Thatcherism is now

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criticized—its only major and permanent accomplishment in the eyes of many being the defeat of the trade unions, with their greatly exaggerated claims to power—there is no new regard for the institutions Mrs. Thatcher so persistently and powerfully disparaged. In her disdain for the universities and for intellectual life as Britons had known it, she did irreparable harm to British education, which already was suffering adverse effects from too much tinkering at the primary and secondary school levels.

Nor have surrogates been found in technology. Having lost its promising situation years earlier in aeronautics and automobiles, Britain has gained no new distinction in such areas as electronics and computers. While the country retains some advantages in pharmaceuticals, and profits greatly from its North Sea oil resources, the latter is regarded as a wasting asset. The old coal and steel industries have collapsed, as they did in much of Europe, and the hopes for a new economy based on banking and insurance have never been wholly realized. Tourism is Britain's not-so-secret economic weapon, and its success threatens to make London (and much of "traditional" England) the Venice of the north, a prospect with limited appeal to many Britons. Incapable of profiting from Thatcherism's unreserved commitment to the principles of the market economy, Britain seems imprisoned in a time capsule that does not bear a 21st-century imprint.

THE DISTRACTIONS OF WEALTH

The situation in Germany differs vastly. Germans recovered in record time from a disastrous and shameful war, creating the impression that hard work and an overwhelming determination to obliterate their Nazi past would produce the longed-for rehabilitation and that it would be reflected in unprecedented prosperity and peace. The decision by the United States to enlist Germany's help in the conflict with Soviet communism made its economic recovery all the more certain. A truncated and reduced Germany, the pariah state of 1945, achieved levels of prosperity never experienced in the days of the kaiser or in the short-lived Weimar republic. The nation rebuilt itself—its cities, in the first instance, but also its institutions. Nazism was made to appear a national aberration, extinguished not by individual heroism—the July plotters who risked their lives in attempting Hitler's assassination never figured as national heroes—but by a collective effort to create a constitutional order based on an aversion to violence.

The Federal Republic, increasingly prosperous, secure and provincial, protected by others but also contributing to its own defense, knew itself to be economically superior to the German communist regime across the dangerous divide symbolized by the Berlin Wall. Its old foe, France, under both the Fourth and the Fifth republics, became a partner that helped to make a new Germany possible. Having emerged as one of the major architects of the European Community, Germany regained its former respectability.

If, in Germany's rhetoric, attention was given principally to the strength of the Deutsche mark and the qualities of the Mercedes-Benz, if less was said about its universities, about its intellectual and scientific prowess, this was because of the insatiable national preoccupation with material comfort and well-being. Travel, second homes, sports and holidays became symbols of a society engaged in an increas-

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ingly reckless race to find and enjoy the sun. A growing prosperity brought millions of foreigners into the country, never as citizens, but as "guest workers," to do the menial jobs.

RETHINKING THE PAST

Today, four years after 1989, both Britain and Germany are compelled to rethink their pasts. The British do so because Thatcherism has fallen into disrepute. The Germans are compelled because a united Germany will not be what Helmut Kohl imagined even as recently as a year ago. The Chancellor is not much preoccupied with Europe-shy Britain or with his more reliable and beleaguered friend, François Mitterrand. Today his concerns are largely domestic. The country is divided over its obligations to the hundreds of thousands who wish to settle in Germany. The old idealism, proclaimed in a constitution that extolled Germany's interest in welcoming refugees—implying some sort of national atonement for past aggressions—seems to belong to another age. When Germans reflect that in the last year alone almost a million men and women came from abroad to seek refuge in Germany, that 450,000 sought to qualify as "asylum seekers," that 250,000 refugees came from former Yugoslavia, and that another 250,000 "ethnic Germans" arrived from the East, taking advantage of the "right of return," the situation is thought to be out of hand.

If there is scant sympathy for the neo-Nazis who attacked and killed a 10-year-old child and her Turkish grandmother, part of a family that had lived in Germany for decades, if the xenophobia revealed by such action dismays decent men and women living in nearby Hamburg, the publicity that attends such incidents is also painful. Abroad as much as at home, Germany is being asked whether the recent showing of the National Democrats does not reflect the revival of right-wing extremism. The citizens of Frankfurt find such questioning impertinent, almost insolent. What would others do if they suddenly had to find housing and provide other facilities for 170,000 foreigners who had chosen their city to live in? Would others be so accommodating?

On proposals that the Germans should involve themselves in military action in Yugoslavia—some believe they bear some small responsibility for the present impasse, having pressed their European Community colleagues to recognize Croatia and Slovenia last year, against the better judgment of both France and the United Kingdom—the official German response is to cite the postwar constitution's ban against using German troops abroad. Still, Germany may be prepared to give money, as it of course did after a certain amount of American pressure during the Gulf War. Money, though said to be in short supply, is always available for worthy foreign causes, and there is not a little pride in the periodic announcements that Germany is doing more to help the newly democratic states of Eastern and Central Europe than any of the other rich industrial societies.

The German government, inward-looking not only for constitutional reasons, is unprepared to risk the lives of German soldiers in any war, including the current Balkan conflict, despite awareness of the risks that an extension of the fighting poses for the whole of Europe. In this, Germany resembles all its European friends in the Community. Knowing that the United States entered the Gulf War only because

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it was safe to do so, that there is no equivalent prospect for negligible loss of life in the Yugoslav imbroglio, it has no illusions that President Clinton will do more than take the most limited military measures, if any.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

Unification has proved to be not only an economic problem, but a deeply troubling psychological one. Whatever the West Germans learned about the East German regime when visits across the fortified borders were common, they were unprepared for Stasi revelations that millions willingly collaborated with the secret police to spy on their neighbors. This disconcerting episode has stoked memories of comparable, widespread behavior in the period when the Nazis held sway, from 1933 to 1945. A dismal chapter in German history, purportedly closed, has been reopened, with consequences that are still not fully acknowledged.

Interestingly, something similar is occurring in the United Kingdom, but for very different reasons and with quite different results. The manifest and continuing failures of the British economy, exacerbated by growing disillusion with the social policies of the Tory government and the performance of more permanent institutions—including the monarchy itself—has led to new introspection on what went wrong in the years after World War II. The shabbiness of public life, the sordidness of stories communicated daily by a press that believes the public's craving for scandal is insatiable, but mostly, the narrowing of the nation's horizons—an empire lost, Europe, and not just the Community, in deep trouble—has generated bewilderment.

A book that created something of a sensation late in 1992, if only for a moment—a new biography of Winston Churchill by a young Tory historian, John Charmley—sought to remove Britain's leading twentieth-century hero from his firmly established World War II pedestal. In doing so, Charmley not only dethroned a folk hero but denied the spirit of an age. Charmley was saying that even the war had been a mistake, that Churchill's conduct of it had been disastrous, and that only a silly conspiracy on the part of official and other historians had concealed the truth.

If the war was a mistake, what pride could be taken in what followed, in the achievements of a Labour government that gave Britain its welfare state, India its independence and the United States its most faithful ally? If all this was nothing, it would be the ultimate denial of a people's wish to be remembered as heroic, if only for a moment.

In Britain and Germany, the new urge to look back at the war, to tell the unvarnished truth, presents great opportunities for discovery and also great hazards. Given the mood in Europe, and not only in the United Kingdom and Germany, where conservative political leaders seem disinclined to acknowledge the sources of their publics' discontents, and where their oppositions are no more able to do so, the discourse is largely about peripheral inessentials. When and if more fundamental issues come to be discussed—race, nationality and religious belief—the significance of the twentieth century will be seen in a new light. The revelations may not be wholly flattering nor even very encouraging.

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Lessons of Chernobyl

The Cultural Causes of the Meltdown

Sergei P. Kapitza

In the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power station disaster, most of the lessons being learned by the scientific community and governments are about the technical, radiological, environmental and medical consequences of that tragic event. The vast literature on the subject deals almost exclusively with these technical issues. Although these aspects are significant, broader social and psychological factors greatly contributed to the catastrophe. These cultural issues were the fundamental cause of the Chernobyl accident.

From its inception the Soviet nuclear effort, aimed primarily at making an atomic bomb, was carried out with utter disregard for human life. Most, if not all, of the construction work for the nuclear industry was done by slave laborers of the Gulag. Often those engaged in building the most secret "installations," as they were called in the newspeak of the industry, were later sent to camps to be isolated for life, as described by Andrei Sakharov in his memoirs. The nuclear industry itself was run by able, determined and ruthless managers who did not take human life into account—insofar as such concerns did not serve their immediate task. The terrible environmental mess left by the Soviet nuclear industry is the painful legacy of those attitudes.

THE DANGER OF SECRECY

Like many other Soviet programs, the developing nuclear industry was shrouded in secrecy, which served three main purposes. First, and most obvious, it served to conceal the effort from the perceived enemy—the United States. A second purpose, usually not taken into account, was to control the scientists and to a lesser extent the engineers who were the brains and hands of the whole project. Last, secrecy protected the industry's leaders from all external criticism. For the political boss of the project, L. P. Beria, the head of the Soviet secret police and a ruthless

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commissar seeking absolute power over society, the atomic bomb epitomized the kind of project he felt compelled to control.

In spite of all this, the efficiency with which the first decade of the Soviet nuclear effort was concluded is amazing. This feat was largely possible because of the dedication of the technological experts who built the industry at all costs. Despite an atmosphere of secrecy and security, for example, these experts recognized that highly centralized decision-making isolated those who make decisions from those who have to implement them and consequently stifled creativity and innovation. In 1955 a second nuclear weapons laboratory, now known as Cheliabinsk-70, was established to compete with the first and most important research center at Arzamas, where all research that led to the initial success of the military effort was carried out.

In the specific case of Chernobyl another fateful decision was made because of the pervasive and misguided need for security. Half of the operating nuclear power stations were transferred to the authority of the Electrical Power Ministry. This ministry was accustomed to operating fuel-burning or hydroelectric power stations; it was unprepared to handle the enormous complexities of a nuclear station. Little institutional experience had accumulated through the developing years of the nuclear industry, and there was virtually no transfer of knowledge from those operating submarine reactors or producing plutonium to the civilian sector. No such watertight separation existed in the aircraft or shipbuilding industries, where expertise from the military and civilian sector was exchanged. The obsessive secrecy of the nuclear industry created a dangerous isolation.

By 1956 the Soviet nuclear industry was capable of designing, producing and delivering hydrogen bombs—bombs of tremendous power. At the same time the navy started to use nuclear power, starting with submarines, and soon afterward the development of civilian nuclear power began. Then the first major nuclear disaster took place. In 1957 a storage facility for the highly radioactive residue of a plutonium-producing plant blew up.[1] It was a chemical, rather than a nuclear, explosion, but as a result a huge amount of radioactivity was thrown into the atmosphere and a large area near Kyshtym, to the east of the Urals, was thoroughly contaminated. Although known to many insiders, the episode was concealed by the Soviet government. If the Kyshtym explosion and its consequences had been widely studied and understood the Chernobyl tragedy might have been, if not prevented, at least mitigated. Yet the Chernobyl experience was in a certain sense a turning point in "nuclear glasnost," an all important development.

THE NEW GENERATION

Despite the Kyshtym accident and the government's insistence on secrecy, the Soviet nuclear program's initial phases were marked mostly by success. Soon, however, many of the scientists and administrators instrumental in conceiving and creating these weapons started to leave the project. A new generation was initiated and indoctrinated, and it was then that a crucial

[1]Recently a much smaller explosion occurred at a chemical plant, a plutonium-producing facility in the Siberian city of Tomsk, causing minor contamination in the vicinity of the plant.

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change occurred. These experts were chosen not so much for their scientific or technical excellence but for their political loyalty. This new criterion led to a gradual degradation of the cultural, intellectual and professional level of the industry. Imperceptible at the start, the politicized atmosphere in the selecting, training and promoting of personnel eventually led to a marked deterioration of the standards of excellence and professionalism that were characteristic of the industry in its early stages. For example, as Dr. A.Vorobiev, one of the foremost medical experts in the Soviet Union, has pointed out, the number of radiation accidents that occurred after the entry of this new generation was much greater than in the beginning of the Soviet nuclear program.

The new generation of scientists and engineers was quite different from its predecessors. Unlike their earlier counterparts, most of the new breed were recruited from the Moscow Institute for Engineering and Physics, where students who were of "dubious" ethnic origin or whose nature it was to question authority were screened out or dismissed because they were seen as trouble by the political administrators. As a result, many creative, vital scientists were lost. In their places, mediocre—though politically correct— personnel were hired and promoted. By favoring the obedient and subservient over the challenging and inventive, the industry and the country suffered. Of those who remained, many were highly trained and specialized experts, but ingenuity and initiative cannot flourish in a compartmentalized and centrally controlled atmosphere. In such a system it is better to fail according to the rules than succeed by breaking them.

The safety of any hazardous enterprise, be it mountain-climbing or nuclear engineering, is ultimately determined by the human factor. At every stage, from conception and design to the construction and running of the enterprise, human attitudes must be factored into the equation. But the general and technical culture of professionalism, which is an absolute prerequisite for safety, was largely missing in the Soviet Union. Thus, despite all kinds of bureaucratic instructions and procedures about safety, the Soviet nuclear energy program was unsafe in its human dimension. This was the root cause of Chernobyl.

THE CULTURE OF SCIENCE

The well-known sequence of events at Chernobyl illustrates how every possible safety rule was broken in that ill-conceived experiment. Apart from disregarding all formal instructions and rules, the engineers and administrators involved displayed a total lack of understanding of nuclear power reactor physics. Here again the scientific and technical issues are less important than the general level of competence of those responsible. To comprehend how such an accident could take place one must look at the state of Soviet engineering schools, where, due to deteriorating intellectual standards, the whole atmosphere was often one of politics, not science. Because the Soviet Union separated higher technical education from fundamental science, future scientists were never properly exposed to a broad intellectual environment. Basic scientific research was pursued, often with fine results, but this high level of competence was not transferred to the universities or to the extensive system of technical institutes engaged in training engineers.

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Basic science is part of a nation's culture. This was traditionally recognized in Russia. But despite having excellent specialized training, the separation of teaching and research in the sciences and the compartmentalization of research contributed to the general deterioration of the educational level of the country's engineers. Although it is very difficult to quantify or measure the importance of these factors, they were certainly present and vastly contributed to the Chernobyl explosion.

Aside from the problems inherent in the Soviet educational system, the declining status of engineers in Soviet society also played a role. From salaries to housing allocations, to the support of families, medical care and recreation, engineers were usually placed lower on the social ladder of prestige than the workers they managed. For many decades the number of engineers produced in the Soviet Union was impressively large, but overstaffing and loss of high-level expertise were permanent features of the industry. Many engineers were forced to do technicians' jobs. Secretarial assistance and the technical facilities for the engineering staff were either absent or underdeveloped. Computers and information technology were in their infancy. In fact the Soviet Union never really managed to produce an engineering elite, an upper class of highly placed, well-paid and respected engineers, which is the backbone of any modern industrial nation, despite the fact that most Soviet officials and the ruling elite were initially trained as engineers.

Moreover, the Soviet Union's isolation from the advanced world and the lack of broad and personal contacts with scientists from other countries contributed to the problem. Despite extensive training in languages and a well-developed system of translating books and technical magazines into Russian, the Soviet engineering corps did not have the international exposure and contacts essential today in high-technology research and development.

THE NUCLEAR FUTURE

The nuclear industry is of great immediate concern to Russia and the republics of the former Soviet Union, especially since the Russian government recently approved an ambitious nuclear power program. Due to the Chernobyl accident, no new nuclear power stations have yet been put into operation and many are being phased out. It will prove very difficult to handle existing facilities with the growing number of emerging sovereign and independent states. Some power stations are in areas of regional conflict. For example, after the Chernobyl explosion and the Spitack earthquake, the nuclear reactors in Armenia were closed down because they were considered too dangerous to operate in a seismically active area. All-out war is now raging in that country, cutting off gas and power supplies from Russia. Demands are now being made to reopen the nuclear power stations, but the dangers of operating reactors under such conditions seem obvious.

In other areas ethnic strife is rising, and rampant nationalism is leading to large-scale remigration of Russians, many of whom worked in and controlled the republics' nuclear industries. These enterprises cannot be transferred to local operators and authorities without grave risks to safety. The alternative—to run all nuclear stations from Moscow—is seen to be politically unpalatable. Recently the republics have agreed that local authorities will have

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the final word on building nuclear power stations, but it is unclear how they will reconcile political ambitions with high technology.

One policy that can and should be implemented on a long-term basis is to professionally develop the university system and the higher technical education establishment of all countries involved. The next generation must be educated and trained to handle these problems. Of the many issues facing Moscow, developing its educational system and opening Russia up to the world should be of the highest priority. Without sacrificing the existing and often good content of science and technology, research facilities will have to be reorganized, uniting science with teaching and using the fundamental scientific and cultural potential that still exists and is now so thoughtlessly squandered and scattered worldwide. The problems are great, but what is at stake is the security and future of the former Soviet Union, and indirectly the world.

The Soviet Union's nuclear energy program was heading for disaster with the fateful inevitability of a Greek tragedy. The final, terrible outcome was predestined to happen. Its roots lay deep in the social and conceptual fabric of Soviet civilization. This message is both painful and instructive, but it must be noted by all concerned, for the imminent disparities of the world today are fraught with the dangers, if not the disasters, of tomorrow.

Russia's fateful history of science and technology should provide instruction and warning to other countries, particularly those non-Western countries whose experience with nuclear technology is limited. In Europe, culture still means something, and the educational standards and the reputation of the engineering elite is high, probably even higher than in the United States. In France 70 percent of all electric power is nuclear. Although this might sound dangerously high from a purely technological point of view, France has a centuries-old tradition of scientific and professional culture dating back to the revolution and the Napoleonic era. This legacy is embodied in the Ecole Polytechnique, the breeding ground for the high echelons of the French establishment.

Many nuclear countries, however, have no such tradition, no such culture. If these governments believe that by putting into place administrative, technological and engineering mechanisms they can prevent nuclear disasters, let them take a hard look at the lessons of Chernobyl.

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The Post-Cold War Press

A New World Needs a New Journalism

Henry A. Grunwald

Journalists are in the same madly rocking boat as diplomats and statesmen. Like them, when the Cold War ended, they looked for a new world order and found a new world disorder. If making and conducting foreign policy in today's turbulent environment is difficult, so is practicing journalism.

At least one sector of the press is suffering from a serious case of obsolescence. With the defense industry, armed forces and the espionage business shrinking, many correspondents in the military/security field require difficult retraining in more relevant specialties. So do yesterday's Kremlinologists. Gone are the days when clues to Moscow politics could be read in the lineup atop Lenin's tomb and between the lines of the official press; when Kremlin intrigues, while shadowy, followed certain logical patterns. Now the Russian political scene is more open but chaotic, with most familiar signposts—left/right, radical/conservative, communist/nationalist—having lost most of their meaning.

But the problem is much larger. The press is faced with at least six new factors: history, geography, global optic, journalistic agenda, sensibility and audience.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

The new history is really ancient history newly discovered. Journalists are taking crash courses in the blood-drenched background of Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, North Ossetians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Two social scientists, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, recently maintained in *The New Republic* that the "ancient hatreds" constantly mentioned in reporting of strife from the Balkans to India are really new hatreds instilled by contemporary politicians. The argument is only partly convincing at best, but the writers have a point when they say that simply using the catchall label "ancient" is intellectually lazy. Like other Americans, U.S. journalists have often neglected the study of history; they have much remedial work to do in trying to understand who did what to whom, why and when—and

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

who did it first. Today's victimized Croatians were yesterday's fascist oppressors of the Serbs; today's brutal, rampaging Serbs see themselves as avengers for a Muslim invasion that began in 1389. These are among the more familiar instances of a process in which revenge is elevated to an all-embracing historical principle.

American history itself is not as remote from this condition as one might think. Understanding Woodrow Wilson's role in the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the end of World War I and the promotion of the double-edged concept of self-determination is pertinent to much of the evening news.

The new geography involves the republics of the Soviet Union and the remains of the former Yugoslavia. This new geography brings with it a fresh cast of characters. Such names as Stanislav Shushkevich, Askar Akayev, Mircea Ivan Snegur, Momir Bulatovic, Saparmurad Niyazov and Ratbek-haji Nysanbai-uly,[1] for instance, are still unfamiliar to most Americans, even to readers of *Foreign Affairs*. Just as the State Department must appoint ambassadors to many of these self-created states, the press must send correspondents. But for private-sector publishers and broadcasters, the financial strain is serious, the logistical problems horrendous. Many news organizations are forced to "parachute" correspondents into these places for stints of a few days or weeks, with the usual risk of superficiality that comes with quick reporting. Moreover, despite the sweep of democracy in former communist countries, there are stubborn rearguard actions against press freedom and access by politicians who do not understand—or understand only too

[1]The presidents of Belarus, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Montenegro and Turkmenistan, and the mufti of Kazakhstan.

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well—the role of independent journalism. Most major news organizations have actually coped well, given the difficulties and dangers. In a piece about covering the Balkan wars, a reporter for *The New Yorker* has described how "often we barely finish hiding one accreditation [press pass] when it is time to fish out a totally different one, and God help those who get them mixed up." In the fighting to date, 30 journalists have been killed in the former Yugoslavia.

NEW WORLD ANGLE

The new global optic results from the disappearance of the bipolar world. The conflict with communism prompted a great Western system of alliances; even the creation of the European Community was partly a defensive effort against communism. Among the first to see the difficulties arising from the absence of that unifying force was then–Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who in 1989 said almost wistfully that the Cold War, for all its risks, "was characterized by a remarkably stable and predictable set of relationships among the great powers." He might have been speaking as an editor.

The superpowers' prolonged confrontation furnished an organizing principle for analysis. Virtually every foreign policy move and world event, from a coup in Central America to cultural legislation in France, was to a great extent judged by its relation to the Cold War. Journalists often criticized this view as oversimple, but they usually followed it willy-nilly. The press is now searching for a different organizing principle—North-South tensions, religion versus secularism, nationalism versus internationalism. These formulations are accurate enough but none by itself offers a satisfactory pattern.

NEW WORD ORDER

The new agenda consists, first of all, of some long-familiar topics that have been transformed by events and must be treated with fresh insight. In economics, the new forces of the information society are sweeping across national boundaries and eroding sovereignty; they are also reshaping standard concepts, such as capital and labor, making much of the old economic vocabulary used by the press misleading. In the Third World, old patterns of reform, revolution and reaction have begun to change, and journalists are finding that the move toward free markets and democracy is complex and sometimes deceptive. (The "Third World," incidentally, urgently needs to be renamed, and not only because the "Second World" has collapsed. The inadequacy of a label covering everything from dysfunctional non-countries in Africa to emerging industrial powers in South America indicates a lack of press understanding and attention.)

Crucial among the newer topics journalism must address are tribalism and ethnic self-assertion, phenomena about which social scientists, let alone reporters, know little; likewise with religion, a subject most journalists have found unsettling ever since it wandered from the Sunday religion pages to the front page. Religious wars, large and small, seem increasingly likely in the decades ahead. *Time* magazine recently tied together in one cover package the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City by Muslim fundamentalists, the siege in Texas of a group of cultists whose leader apparently thought he was a messiah, and the conflict between Muslims and Christians in Bosnia. This link was legitimate but fragile, because these were very different manifestations of "religion."

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Not every Muslim fundamentalist wants to blow up New York City, and few Christian fundamentalists belong to cults ready for Armageddon. The press must discuss such distinctions knowledgeably and conscientiously.

The new sensibility is best understood if one recalls how the present period started, how the Soviet empire collapsed. The press by and large was surprised by these momentous events. So was practically everyone else, including, as far as we know, the CIA. Some critics of the press maintain that one significant reason journalists were unprepared is that they paid too much attention to governments and officials (especially former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, around whom the press built an extraordinary personality cult). They did not pay enough attention to "civil society"—the many forces and people who move events quite independently of governments. (The press made a similar mistake years ago in Iran when it concentrated on the shah and disgruntled intellectuals rather than on mullahs and bazaars.)

THE END OF JOURNALISM

The new sensibility will require avoiding such mistakes, which may not be as simple as it sounds. Professor Robert Karl Manoff, who heads the New York University Center for War, Peace and the News Media, invokes Hegel to underline this point. Hegel believed in Spirit as the driving force of history. The press as a whole, argues Manoff, is poorly equipped to deal with Spirit, having dwelled for too long on the State as the final arbiter of human affairs. What is needed now from the press is a form of self-consciousness through which the world can seize the new opportunities for freedom. A tall and perhaps impossible order for the press. Unlike historian Francis Fukuyama, who also noted the work of Hegel, Manoff does not proclaim the end of history, but the end of journalism (by which he means, one hopes, only journalism as we know it).

The new audience is new in the sense that its receptivity to news has changed. Americans, like most people, are not very interested in foreign affairs unless they perceive the national interest to be involved. The Cold War outlook could turn anything into an issue of national interest if communism was somehow implicated. That easy link is gone. As James Woolsey, the new director of the CIA, recently put it, the big dragon may have been slain, but the world is still full of poisonous snakes. How does the press explain where the snakes lurk and why they are dangerous? It will not be easy, unless there is an increase of blatantly hostile acts against the West, such as terrorism by groups from abroad.

Even so, how does the press relate national interest to more or less obscure civil wars in remote areas, to communal strife in India, corruption in Brazil, AIDS in Zaire or overpopulation worldwide? How does it make clear to the public (and to some of its own) that the old dividing line between foreign and domestic affairs is getting ever thinner? To the extent that it can be done at all, it will take all the skills of reporting, writing and reasoning, plus a few tricks of the trade usually described under the heading of "human interest."

That often means an appeal to terror and pity, the stuff of tragedy (and sensationalism). In an earlier era of satellite transmission, in 1977, correspondents Barbara Walters and Walter Cronkite each managed joint interviews with Israeli

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Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat; Sadat first made his historic offer to go to Jerusalem, if invited, while talking to Cronkite. Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce, a magazine editor and former U.S. ambassador, once observed that TV journalism was replacing diplomacy. That fact is even truer today, not necessarily through anything as conventional as interviews, but thanks to instantaneously transmitted images that now have even greater impact than they did during the Vietnam War.

It is the heartrending television pictures of starvation (the sort of pictures one never used to see from many other zones of famine and slaughter around the world) that helped persuade Americans to police the tribal wars and banditry in Somalia. The same phenomenon has led many sober people, including commentators who were certified doves until recently, to cry out for raining punishment down on the Serbs. This episode illustrates the tremendous and growing responsibility of the media in exercising their ability, often haphazardly used, to stir the emotions. The ability to stir reason, however, lags behind.

FREEDOM TO FAX

The press is up against another phenomenon that did not result from the end of the Cold War, but partly caused it. By wide consensus, a major reason for the Soviet Union's collapse was its inability to control information and insulate its people from outside messages and signals. Ideas and images were not delivered solely by the officially sanctioned Soviet outlets, but by daring people with fairly primitive technology, including mimeograph machines and telephones. Technology worldwide is getting less primitive and more widespread. The world has entered, it has been said, an age of terrorists with fax machines and guerrillas with software.

Something similar is happening in the United States. The forces of information are bursting through the conventional bounds, beyond the control of the established media. Ross Perot is, in a sense, a guerrilla with software. In last year's election campaign, he used the latest computer, telephone and electronic technology to assemble a vast organization in a stunningly short time. He transmitted his message through call-in radio and television shows, which are major new carriers of public anger and favor. If the "electronic town meeting" does not exist yet, it is certainly feasible, evoking the highly unsettling vision of instant referendums on every conceivable issue.

Americans will soon have cable systems with hundreds of channels, hungry for program fare. There will be many C-Span-like services bringing us constantly close to the action, including politics at every level. Telephone companies may get into the information business. The traditional media will lose even more of their role as mediators between events and the public. In short, the force that was instrumental in bringing down the Berlin Wall is likely to bring down many walls in our own society.

Amid this bewildering welter of communication, who will pay attention, to what and how carefully? The sifting of truth from falsehood, fact from propaganda, sentiment from argument will be even more difficult—and necessary—than before. It will not be the end of journalism, surely, but in many ways the beginning of a new one.

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Reining in the U.N.

Mistaking the Instrument for the Actor

Ernest W. Lefever

The United Nations is not and cannot be a political actor in a world of sovereign states. Despite the successful Persian Gulf War coalition, the humanitarian effort in Somalia and repeated calls for strengthening U.N. peacekeeping capability, the Security Council is no substitute for alliances, ad hoc Great Power coalitions or unilateral U.S. foreign policy initiatives. The United Nations on occasion may be a useful instrument to serve the parallel interests of the United States and other major powers in addressing specific crises. But this consequential difference between actor and instrument has been frequently confused, especially since the Cold War's end.

One should not be surprised if U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali considers the United Nations, indeed the position of secretary general itself, as an international actor with the power to make and maintain peace in troubled regions. Even critics of the United Nations often accept that U.N.-authorized troops may have an "international legitimacy" that allied or unilateral military actions do not. But both this modest claim and the more extravagant ones of the secretary general call for critical comment.

THE WRECKAGE OF WILSONIANISM

Both views must be seen against the backdrop of a persistent Wilsonian idealism that has been rejuvenated in the wake of the Security Council-blessed Gulf War. President Woodrow Wilson helped to usher in the idea of a League of Nations that sought to sanitize and order world politics. At the dawn of the United Nations in 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull predicted that "there will no longer be any need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power ... by which in the unhappy past the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."

But the long weekend between Versailles and Pearl Harbor was quickly littered with the whitened bones of failed expectations. The World Court was powerless to resolve disputes, and the 1928

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Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war did no better. The League could not stop Mussolini or Hitler or prevent Japan from rearming. The symbols and machinery of international cooperation were tragically irrelevant as the world was racked by tyranny, aggression and civil conflict. The juggernaut of war rolled on.

The fateful decisions of war and peace, tyranny and freedom, were made by the governments of sovereign states—usually unilaterally, sometimes in alliance with other states, and very rarely with the assistance or sanction of any international body. This fact was true of both the enemies of freedom and its defenders.

The secretary general has claimed that the United Nations "invented peacekeeping." But more often peace has been created and maintained by the decisions of independent states taken to curb turbulence or to deter expansionist powers. The decisions of the United States to enter the world wars were unilateral and contributed mightily to world peace. In World War II the U.S. effort, alongside that of its allies, led to the defeat of Hitler's Germany and of Japan. Five years later, President Truman's move to counter North Korean aggression was also unilateral. But due to a fluke—the Soviet delegate was absent from the Security Council—Truman's initiative received a retroactive U.N. fig leaf. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy acted unilaterally to have Soviet missiles withdrawn from Cuba, though he kept America's European and Latin American allies informed.

Even today the most consequential decisions are still made by the major powers. Internal factors aside, the downfall of the Soviet empire can be attributed in part to President Ronald Reagan's unilateral decision to deploy medium-range Pershing II missiles in Europe to counter Soviet SS-20s, and to pursue a space-based missile defense system. Those actions resulted not only in the eventual elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear weapons but also helped convince Mikhail Gorbachev that the U.S.S.R. could no longer compete militarily with the United States. Along with other unilateral actions, such as military aid to anticommunist forces in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, those decisions helped alter the "correlation of forces" that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of Soviet power in Eastern Europe.

JUDGING WHAT IS JUST

Whatever one may think of the Gulf War, it must ultimately be judged by what it accomplished and failed to accomplish and at what human and political cost, not by the fact that it was a U.S.-led coalition sanctioned and constrained by the Security Council. All military action, indeed all foreign policies, should be subjected to the traditional just war criteria: Is the intention just? Are the means just and proportional? And, if the effort succeeds, will the chances for justice and peace be enhanced?

Notwithstanding reservations about how President Bush conducted the Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition met these just war criteria. But this conclusion would have been equally valid if the United States had acted unilaterally or in concert with Britain, France and Saudi Arabia. To judge the morality of that military action by the number of allies or the imprimatur of the United Nations would be falling prey to the Orwellian slogan, "Two legs bad. Four legs good."

International action enjoys no special moral status over unilateral action. The

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twentieth century has seen many examples of destructive multinational behavior, from the League of Nations' flaccid and ineffectual effort to stop Mussolini's rape of Ethiopia in 1935, to the Warsaw Pact's crushing of the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Prague Spring in 1968. The number of actors is morally irrelevant. It is the intention and consequence of the action that counts.

Wilsonian idealists persist in attributing intrinsic merit to multinational action, an ideal rooted in the democratic concept of majority rule. That notion is quite appropriate for a democratic community that shares a common moral heritage and political culture. But a world of highly disparate states is neither democratic nor driven by common values. The actors are governments with different interests and expectations, and led by men with varying degrees of moral rectitude and political responsibility. Under a one-government one-vote scheme, Libya's Muammar Qadhafi and Zaïre's Mobutu Sese Seko would have an equal voice with the United States and Britain.

A unanimous Security Council vote authorizing measures to deal with a threat to or breach of the peace does not necessarily mean that these measures are right or just. Such a vote may reflect a temporary and fragile concurrence of interests, or far more serious, a least-common-denominator consensus that compromises or undercuts effective action.

The all but forgotten U.N. debacle in the Congo in 1960 is a good example of ineffectual multilateral policies and should stand as a timely warning to those calling for U.N. military intervention in the former Yugoslavia and other conflicts. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold had persuaded the Security Council to dispatch a peacekeeping force to quell the local mutiny of Congolese soldiers that occurred in the wake of independence from Belgium. But that conflict was no threat to neighboring states. The secretary general acted too hastily when Congolese politicians appealed to him and the United States for military assistance to frustrate alleged "colonialist machinations" by Belgium. As the Congo descended into chaos, there was no peace to keep, no line to be patrolled.

That four-year expeditionary force would soon become the largest U.N. peacekeeping operation in history, involving a total of 93,000 men and officers from 34 governments that provided 675,000 man-months of service. At its height the U.N. force numbered 20,000 troops, and the operation cost $411 million, of which the United States paid 42 percent. The U.N. intervention internationalized and prolonged a local conflict that could have been dealt with quickly by the prudent use of Belgian troops still in the country, with or without the political support of France, Britain or the United States—the very powers prohibited from sending troops by the Security Council.

The political and moral cost of the deeply flawed U.N. Congo mission stands in sharp contrast to the success and low cost of unilateral British intervention in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in 1964. The situations in both newly independent countries were strikingly similar. When two battalions of Tanganyikan soldiers mutinied against their British officers, President Julius Nyerere asked London for help. Five hundred Royal Marine commandos were sent in from Aden; order was quickly restored with the loss of only

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five men and a cost of a few thousand dollars. The British were invited, did their job and left promptly. Fortunately, the United Nations was not involved.

ACTING JUDICIOUSLY IN BOSNIA

How should the United States respond to those urging support for major U.N. peacekeeping operations? Certainly President Clinton should heed the lessons of the Congo and Tanganyika experiences, especially the risks of internationalizing a local crisis. Of course, each crisis is different and the extent of national interests will vary. In most cases the United States should act alone or with close allies. There may be a few crises where it is prudent for Washington to turn to the Security Council. It is no small matter for the United States to invest money, troops and prestige in an international effort in which it surrenders a measure of control. During the Gulf War, President Bush repeatedly invoked the constraints of Security Council resolutions to justify his military strategy.

Perhaps the greatest peril in relying on a U.N. sanction is the abdication of moral responsibility. There is no honorable way for the United States to turn over its foreign policy burdens to an international body, however appealing that may seem to those Americans who feel guilt over their power and wealth and think that somehow a U.N. fig leaf will sanctify the use of military force. But a sovereign state, like a free human being, is responsible for its actions.

When U.S. interests are clearly involved in a crisis—whether in the Middle East, Central Europe or Asia—and America has the necessary military assets and public support to act, it should act. On occasion, it may act in concert with allies who have parallel interests, but in rare instances, such as Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, the United States may seek support from other governments through the U.N. Security Council. America must recognize, however, that Saddam Hussein's attack was unique and had to be thrown back because it threatened vast oil reserves vital to this nation and its allies.

Looking over the turbulent global landscape, America, the only remaining superpower, faces agonizing choices. Americans are rightly concerned about starving people in Somalia, the Sudan and Ethiopia, and by the ethnic cleansing and genocide in the former Yugoslavia, to say nothing of a score of other conflicts where U.S. interests may be more directly threatened. Major economic problems at home cry out for attention. The nation is wealthy, powerful and influential, but not omnipotent. Consulting our conscience, our interests and our resources, we must use our power judiciously.

Taking into account all these factors and acknowledging the multitude of crises in a dangerous world, President Clinton faces difficult decisions in Bosnia. Americans cannot escape their moral heritage with its deep concern for freedom, justice and democracy here and abroad. External policies should seize every reasonable opportunity to nudge history in a humane direction. But, in the end, those urging America to launch a global crusade for democracy may well ponder the words of John Quincy Adams: "We are the friends of liberty everywhere, but the custodians only of our own."

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Essays



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Sarcophagus of Alexander, Late Fourth Century B.C.

"The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future."

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The Clash of Civilizations?

Samuel P. Huntington

THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT

WORLD POLITICS IS entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be—the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the conflicts of the Western world were largely among

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princes—emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology.

These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS

DURING THE COLD WAR the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.

What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, reli-

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gious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change.

Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China ("a civilization pretending to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall; they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are buried in the sands of time.

Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civi-

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lizations. In *A Study of History*, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.

WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH

CIVILIZATION IDENTITY will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.

> The conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating civilizations.

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans

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react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, "An Ibo may be ... an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian. In New York, he is an African." The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has remarked, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century." The revival of religion, "la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the

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people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity

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in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like that in Europe and North America.

Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed,

> Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China).... From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network—often based on extensions of the traditional clans—has been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy.[1]

Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization, founded originally in the 1960s by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central American Common Market and Mercosur rest

[1]Murray Weidenbaum, *Greater China: The Next Economic Superpower?*, St. Louis: Washington University Center for the Study of American Business, Contemporary Issues, Series 57, February 1993, pp. 2-3.

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on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.

As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore. Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS

THE FAULT LINES between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity

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

Source: W. Wallace, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN EUROPE. London: Pinter, 1990.
Map by Ib Ohlsson for FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experiences of European history—feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution; they are generally economically better off than the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems. The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much

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less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict.

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East.

After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (created by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956; American forces went into Lebanon in 1958; subsequently American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle Eastern governments, employed the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations and seized Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."

This centuries-old military interaction between the West and

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Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.

Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab countries, particularly in North Africa, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe toward minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened political sensitivities with respect to this development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is increasingly open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish migrants have become more intense and more widespread since 1990.

On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. The West's "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion:

> We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.[2]

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[2]Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 266, September 1990, p. 60; *Time*, June 15, 1992, pp. 24-28.

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Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian black peoples to the south. In the past, this antagonism was epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul II's speech in Khartoum in February 1993 attacking the actions of the Sudan's Islamist government against the Christian minority there.

On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted between Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo, the simmering violence between Serb and Albanian, the tenuous relations between Bulgarians and their Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and Ingush, the unremitting slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris, the tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and the deployment of Russian troops to protect Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their southern borders. This concern is well captured by Archie Roosevelt:

> Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between the Slavs and the Turkic peoples on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long confrontation with their eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding not only of Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries.[3]

The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent

[3]Archie Roosevelt, *For Lust of Knowing*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1988, pp. 332-333.

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manifests itself now not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's substantial Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In East Asia, China has outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has pursued a ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of Tibet, and it is pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy toward its Turkic-Muslim minority. With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate. A "new cold war," Deng Xaioping reportedly asserted in 1991, is under way between China and America.

The crescent-shaped Islamic bloc, from the bulge of Africa to central Asia, has bloody borders.

The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, but at least on the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be more different. The economic issues between the United States and Europe are no less serious than those between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the same political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between American culture and European culture are so much less than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.

The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which they are likely to be characterized by violence. Economic competition clearly predominates between the American and European subcivilizations of the West and between both of them and Japan. On the Eurasian continent, however, the proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing," has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and most violent between groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia the great historic fault

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lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.

CIVILIZATION RALLYING: THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME

GROUPS OR STATES belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization. As the post-Cold War world evolves, civilization commonality, what H. D. S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome, is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can be seen gradually emerging in the post-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilizational rallying, which seemed to become more important as the conflict continued and which may provide a foretaste of the future.

First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then fought a coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While only a few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many Arab elites privately cheered him on, and he was highly popular among large sections of the Arab publics. Islamic fundamentalist movements universally supported Iraq rather than the Western-backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Forswearing Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal. He and his supporters attempted to define the war as a war between civilizations. "It is not the world against Iraq," as Safar Al-Hawali, dean of Islamic Studies at the Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca, put it in a widely circulated tape. "It is the West against Islam." Ignoring the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for a holy war against the West: "The struggle against American aggression, greed, plans and

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policies will be counted as a jihad, and anybody who is killed on that path is a martyr." "This is a war," King Hussein of Jordan argued, "against all Arabs and all Muslims and not against Iraq alone."

The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publics behind Saddam Hussein caused those Arab governments in the anti-Iraq coalition to moderate their activities and temper their public statements. Arab governments opposed or distanced themselves from subsequent Western efforts to apply pressure on Iraq, including enforcement of a no-fly zone in the summer of 1992 and the bombing of Iraq in January 1993. The Western-Soviet-Turkish-Arab anti-Iraq coalition of 1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost only the West and Kuwait against Iraq.

Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with the West's failure to protect Bosnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on Israel for violating U.N. resolutions. The West, they alleged, was using a double standard. A world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.

Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Armenian military successes in 1992 and 1993 stimulated Turkey to become increasingly supportive of its religious, ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan. "We have a Turkish nation feeling the same sentiments as the Azerbaijanis," said one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities and are asking us if we are still serious about pursuing our neutral policy. Maybe we should show Armenia that there's a big Turkey in the region." President Turgut Özal agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the Armenians a little bit." Turkey, Özal threatened again in 1993, would "show its fangs." Turkish Air Force jets flew reconnaissance flights along the Armenian border; Turkey suspended food shipments and air flights to Armenia; and Turkey and Iran announced they would not accept dismemberment of Azerbaijan. In the last years of its existence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan because its government was dominated by former communists. With the end of the Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way to religious

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ones. Russian troops fought on the side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan accused the "Russian government of turning 180 degrees" toward support for Christian Armenia.

Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed, however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation in the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav breakup, Germany, in an unusual display of diplomatic initiative and muscle, induced the other 11 members of the European Community to follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the pope's determination to provide strong backing to the two Catholic countries, the Vatican extended recognition even before the Community did. The United States followed the European lead. Thus the leading actors in Western civilization rallied behind their coreligionists. Subsequently Croatia was reported to be receiving substantial quantities of arms from Central European and other Western countries. Boris Yeltsin's government, on the other hand, attempted to pursue a middle course that would be sympathetic to the Orthodox Serbs but not alienate Russia from the West. Russian conservative and nationalist groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the government for not being more forthcoming in its support for the Serbs. By early 1993 several hundred Russians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia.

Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the West for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims from all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, Iran supplied weapons and men for the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese groups sent guerrillas to train and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were reported to be fighting in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other countries felt under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies to provide more vigorous support for the Bosnians. By the

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end of 1992, Saudi Arabia had reportedly supplied substantial funding for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, which significantly increased their military capabilities vis-à-vis the Serbs.

In the 1930s the Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from countries that politically were fascist, communist and democratic. In the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict is provoking intervention from countries that are Muslim, Orthodox and Western Christian. The parallel has not gone unnoticed. "The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those who died there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."

Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur. In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainians.

Civilization rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential to spread much further. As the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders and the media have found it a potent means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments. In the coming years, the

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local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.

THE WEST VERSUS THE REST

THE WEST IS NOW at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It dominates international political and security institutions and with Japan international economic institutions. Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan, all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other to the exclusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries. Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing "the Free World") to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.[4] Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. In any poll of non-Western peoples, the IMF undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others, but get an overwhelmingly unfavorable rating from just about everyone else, who would agree

[4]Almost invariably Western leaders claim they are acting on behalf of "the world community." One minor lapse occurred during the run-up to the Gulf War. In an interview on "Good Morning America," Dec. 21, 1990, British Prime Minister John Major referred to the actions "the West" was taking against Saddam Hussein. He quickly corrected himself and subsequently referred to "the world community." He was, however, right when he erred.

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with Georgy Arbatov's characterization of IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks who love expropriating other people's money, imposing undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political conduct and stifling economic freedom."

Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its decisions, tempered only by occasional abstention by China, produced U.N. legitimation of the West's use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and its elimination of Iraq's sophisticated weapons and capacity to produce such weapons. It also produced the quite unprecedented action by the United States, Britain and France in getting the Security Council to demand that Libya hand over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and then to impose sanctions when Libya refused. After defeating the largest Arab army, the West did not hesitate to throw its weight around in the Arab world. The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values.

The very phrase "world community" has become a euphemism to give legitimacy to the actions of the West.

That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new world, and there is a significant element of truth in their view. Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S. Naipaul has argued that Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men." At a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction

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

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against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could be a "universal civilization" is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another. Indeed, the author of a review of 100 comparative studies of values in different societies concluded that "the values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide."[5] In the political realm, of course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the United States and other Western powers to induce other peoples to adopt Western ideas concerning democracy and human rights. Modern democratic government originated in the West. When it has developed in non-Western societies it has usually been the product of Western colonialism or imposition.

The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore Mahbubani's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values.[6] Those responses generally take one or a combination of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or "corruption" by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western-dominated global community. The costs of this course, however, are high, and few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equivalent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, is to attempt to join the West and accept its values and institutions. The third alternative is to attempt to "balance" the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short, to modernize but not to Westernize.

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[5]Harry C. Triandis, *The New York Times*, Dec. 25, 1990, p. 41, and "Cross-Cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism," Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, vol. 37, 1989, pp. 41-133.

[6]Kishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest," *The National Interest*, Summer 1992, pp. 3-13.

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THE TORN COUNTRIES

IN THE FUTURE, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another. These are torn countries. Their leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make their countries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypical torn country is Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Attatürk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War; they applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. In addition, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey as such. Turkey will not become a member of the European Community, and the real reason, as President Özal said, "is that we are Muslim and they are Christian and they don't say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous efforts to carve out this new identity for itself.

During the past decade Mexico has assumed a position somewhat similar to that of Turkey. Just as Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and attempted to join Europe, Mexico has stopped defining itself by its opposition to the United States and is instead attempting to imitate the United States and to join it in the North American Free Trade Area. Mexican leaders are engaged in the great task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fundamen-

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tal economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental political change. In 1991 a top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari described at length to me all the changes the Salinas government was making. When he finished, I remarked: "That's most impressive. It seems to me that basically you want to change Mexico from a Latin American country into a North American country." He looked at me with surprise and exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely what we are trying to do, but of course we could never say so publicly." As his remark indicates, in Mexico as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity. In Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to Islam (Özal's pilgrimage to Mecca); so also Mexico's North American-oriented leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico to be a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara summit).

Historically Turkey has been the most profoundly torn country. For the United States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country. Globally the most important torn country is Russia. The question of whether Russia is part of the West or the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization has been a recurring one in Russian history. That issue was obscured by the communist victory in Russia, which imported a Western ideology, adapted it to Russian conditions and then challenged the West in the name of that ideology. The dominance of communism shut off the historic debate over Westernization versus Russification. With communism discredited Russians once again face that question.

President Yeltsin is adopting Western principles and goals and seeking to make Russia a "normal" country and a part of the West. Yet both the Russian elite and the Russian public are divided on this issue. Among the more moderate dissenters, Sergei Stankevich argues that Russia should reject the "Atlanticist" course, which would lead it "to become European, to become a part of the world economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of the Seven, and to put particular emphasis on Germany and the United States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." While also rejecting an exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless

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argues that Russia should give priority to the protection of Russians in other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections, and promote "an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our options, our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern direction." People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinating Russia's interests to those of the West, for reducing Russian military strength, for failing to support traditional friends such as Serbia, and for pushing economic and political reform in ways injurious to the Russian people. Indicative of this trend is the new popularity of the ideas of Petr Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a unique Eurasian civilization.[7] More extreme dissidents voice much more blatantly nationalist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and urge Russia to redevelop its military strength and to establish closer ties with China and Muslim countries. The people of Russia are as divided as the elite. An opinion survey in European Russia in the spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positive attitudes toward the West and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it has been for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s is truly a torn country.

To redefine its civilization identity, a torn country must meet three requirements. First, its political and economic elite has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to be willing to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to be willing to embrace the convert. All three requirements in large part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in large part exist with respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with respect to Russia's joining the West. The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could have quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually

[7]Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," *The National Interest*, Summer 1992, pp. 47-51; Daniel Schneider, "A Russian Movement Rejects Western Tilt," *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 5, 1993, pp. 5-7.

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impossible for him to do that with a Russian traditionalist. If, as the Russians stop behaving like Marxists, they reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like Russians but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West could again become distant and conflictual.[8]

THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION

THE OBSTACLES TO non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably. They are least for Latin American and East European countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions. Those countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or cannot, join the West compete with the West by developing their own economic, military and political power. They do this by promoting their internal development and by cooperating with other non-Western countries. The most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power.

Almost without exception, Western countries are reducing their military power; under Yeltsin's leadership so also is Russia. China, North Korea and several Middle Eastern states, however, are significantly expanding their military capabilities. They are doing this by the import of arms from Western and non-Western sources and by the development of indigenous arms industries. One result is the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called "Weapon

[8]Owen Harries has pointed out that Australia is trying (unwisely in his view) to become a torn country in reverse. Although it has been a full member not only of the West but also of the ABCA military and intelligence core of the West, its current leaders are in effect proposing that it defect from the West, redefine itself as an Asian country and cultivate close ties with its neighbors. Australia's future, they argue, is with the dynamic economies of East Asia. But, as I have suggested, close economic cooperation normally requires a common cultural base. In addition, none of the three conditions necessary for a torn country to join another civilization is likely to exist in Australia's case.

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States," and the Weapon States are not Western states. Another result is the redefinition of arms control, which is a Western concept and a Western goal. During the Cold War the primary purpose of arms control was to establish a stable military balance between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts to do this through international agreements, economic pressure and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.

The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal. The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The attention of the West focuses, naturally, on nations that are actually or potentially hostile to the West.

A Confucian-Islamic connection has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power.

The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert their right to acquire and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. They also have absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the Indian defense minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf War: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously, as the potential equalizer of superior Western conventional power. China, of course, already has nuclear weapons; Pakistan and India have the capability to deploy them. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be attempting to acquire them. A top Iranian official has declared that all Muslim states should acquire nuclear weapons, and in 1988 the president of

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Iran reportedly issued a directive calling for development of "offensive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons."

Centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of China's military power and its means to create military power. Buoyed by spectacular economic development, China is rapidly increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed forces. It is purchasing weapons from the former Soviet states; it is developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested a one-megaton nuclear device. It is developing power-projection capabilities, acquiring aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft carrier. Its military buildup and assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea are provoking a multilateral regional arms race in East Asia. China is also a major exporter of arms and weapons technology. It has exported materials to Libya and Iraq that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas. It has helped Algeria build a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production. China has sold to Iran nuclear technology that American officials believe could only be used to create weapons and apparently has shipped components of 300-mile-range missiles to Pakistan. North Korea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while and has sold advanced missiles and missile technology to Syria and Iran. The flow of weapons and weapons technology is generally from East Asia to the Middle East. There is, however, some movement in the reverse direction; China has received Stinger missiles from Pakistan.

A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military power of the West. It may or may not last. At present, however, it is, as Dave McCurdy has said, "a renegades' mutual support pact, run by the proliferators and their backers." A new form of arms competition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the West. In an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form of arms competition, one side is developing its arms and the other

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side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up while at the same time reducing its own military capabilities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

THIS ARTICLE DOES not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization will not conflict with and even fight each other. This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest"; the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.

This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be like. If these are plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider their implications for Western policy. These implications should be divided between short-term advantage and long-term accommodation. In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civi-

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lization, particularly between its European and North American components; to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.

In the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.

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Debate

The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent

John J. Mearsheimer

THE LOGIC OF PROLIFERATION

MOST WESTERN OBSERVERS want Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. In this view, articulated recently by President Bill Clinton, Europe would be more stable if Russia were to become "the only nuclear-armed successor state to the Soviet Union." The United States and its European allies have been pressing Ukraine to transfer all of the nuclear weapons on its territory to the Russians, who naturally think this is an excellent idea.

President Clinton is wrong. The conventional wisdom about Ukraine's nuclear weapons is wrong. In fact, as soon as it declared independence, Ukraine should have been quietly encouraged to fashion its own nuclear deterrent. Even now, pressing Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state is a mistake.

A nuclear Ukraine makes sense for two reasons. First, it is imperative to maintain peace between Russia and Ukraine. That means ensuring that the Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it. Ukraine cannot defend itself against a nuclear-armed Russia with conventional weapons, and no

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state, including the United States, is going to extend to it a meaningful security guarantee. Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to Russian aggression. If the U.S. aim is to enhance stability in Europe, the case against a nuclear-armed Ukraine is unpersuasive.

Second, it is unlikely that Ukraine will transfer its remaining nuclear weapons to Russia, the state it fears most. The United States and its European allies can complain bitterly about this decision, but they are not in a position to force Ukraine to go nonnuclear. Moreover, pursuing a confrontation with Ukraine over the nuclear issue raises the risks of war by making the Russians more daring, the Ukrainians more fearful, and the Americans less able to defuse a crisis between them.

The case presented here for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent is not a brief for unrestricted nuclear proliferation in Europe or anywhere else in the world. Nuclear proliferation does not axiomatically promote peace and can in some cases even cause war. For example, smaller European powers might lack the resources needed to make their nuclear force survivable, and vulnerable nuclear forces would invite a first strike in a crisis. Moreover, widespread proliferation would increase the number of fingers on the nuclear trigger, which in turn would increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons could be fired due to accident, unauthorized use, terrorist seizure or irrational decision-making.

Nevertheless, nuclear proliferation sometimes promotes peace. Overall, the best formula for maintaining stability in post-Cold War Europe is for all the great powers—including Germany and Ukraine—to have secure nuclear deterrents and for all the minor powers to be nonnuclear.

WHO CONTROLS THE WEAPONS?

THE BREAKUP OF the Soviet Union left Ukraine with almost 4,000 nuclear weapons on its territory. Ukrainian leaders emphasized before and immediately after Ukraine declared its independence on December 1, 1991, that Ukraine would transfer all of its nuclear

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weapons to Russia by the end of 1994, sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and live the life of a nonnuclear state.

True to its word, Ukraine moved all of its tactical nuclear weapons to Russia between January and May 1992. However, none of Ukraine's 1,656 strategic nuclear weapons have been transferred to Russia. That force, which is aimed at the United States but could be programmed to strike Russia, includes 130 SS-19s (6 warheads each), 46 SS-24s (10 warheads each), and 30 Bear-H and Blackjack bombers (together carrying 416 bombs), making a total of 1,656 nuclear weapons.

Who actually controls these nuclear weapons is a complicated and somewhat murky matter. Russia and Ukraine each claim administrative responsibility over the weapons. Ukraine apparently has administrative jurisdiction, which means it is responsible for protecting and maintaining the weapons. Russian experts, however, help service them. Ukraine supposedly has neither the authority nor the capability to launch the nuclear weapons it houses. The Commonwealth of Independent States makes those decisions, although Ukraine has the authority but not the capability to veto a launch decision.

There is evidence to suggest, however, that Ukraine might have ultimate control over the bombers. Also, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has hinted that his country has the ability to fire its SS-24s, which were built in Ukraine. Finally, Kiev is developing a command and control system of its own that could be used to launch the weapons without Moscow's permission. If Ukraine were to abandon its commitment to denuclearize and instead keep the strategic nuclear arsenal located on its soil—as seems increasingly likely—it would have the third-largest nuclear force in the world, behind the formidable American and Russian forces.

WHY RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN PEACE IS IMPORTANT

A WAR BETWEEN Russia and Ukraine would be a disaster. Great power wars are very costly and dangerous, causing massive loss of life and worldwide turmoil, and possibly spreading to involve other countries. The likely result of that war—Russia's reconquest of

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Ukraine—would injure prospects for peace throughout Europe. It would increase the danger of a Russian-German collision, and sharply intensify the security competition across the continent.

A conventional war between Russia and Ukraine would entail vast military casualties and the possible murder of many thousands of civilians. Russians and Ukrainians have a history of mutual enmity; this hostility, combined with the intermixing of their populations, raises the possibility that war between them could entail Bosnian-style ethnic cleansing and mass murder. This war could produce millions of refugees clamoring at the borders of Western Europe.

In addition, there are 14 operational nuclear reactors in Ukraine that might produce new Chernobyls if left unattended or attacked during a conventional war. The consequences of such a war would dwarf the death and suffering in the Balkans, where more than 50,000 people have died since the summer of 1991. Needless to say, if nuclear weapons were used the costs would be immeasurable.

There is also the threat of escalation beyond the borders of Russia and Ukraine. For example, the Russians might decide to reconquer other parts of the former Soviet Union in the midst of a war, or might try to take back some of Eastern Europe. Poland and Belarus might join forces with Russia against Ukraine or gang up with Ukraine to prevent a Russian resurgence. The Germans, Americans or Chinese could get pulled in by their fear of a Russian victory. (Doubters should remember that the United States had no intention of fighting in Europe when war broke out in 1914 and again in 1939.) Finally, nuclear weapons might be used accidentally or purposefully against a third state.

Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to Russian aggression.

The security environment in Europe would certainly become heated and competitive in the wake of a Russian war with Ukraine. Other great powers would move quickly and sharply to contain further Russian expansion. The Russians would then think seriously—for security reasons—about controlling their many smaller neighbors. Other great powers would move to check them.

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One might expect the burden of deterring a resurgent Russia to fall to an American-dominated NATO, in effect, bringing back the Cold War order that kept Europe at peace for 45 years. That outcome is not likely, however, for a number of reasons. The United States is reducing force levels in Europe significantly, which will cause it to lose much of its leverage on the continent. Even if Russia behaves aggressively, U.S. troops are not likely to return to Europe in large numbers, mainly because the Germans are capable of bearing most of the burden of checking the Russians. The Germans are well-located geographically to counter Russian expansion, and they are strong enough to do so. Germany not only has a powerful economy, but its population has just increased by almost 20 million. Russia, even with the conquest of Ukraine, would probably be markedly less powerful than the former Soviet Union.

A multipolar Europe with a German-Russian security competition at its core might be inevitable, regardless of Ukraine's fate. Germany and Russia will probably be the two most powerful states in post-Cold War Europe. Nevertheless, an independent Ukraine dampens that competition because it is a formidable barrier between Russia and Germany. Remove that key buffer, however, and the borders of the two most powerful states on the continent would be much closer to each other, with the territory in between occupied by weak states. An intense political rivalry focused on this new buffer zone would probably result.

WHY RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT IS LIKELY

DESPITE SOME TESTY moments, relations between Russia and Ukraine have generally been stable since the Soviet breakup. There are, however, good reasons to fear that these relations might deteriorate. First, the situation between Ukraine and Russia is ripe for the outbreak of security competition between them. Great powers that share a long and unprotected common border, like that between Russia and Ukraine, often lapse into competition driven by security fears. Russia and Ukraine might overcome this dynamic and learn to live together in harmony, but it would be unusual if they do.

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Second, there is the danger of hypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly. Expressions of Russian and Ukrainian nationalism have been largely benign since the Soviet collapse, and there have been few manifestations of communal hatred on either side. Nevertheless, the Russians and the Ukrainians neither like nor trust each other. The grim history that has passed between these two peoples provides explosive material that could ignite conflict between them.

Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this relationship: Stalin's government murdered an astounding 12 million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian" government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast suffering under Bolshevism. Against this explosive psychological backdrop, small disputes could trigger an outbreak of hypernationalism on either side.

Third, several such disputes are already on the horizon: ownership of the Black Sea Fleet, control of the Crimea, ownership of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, and a host of economic issues stemming from the breakup of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, many Russians would change the present border with Ukraine, and some even reject the idea of an independent Ukraine. Senior Russian officials, for example, have recently been describing Ukraine's independence as a "transitional" phenomenon and have been warning other European governments not to open embassies in Kiev because they would soon be downgraded to consular sections subordinate to their embassies in Moscow.[1]

Fourth, there is the problem of mixed populations. Roughly 11.5 million Russians live in Ukraine (comprising 22 percent of Ukraine's

[1]Chrystia Freeland, "Russia 'Trying' To Isolate Ukraine," *The Financial Times*, March 17, 1993, p. 2.

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population) and approximately 4.5 million Ukrainians live in Russia. Abuse of either minority by the local majority could be a flash point for crisis.

WHY THE ALTERNATIVES WILL NOT WORK

To deter Russian aggression in a future crisis, Ukraine might consider developing a conventional deterrent, or asking the West to extend it a security guarantee. These alternatives, however, are not feasible.

A Ukrainian conventional deterrent is not a viable option because Ukraine cannot build an army powerful enough to stop a Russian attack. Ukraine's army might put up dogged resistance, but it would eventually be defeated. Russia is simply too powerful. The best indicators of latent military power—population, gross national product, industrial output—show Russia to be about three times more powerful than Ukraine. Even if Ukraine had a stalwart conventional deterrent, a nuclear-free Ukraine would still be vulnerable to Russian nuclear blackmail.

Finally, Ukraine would have to ruthlessly extract resources from its society if it tried to compete with its bigger neighbor at the conventional level. Conventional military power is significantly more expensive than nuclear military power and requires a larger military; hence it requires far more popular mobilization. Reliance on conventional forces would therefore tempt Ukrainian leaders to portray the Russian threat in the worst possible light and fan the flames of nationalism, which could heighten friction between Ukrainians and the large Russian population living in Ukraine. This development would upset the Russians and push them to consider military intervention to protect their fellow Russians.

A security guarantee from the West is theoretically possible but not a practical strategy for maintaining Ukrainian sovereignty. Extending deterrence to Germany during the Cold War was a demanding and expensive job; extending deterrence further east to Ukraine would be even more difficult. Neither America nor its European allies are eager to take on an expensive new commitment;

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on the contrary, NATO's power is shrinking rapidly. Political will aside, extending NATO's security umbrella into the heart of the old Soviet Union is not wise. It is sure to enrage the Russians and cause them to act belligerently.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE ANSWER

VILIFYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS is a fashionable sport in the West. Many believe they are a major source of tension between states and that their deterrent value is quite limited. Given these beliefs and the horrible consequences of nuclear war, it is hardly surprising that many people want to rid the world of these weapons.

This view of nuclear weapons is simplistic and flies in the face of the inherent logic of nuclear deterrence, as well as the history of the Cold War. In fact, nuclear weapons often diminish international violence, and Ukrainian nuclear weapons would be an effective deterrent against a Russian conventional attack or nuclear blackmail.

In the pre-nuclear world of industrialized great powers, there were two world wars between 1900 and 1945 in which some 50 million Europeans died. In the nuclear age, the story is very different. Only some 15,000 Europeans were killed in minor wars between 1945 and 1990, and there was a stable peace between the superpowers that became increasingly robust over time. A principal cause of this "long peace" was nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are a powerful force for peace because they are weapons of mass destruction. They create the possibility that in a war both sides will cease to exist as functioning societies. This catastrophic threat will foreclose any Russian thoughts of aggression against Ukraine, since a defeated Ukraine could well use its nuclear weapons against Russia before going under. Defeat for Ukraine at the hands of the Russians would mean loss of sovereignty, and history makes clear that states will pay very high costs to maintain it. Hence an aggressive Russia could not dismiss the Ukrainian nuclear threat. Moreover, there is always the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used inadvertently or accidentally in the course of a conventional war, which provides further incentives for caution.

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There is a second reason to favor a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent: it is inevitable. Ukraine is likely to keep its nuclear weapons, regardless of what other states say and do. American opposition would raise the risk of war between Russia and Ukraine.

Ukraine has suffered greatly at the hands of outside occupiers. After Stalin's murder of 12 million in the 1930s, the Germans killed another 7 million Ukrainians during World War II. This dark history, plus a Russian threat next door and the absence of outsiders willing to deter that threat, makes it unlikely that Ukraine would give up its nuclear weapons. Reflecting this reality, pronuclear sentiment is already growing rapidly in Ukraine. America and its allies may complain about Ukraine's new posture, but they would not have to live with the consequences of a Russian attack if deterrence fails.

Once the Russians learn that Ukraine is keeping its nuclear arsenal, they will doubtless consider launching a preventive war to eliminate it before it becomes fully operational. But this is an unattractive military option. It would be a difficult task with conventional means, since Ukraine inherited substantial conventional forces from the Soviet military, which would enable it to put up formidable resistance. The Russians might launch a nuclear strike against the Ukrainian arsenal. The probability of Ukrainian nuclear retaliation would be small, but the Russians could never be sure that Ukraine would not launch some nuclear weapons back at them, causing cataclysmic damage, even if the retaliation was ragged. Also, radioactive fallout from an attack on Ukraine would contaminate Russia as well.

There were two world wars between 1900 and 1945 in which some 50 million Europeans died; only 15,000 were killed in minor wars between 1945 and 1990.

Thus military calculations alone should suffice to deter the Russians from launching a preventive war. Nevertheless, it is important that every element in the deterrent equation work to prevent war from breaking out. Strong American and European resistance to Ukraine's decision to be a nuclear state is likely to isolate Ukraine diplomatically and weaken deterrence.

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An American-Ukrainian confrontation over Ukrainian nuclear weapons could encourage the Russians to believe that they could destroy those weapons by force without doing much long-term damage to Russian relations with the West. Russians who favored such an attack could point to recent history to bolster their argument: the United States tolerated the Israeli raid against the Iraqi nuclear facilities in 1981, and then went to war itself against Iraq in 1991 over this very issue. These cases may suggest to the Russians that the United States would not strongly oppose Russia if it adopts the same course of action against Ukraine.

Furthermore, an isolated and fearful Ukraine is likely to be especially suspicious of and hostile to the Russians in a crisis. This can only work to fuel Russian fears and thus make war more likely. Finally, American efforts to compel Ukraine to yield its nuclear weapons would leave Ukraine resentful and mistrustful of the United States. As a result, America would be less able to defuse a Russian-Ukrainian crisis, since Ukraine would no longer see the United States as an honest broker.

THE CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

FOUR PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS might be raised against Ukraine keeping its nuclear arsenal.

First, a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent will cause proliferation, especially in Europe, and undermine both the NPT and the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction (START) agreements.

Second, Ukraine has neither the technical, intellectual, nor political wherewithal to be trusted with nuclear weapons.

Third, Russia will react aggressively toward Ukraine if Ukraine keeps its nuclear arsenal, thus increasing the likelihood of war.

And fourth, there is a small but reasonable chance that nuclear war might occur. That possibility is so frightening that it makes sense to forsake a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent, even though it means a greater likelihood of conventional war between Russia and Ukraine.

These arguments cannot be summarily dismissed. They sound intuitively plausible, and there is no fatal flaw common to all of them.

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Instead, the logic underpinning each one must be unpacked and matched against the appropriate counterargument to demonstrate why the case against a nuclear Ukraine is unpersuasive.

INCREASED PROLIFERATION

A UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR deterrent might be thought to cause proliferation in four ways. First, it could be argued that other states might imitate Ukraine, because nuclear weapons confer status. It is true that status does matter in the international system and that nuclear weapons enhance a state's status somewhat. Status concerns, however, are not the main cause of proliferation. Insecurity is the driving force behind national security policy, and highly insecure states are the most likely to acquire nuclear weapons.

Second, there is a concern that Ukraine would be the first state to go nuclear in the post-Cold War world, thus legitimizing nuclear arsenals as a military strategy for other nonnuclear states. This argument about precedent would have been moot if the United States had not labeled Ukraine a new nuclear state, and instead accepted that it, like Russia, was a legitimate heir to the Soviet arsenal. More important, insecure nonnuclear states do not need the Ukrainian case to enlighten them about the benefits of nuclear deterrence or to justify a decision to go nuclear. The simple desire to survive in this precarious world will suffice.

Third, people fear that a nuclear-armed Ukraine would make other states in Europe, especially Poland and Germany, feel insecure and push them to acquire nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, proliferation was driven in good part by this logic. For example, the Soviets surely felt threatened by America's nuclear deterrent, while the Chinese were undoubtedly motivated by both the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals. It is not clear, however, that a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent would push Poland and Germany to go nuclear. In fact, Ukrainian nuclear weapons might dampen the incentives for proliferation in Europe.

A nuclear-armed Ukraine is not likely to pursue expansionist policies to its west. While there is no love lost between Poland and

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International Monetary Fund announces

World Economic Outlook: May 1993



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Ukraine, neither Germany nor Russia would look kindly on Ukrainian pressure against Poland. Ukraine's military is likely to be pointed overwhelmingly in one direction: eastward at the Russians. The event most likely to scare the Poles and Germans enough to acquire nuclear weapons would be Russian reconquest of Ukraine. That possibility is much less likely if Russia is facing a nuclear-armed Ukraine. Insecurity above all else will drive the Poles and Germans down the nuclear road, and, on balance, they are likely to feel safer with the present map of Europe than one with a greater Russia.

Fourth, arms controllers argue that the NPT would be crippled if Ukraine keeps its nuclear arsenal, and the START agreements would have to be abandoned. They may be right, but their argument is irrelevant. The United States should continue to support the NPT, but it must recognize that the agreement will come under increasing stress in the post-Cold War world. The international system's new architecture creates powerful incentives to proliferate. A nuclear Ukraine will corrode the legitimacy of the NPT, but this damage can be limited if the United States reverses its 1991 policy of labeling Ukraine a potential proliferator and instead redefines Ukraine as a nuclear inheritor, and hence a special case. Regardless, preventing war between Russia and Ukraine is more impotant than preserving the NPT. The START treaties are vestiges of the Cold War order. If a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent threatens them, they should be renegotiated to accommodate a nuclear Ukraine. After all, America's ultimate goal is to create peace and stability in Europe, not ratify arms control agreements for their own sake, especially those created for another time.

Preventing war between Russia and Ukraine is more important than preserving the Nonproliferation Treaty.

UKRAINE'S INCOMPETENCE

THE FIRST STRAND of the "incompetence" argument is that Ukraine does not have the wherewithal to develop and maintain a secure retaliatory force. Thus, the Russians would be tempted to launch a disarming first strike in a crisis against Ukraine.

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But while the precise details of the future nuclear balance between Russia and Ukraine cannot now be foreseen, it seems unlikely that the Russians can develop a disarming first-strike capability against Ukraine. Decapitating Ukraine's command and control system would be extremely difficult, and could be made even more so if Ukraine pre-delegated control away from the center. A direct attack against Ukraine's intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers would be no more promising.

Consider a Russian first strike against the existing Ukrainian nuclear arsenal predicated on worst-case assumptions for Ukraine. Assume the Russians achieve complete surprise and destroy all of Ukraine's bombers and 90 percent of its 176 ICBMs.[2] Ukraine would be left with 18 ICBMs—13 SS-19s and 5 SS-24s. These missiles contain 128 nuclear warheads, which should be more than enough to wreak vast destruction on Russia. Even if only 10 percent or 13 of those warheads reached Russian cities, they would leave Russia devastated. More realistic assumptions about the effectiveness of a Russian attack would leave Ukraine even more warheads with which to strike Russia. In addition, Ukraine can enhance the survivability of its nuclear deterrent over time.

The second strand of the incompetence argument is that even if Ukraine builds a survivable retaliatory force, it cannot be trusted to be a responsible nuclear weapons custodian. Its elites are not likely to grasp the essentials of national security policy, much less the nuances of nuclear deterrence theory, and its political system is unstable. It is true that Ukraine's national security elite will have to adjust rapidly to its country's new position as a sovereign state in the international system. However, there is no reason to think that the elite will be less competent than its Russian counterpart. After all, Ukrainians were

[2] The most comprehensive public study of Cold War nuclear-exchange scenarios concludes that an all-out Soviet surprise attack—under worst-case assumptions for the United States—could have destroyed 79 percent of America's ICBMs. See Michael Salaman, Kevin J. Sullivan and Stephen Van Evera, "Analysis or Propaganda? Measuring American Strategic Nuclear Capability, 1969–88," in *Nuclear Arguments: Understanding The Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates*, Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, eds., Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 216. Extrapolating from that analysis, my 90 percent figure seems conservative.

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well represented in the Soviet national security apparatus. They are not babes in the woods when it comes to nuclear issues, and they can learn quickly.

As a newly independent state facing significant internal problems, it is difficult to predict how stable Ukraine's political system will be over time. Nevertheless, it is stable now, and there is no good reason to think it will be chronically unstable. Besides, by this logic, Russia would be the more dangerous state and it would be even more dangerous to its neighbor if left undeterred. Even if Ukraine were destabilized, the likelihood of nuclear use should not increase substantially. Obviously it is best not to have internal upheaval in nuclear states. But the costs of nuclear war are so great, and so obvious, that all sides in a domestic dispute would have powerful incentives to keep the nuclear arsenal safely stowed away. There have been four cases of significant domestic unrest involving nuclear powers: the French "generals' revolt" (1961), the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–69), the unseating of Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto (1990) and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991). Nuclear weapons were not part of the internal political struggle in any of these cases.

THE ANGRY RUSSIAN REACTION

MANY EXPERTS EXPLAIN that Russia and Ukraine are on reasonably good terms at the moment, and there is no serious prospect of war between them. A Ukrainian decision to keep its nuclear weapons might anger and unnerve the Russians, who want Ukraine denuclearized. The hand of Russian hardliners would be strengthened, which would cause Russia to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy against Ukraine, thus increasing the chances of preventive war. In this view, nuclear weapons would cause the problem they are designed to prevent.

My argument for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent assumes that Russian-Ukrainian relations are likely to deteriorate in the future. If trouble were not in the offing, Ukraine would not need a nuclear arsenal. The safest strategy is to make Ukraine a responsible nuclear

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power before serious trouble starts between them, and not have to attempt this in the middle of a Russian-Ukrainian crisis.

There will certainly be an outcry in Russia if Ukraine retains its nuclear weapons. Russian hawks will probably benefit from the commotion, with potentially serious effects. That is not good news, but the Russians are not likely to initiate a war over the issue. To start, Ukraine's nuclear arsenal would not be especially threatening to Russia, as it would be essentially a deterrent force with hardly any offensive utility. The West should work to convince the Russians of this point, and also go to considerable lengths to assure the Russians that Ukraine has no close links with NATO, but is only seeking to defend itself.

The likely outcome of a preventive war further mitigates against a Russian attack. If Ukraine is a virtual nuclear state, a Russian strike would be tantamount to suicide. A Russian attack against Ukraine before its nuclear weapons were fully operational would be a terribly risky option. Ukraine has powerful conventional forces, and whether the Russians strike with conventional or nuclear forces, they could never be sure Ukraine will not have at least a few nuclear weapons to detonate on Russian cities. As long as Ukraine has more than a thousand nuclear warheads on its soil, Russia is likely to be deterred from starting a war.

If nuclear deterrence works, and there is ample reason to believe it will, the Russians will protest loudly at first, and increase their military spending somewhat. With time, however, they are likely to accommodate themselves to Ukraine's nuclear weapons and the stability they bring to the region. Relations will probably settle down in the long run, as they did between the superpowers during the Cold War.

WHAT IF DETERRENCE FAILS?

MANY ACCEPT THAT nuclear weapons may be an excellent deterrent, but there is always the possibility that deterrence will fail and nuclear weapons will be used. The consequences of a nuclear war for Europe would be catastrophic. It is unlikely that the United States

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would be struck in the event of a Russian-Ukrainian nuclear exchange. Nevertheless, both remnant states have nuclear weapons that can reach the United States. Thus, some ask, would it not make sense to do away with Ukraine's nuclear weapons even if it makes conventional war between Russia and Ukraine more likely? At least the United States would reduce the risk of getting hit with a nuclear weapon in such a conflict to almost zero.

It is true that nuclear weapons, very attractive as a deterrent, begin to look awfully unattractive when the focus shifts to war fighting. Proponents of nuclear deterrence are betting that precisely because a nuclear war would be so destructive for both sides, statesmen will shrink from nuclear weapons. This is a Faustian bargain, attractive only because the alternative—a reasonable chance of destructive great power conventional war—seems worse. It is the same bargain America made during the Cold War.

The United States should solve the "innocent bystander problem," even though it has a low probability of materializing. Eliminating Ukrainian nuclear weapons does make it less likely that a nuclear weapon would land on the United States in the event of a Russian-Ukrainian war. However, the problem would not go away and might even become more acute, because Europe would be more unstable after Russia reconquered Ukraine, and the principal antagonists on the continent would surely have nuclear weapons that might land in America. The best way to avoid the innocent bystander problem is to create a stable order in Europe. That goal is best accomplished by maintaining an independent Ukraine, a goal, in turn, best achieved by a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent.

IT IS STILL NOT TOO LATE

THE UNITED STATES should have begun working immediately after the Soviet Union collapsed to quickly and smoothly make Ukraine a nuclear power. In fact Washington rejected this approach and adopted the opposite policy, which remains firmly in place. Nevertheless, it is wrongheaded, and despite the sunk costs and the

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difficulty of reversing field in the policy world, the Clinton administration should make a gradual but unmistakable about-face.

From the start American policy should have had three main components. First, Ukraine should have been discreetly encouraged to keep its nuclear weapons, while American policymakers worked to convince Russia that Ukraine's nuclear arsenal would be defensive and would not seriously threaten Russia. That task would not have been too difficult in late 1991, when relations between Russia and Ukraine were good, and when almost every aspect of national security in the former Soviet Union was in a state of flux, and thinking about nuclear succession had not gelled.

Second, the charge that Ukraine was a potential proliferator should have been countered by arguing that Ukraine was an integral part of a nuclear superpower, and merely inherited its share of the spoils, just like the Russians. Third, Ukraine should have been pushed to develop both doctrines and technology that would reduce the risks of preemptive and accidental war. The United States should not have offered Ukraine an interim security guarantee, and more generally should have gone to great lengths not to appear to be joining forces with Ukraine against Russia.

At this point, the United States cannot fully undo the effects of these omissions. However, it still has room to recover some lost ground. Specifically, it should tone down its warnings of the dangers of a nuclear Ukraine and move toward an agnostic public posture on the issue. It is probably best if Ukraine develops a full-fledged nuclear capability gradually and quietly. During that process, the United States should strive to stay on good terms with both sides, so it can help defuse disputes that arise between them. The United States should recognize that Ukraine is going to be a nuclear power, irrespective of what the West does. It is in America's interest to help make that happen smoothly.

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Debate

The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent

Steven E. Miller

THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION

THE CASE FOR UKRAINIAN acquisition of nuclear weapons rests fundamentally on two key arguments: first, Ukrainian nuclear weapons will promote peace and stability in a region that might otherwise be prone to conflict; and second, nuclear weapons will enhance Ukrainian security, providing an ultimate security guarantee for a state fearful that its sovereignty might otherwise be jeopardized by its enormous and potentially menacing neighbor to the east—Russia.

These are not trivial or easily dismissable arguments. They suggest that Ukrainian acquisition of nuclear weapons would produce desirable and beneficial security consequences for both Ukraine and the West. At first glance, they appear to provide a convincing rationale for Ukrainian nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, Ukraine should not become a nuclear power. Its own interests and those of the West will best be served if Kiev fulfills its oft-made pledges to join the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. The benefits provided by nuclear weapons are

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less certain and more conditional than the proponents of nuclear proliferation believe. When the costs and complications associated with nuclear acquisition are taken into account, the case for Ukrainian nuclear weapons is not compelling.

DO NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAUSE PEACE?

THE CASE FOR NUCLEAR proliferation rests on the pacific effects of nuclear weapons. As Kenneth Waltz asserts in the most famous advocacy of proliferation, nuclear spread "will promote peace and reinforce international stability."[1] Because nuclear weapons greatly increase the costs and risks of war, they induce caution in the behavior of states and substantially reduce the likelihood of miscalculation. Wars between nuclear-armed states become simply too dangerous to fight. The force of this argument is greatly strengthened by the experience of the Cold War, in which the two bitterly opposed protagonists avoided war for nearly half a century despite numerous crises and provocations.

If nuclear weapons reliably cause peace, then nuclear proliferation to Ukraine—or any other state, for that matter—is not merely acceptable, but desirable, stabilizing a situation that might otherwise be prone to conflict. But there are a number of reasons to question whether nuclear weapons will promote peace and stability in all conditions and circumstances and whether they will have the desired effects in the particular case of Ukraine.

The Cold War was in fact "the long peace"; for all the tensions and crises of the postwar era, war between the United States and the Soviet Union was avoided. It is widely believed that nuclear weapons contributed substantially to this outcome—a view that I share.

But accounts of the long peace invariably focus on a number of other explanations, including the stability created by the existence of a bipolar international order, and the rough equality of military power between the two protagonists in the Cold War. In the most extensive

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[1]Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, Adelphi Paper No. 171, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1981, p. 28.

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analysis of the long peace, John Lewis Gaddis identifies no fewer than seven factors contributing to the stability of the Cold War system. These include bipolarity; the remarkable independence of the United States and the Soviet Union from each other, economically and geographically; the existence of domestic structures on both sides that, whatever their other merits or faults, did not undermine international peace and stability; nuclear weapons; the exploitation by both sides of advanced reconnaissance technologies that reduced the risk and fear of surprise attack; the ideological moderation of the Cold War protagonists in preferring international order to ideological purity; and the evolution of an implicit set of rules for the superpower game.[2]

It is difficult to assess the impact of nuclear weapons when other powerful factors were also working to stabilize the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Nuclear weapons may have been a major, or even the dominant, contributor to superpower peace during the Cold War. But given the existence of other powerful causes, it is also plausible that nuclear weapons have not been a significant factor in determining the course of the postwar era. Hence, the proposition that nuclear weapons promote peace and stability is properly regarded not as a fact but as an interpretation, largely based on the evidence of a single case.

Explanations of the long peace indicate that insofar as nuclear weapons have caused peace, they have done so in the context of a distinctive set of conditions. Virtually none of the conditions noted above now exist in relation to Ukrainian nuclear weapons. A Russian-Ukrainian nuclear relationship will not exist within a bipolar international system. Ukraine will be unable, over the long run, to maintain a rough equivalence in military power with Russia, which has three times the population and many times the geographical expanse and exploitable resources of Ukraine. Far from being geographically distant and highly independent, Ukraine and Russia are neighboring states with borders still described by some in Moscow as merely "administrative"; and they are deeply interdependent, eco-

[2]John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *International Security*, Spring 1986, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 99–142.

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nomically and culturally. Because both Kiev and Moscow are in the throes of internal transformation, it is uncertain whether their future domestic structures will be conducive to peace, nor is it clear that ideological moderation will prevail in both capitals. Many years may pass before Ukraine will possess—if ever—the independent reconnaissance capabilities necessary to provide reassurance against surprise attack. And while rules of the game for Russian-Ukrainian relations may eventually evolve, they do not now exist.

Thus, most of the factors working for peace in Soviet-American relations are absent from the Russian-Ukrainian context. Nuclear weapons may have contributed to peace during the Cold War, but that is no guarantee that they will have the same effect in dramatically different settings and conditions.

DO POLITICIANS BELIEVE DETERRENCE THEORY?

Advocates of nuclear proliferation argue, however, that the logic of the nuclear-peace paradigm is so powerful that it applies across the wide range of domestic, regional and international conditions. Nuclear weapons are so clearly and unquestionably destructive that even a small risk they might be used is enough to stay the hand of decision-makers contemplating war. Nuclear weapons make it easy for states to ensure their security. Hence, in this logic nuclear-armed states "should" be confident of their security, prudent in their international behavior, insensitive to the military posture and policies of their adversaries, avoid arms races and spend less on defense.

This logic is impeccable. Unfortunately the behavior of nuclear-armed states has failed to conform to these predictions. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, seemed to feel remarkably insecure during the Cold War, given their size, power and nuclear status. Apart from avoiding war with one another, their behavior was not invariably prudent, as evidenced by a series of dangerous confrontations. Far from being insensitive to the military preparations of the other side, both countries were obsessed by them. By the standards of modern history, they spent unusually large shares of their national treasure on defense. And throughout the Cold War the

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United States and Soviet Union opted for precisely the war-fighting nuclear doctrines that are regarded as unnecessary, inappropriate and destabilizing by most deterrence theorists.

If nuclear deterrence theorists ran the world, the benign and beneficial effects of nuclear weapons might be assured. The actual perceptions and behavior of policymakers in nuclear-armed states are much less reassuring.

THE DANGERS OF A DETERRENT

IT IS RARELY ARGUED that nuclear weapons will magically solve the problem of conflict in its entirety. While all-out or high-stakes wars may become too dangerous to fight, there is still room for lesser challenges at lower levels of conflict. If the nuclear balance is believed to be highly stable, then decision-makers may calculate that they can fight even substantial conventional wars with little risk of escalation, since all parties possess enormous incentives not to use nuclear weapons. In addition, nuclear deterrent threats will not be equally effective in all circumstances; deterrence will not work well when dealing with ambiguous borders or disputed territories—a point that may be highly relevant to Russian-Ukrainian relations.

But conventional conflict in a nuclear environment raises the risk not only of intentional nuclear escalation, which leaders will have incentives to avoid, but also of inadvertent nuclear escalation, which leaders may not be able to avoid even if they want. A conventional war could jeopardize nuclear deterrent capabilities directly or degrade other important capabilities, such as warning systems, thus increasing the possibility of successful nuclear preemption. The most extensive analysis of this question concludes that the problem of inadvertent escalation will "loom especially large for small and medium-sized nuclear powers, since they will have the most difficult time building nuclear forces that can survive."[3] This point clearly applies to Ukraine.

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[3]Barry R. Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks,* Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 201–202.

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There are a number of considerations specific to the Ukrainian case that undermine the argument that nuclear weapons will enhance Ukrainian security and lead to international stability. Many of these concerns have to do with the risks and dangers associated with the transition to nuclear status.

The perils of expropriating nuclear weapons. Ukraine possesses an unusual path to nuclear status: it can take control of the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. However, Ukraine's ownership of these weapons is contested by Russia; the weapons are formally under the control of the Commonwealth of Independent States and are de facto in the operational control of Russia. There is no indication that Russia will willingly hand over these weapons to Ukraine. This raises the possibility of confrontation, crisis or, in the worst case, conflict between Russia and Ukraine, should Kiev move to take custody of these weapons.

The risks of "instant" proliferation. If Ukraine does succeed in obtaining custody of some or all of the nuclear weapons on its territory, it will have become, in effect, an "instant" nuclear power. Unlike other nuclear states, it will not have experienced a protracted, multi-year nuclear development program during which appropriate organizations and procedures can be created, personnel can be trained and thinking can be adjusted. While Ukraine has undoubtedly inherited some military personnel who have expertise derived from their involvement in the Soviet nuclear program, its government will inevitably be inexperienced in nuclear weapons matters and in the immediate future will lack a coherent nuclear establishment.

Even those who argue the benefits of nuclear proliferation are attentive to the risks of such a situation. Waltz, for example, frames his entire analysis in terms of the slow spread of nuclear weapons, suggesting that the long lead times normally associated with nuclear acquisition lessen some of the potential dangers of nuclear proliferation, and offering the conclusion that "rapid change may be destabilizing." The slow spread of nuclear weapons gives states time to learn how to live with them, to appreciate their virtues and to understand the limits they place on behavior.

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Custodial dangers. Ukraine will not have immediately in place a mature framework for providing safe and secure custody of the nuclear weapons in its possession. This is a critical gap because organizational and procedural safeguards are necessary if nuclear safety and security are to be assured; technical safeguards alone (insofar as they exist) do not suffice. Hence, the standard worry that nuclear proliferation will increase the risk of inadvertent or unauthorized use, or the risk of nuclear terrorism, may initially be all the more acute in the case of Ukraine. Instability in Ukraine only exacerbates this concern.

Nuclear instability between Russia and Ukraine. There are also serious questions about the stability of the nuclear relationship between Russia and Ukraine, in both the short and the long run. The near-term situation would be quite precarious. If Ukraine succeeds in becoming a nuclear power by taking custody of the nuclear weapons on its territory, the locations, capabilities and vulnerabilities of those weapons will be known in intimate detail by Russia; initially, Moscow will probably know more about these weapons than Kiev. Ukraine presently lacks any warning capability whatsoever. And it would likely take some time before Ukraine had an operational nuclear capability. Thus, Ukraine would pass through an initial period of substantial nuclear vulnerability—potentially raising a preventive war temptation for Moscow.

The capabilities and vulnerabilities of Ukraine's nuclear weapons will be known in intimate detail by Russia.

The situation is not easy to remedy over the longer run. Ukraine will face a number of difficult constraints in attempting to construct a survivable deterrent force. The proximity of Russia and Ukraine means that Kiev is condemned to live with short warning time, even when it possesses early warning capabilities. Survivability measures based on exploitation of warning—such as alert and evacuation programs for aircraft and many schemes for mobile missiles—will be unavailable to Ukraine. While not landlocked, Ukraine has access only to the Black Sea, which does not provide a viable sea-based option. Fixed land-based sites are considered vulnerable, given the accuracy and lethality of modern nuclear systems. As the American

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experience has shown, developing survivable command and control for nuclear forces is neither cheap nor easy; it will not be surprising if Ukraine experiences grave concerns about the threat of nuclear decapitation. Moreover, Ukraine may be, in the manner of the two Germanies, particularly vulnerable to espionage, given that Russia and Ukraine share both the Russian language and Slavic backgrounds, while millions of people with Russian ancestry reside within Ukraine's borders. Accordingly, Russia may have access to unusually good intelligence about Ukraine's nuclear capabilities, even over the long haul.

These factors provide a recipe for endemic instability. Even the United States, with its many thousands of warheads and multiple means of delivery, was recurrently plagued with vulnerability crises throughout the Cold War. Ukrainian leaders will, for good reason, be considerably less confident in the survivability of their nuclear deterrent forces—a situation that would probably lead to first-use doctrines and hair-trigger postures. While there is no doubt that any attack on nuclear forces would be risky, this scenario leaves plenty of room for clever briefers and for dangerous "use them or lose them" pressures.

Political instability in Ukraine. Ukraine is in the midst of a dramatic political transformation. Its politics are unsettled, its economy is struggling, its society is ethnically divided and democracy is not deeply rooted. The internal uncertainties in Ukraine amplify many of the dangers described above. What if Ukraine comes to be led by authorities who do not harbor "appropriate" thoughts about the character of nuclear weapons? What if internal unrest disrupts nuclear custodial arrangements? What if nuclear weapons get caught up in civil strife? The potential for trouble is obvious.

UKRAINE'S BEST INTERESTS

UKRAINE'S LEADERS WILL be rightly concerned first and foremost with Ukrainian security. The fundamental question for them is not whether nuclear weapons will produce international stability, but whether, on balance, they will improve Ukraine's capacity to defend

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itself. As an independent and sovereign state, Ukraine has every right to make the preparations it thinks necessary for its security. Having just emerged from several centuries of subjugation to Moscow, Ukrainians will be intensely aware of the need to defend their sovereignty. Hence, if there is not a plausible case that Ukraine is better off without nuclear weapons than with them, then the international community's worries about the dangers of nuclear proliferation will probably be moot; Ukraine will look after its own interests. But there is a case to be made that the security benefits provided to Ukraine are outweighed by the costs of nuclear acquisition. At least eight considerations lead to this conclusion.

First, as mentioned previously, Ukraine cannot take custody of the nuclear weapons on its territory without running a considerable risk of military intervention by Russia. Even if this is avoided at first, Ukrainian seizure of these weapons will create powerful preventive and preemptive motivations in Moscow, increasing the risk of intervention in subsequent confrontations. Grabbing these weapons could provoke the very war Ukraine professes to fear.

Second, taking control of the nuclear weapons on its territory guarantees that Ukraine will be regarded as a necessary target by all nuclear states who fear that they could conceivably be threatened by Ukrainian forces—including the United States, since most of the nuclear systems in Ukraine were designed for intercontinental missions against U.S. territory. Forgoing nuclear weapons cannot protect Ukraine against nuclear risks, although some limited protection may be offered by the international norm that nuclear threats should not be made against nonnuclear states and by the taboo against nuclear use. But nuclear acquisition is one of the few things Ukraine could do that would both ensure and legitimize nuclear threats against it.

Third, Ukraine will inherit only incoherent fragments of a meaningful nuclear weapons capability. The missiles on its territory are more suitable for striking the United States than Russia, and must be modified to Ukraine's relevant security needs. Russia may possibly leave behind disabled, rather than functional, nuclear weapons; Moscow has little incentive to make things easy for Kiev. Nor will Ukraine initially possess the nuclear weapons production complex

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necessary for the restoration and maintenance of its nuclear arsenal. These considerations reinforce the point that in the short run Ukraine is likely to experience a dangerous period of extreme vulnerability.

Fourth, Ukraine will be condemned to nuclear inferiority, possibly over the long run. Russia possesses thousands of warheads and a vast nuclear production complex, and it will be able to invest more resources in maintaining and modernizing its nuclear forces. Ukraine's nuclear force will be much smaller. In the short run, it could be wholly vulnerable. Over the longer run, it could remain substantially vulnerable—a fact that will be a perennial source of worry and instability. This situation will limit Kiev's nuclear options and make any threat or use of nuclear weapons by Ukraine extremely dangerous for Ukraine.

This leads to a fifth, particularly important, point: Ukraine's nuclear force will be deterred by Russia's under most circumstances. The risks for Ukraine of initiating a nuclear exchange will be so great that its deterrent threats will lack credibility in all but the most extreme contingencies. Proponents of a Ukrainian nuclear force will argue that nuclear weapons will provide an ultimate guarantee of Ukraine's sovereignty, that its nuclear threats will be credible if faced with conquest. But it makes little sense to use nuclear weapons even in that situation. As even Waltz points out, "If their national existence should be threatened, weaker states ... may destroy themselves through resorting to nuclear weapons."[4] If a bold, reckless or highly motivated nuclear opponent should calculate similarly, Ukraine's ultimate deterrent may be unreliable. Russia, of course, would still have to confront the risk that Ukraine would carry out its nuclear threat, however irrational that might be, and this should provide some deterrent benefit. But Ukraine cannot gain that benefit without exposing itself to perilous risks.

Even if nuclear weapons provide some ultimate safeguard for Ukraine's sovereignty, they clearly do not solve all of its security problems. Not one nuclear weapon state has found its security rendered

[4]Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 24-25.

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quiescent by the fact of its nuclear capabilities. For each, threats continued to exist and crises continued to happen. Most nuclear powers have found themselves in one or more conventional wars despite their nuclear capabilities. Each has maintained a considerable conventional capability; indeed, there is a high correlation between nuclear status and possession of some of the world's largest and most formidable conventional military establishments. And there is no evidence to suggest that nuclear-armed states are insensitive to the conventional preparations of their adversaries. The United States, after all, possessed more than 20,000 nuclear weapons but nevertheless still spent over 80 percent of its defense budget on conventional assets to counter the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its allies.

Hence, a sixth consideration is all the more important: despite the myth that nuclear weapons are cheap, they are in fact quite expensive for most states. If Ukraine wished to become a medium nuclear power on the order of Britain or France, for example, it would have to spend at least $3 billion to $5 billion per year on its nuclear capabilities—and probably more, since British and French nuclear expenditures are reduced because of their nuclear cooperation with the United States. Five billion dollars constitutes the overwhelming fraction of the defense budgets of all but the six or seven largest defense spenders in the world. Given Ukraine's economic needs and constraints, there will surely be incentives to minimize the resources devoted to defense, and the sums associated with a medium nuclear capability will surely be painful for Kiev.

The risks for Ukraine of initiating a nuclear exchange will be so great that its deterrent threats will lack credibility.

The economic burden for Ukraine will be substantial, but the trade-offs between conventional and nuclear forces will be even more difficult. In view of its economic problems, Ukraine will be unable to become a medium nuclear power without making significant sacrifices in its conventional capabilities. From the point of view of Ukraine's security, this trade-off is unfortunate. Conventional forces, unlike nuclear, are useful to confront a whole range of security chal-

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lenges that Ukraine might face. The costs of nuclear weapons could so weaken Ukraine conventionally that it might be unable to defend itself conventionally in extreme contingencies. Kiev would thus have the options of suicide or surrender—hardly a desirable state of affairs.

Ukraine is, in terms of population, resources and geographic expanse, one of the largest states in Europe. Ukraine could generate considerable conventional combat power; even now it inherits a considerable conventional capability from the Red Army. While Kiev will never be able to match Moscow in a conventional arms race, it is capable of mounting a credible conventional deterrent. Decision-makers considering a conventional attack are highly sensitive to anticipated costs and are likely to be deterred if they cannot count on achieving a quick, cheap victory. By adopting a conventional deterrent strategy, Ukraine could muster enough conventional capability to make any major military action against it a costly exercise—but the financial costs of nuclear status could undermine such an approach.

Proponents of Ukrainian nuclear weapons like to pose Kiev's alternatives as nuclear weapons or insecurity. This is doubly wrong: Ukraine is neither wholly secure with nuclear weapons nor, taking into account the conventional deterrent option, completely insecure without them. Certainly there are risks associated with a conventional deterrent strategy, but this is no less true of a nuclear deterrent strategy.

A seventh consideration bears on Ukraine's security problems and military options: for Ukraine to exercise its nuclear option would have a damaging effect on the arms control frameworks that presently apply to Russian and Ukrainian forces and territory. The first and second Strategic Arms Reduction treaties would be most directly affected, since Russian ratification of the former and acceptance of the latter are conditional on Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear state. But the tension and acrimony that would surely accompany Ukraine's move to nuclear status could also undermine the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, the Helsinki Confidence and Security Building Measures regime, and the Open Skies Agreement. Since these agreements together limit Russia's ability to deploy forces in the area west of the Urals, restrict and require

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notifications of major troop movements and exercises, and institutionalize high levels of transparency, they are very much in Ukraine's security interest. Indeed, they increase the viability of a conventional deterrent strategy. On the other hand, Ukraine's security predicament will be much worse if these agreements are undone.

Finally, Ukraine cannot exercise the nuclear option without damaging its relations with the United States and other Western states, all of whom are steadfastly opposed to nuclear proliferation. Although Western states, without exception, want good relations with Ukraine, most will make nuclear Ukraine pay a price, if only to discourage other potential proliferators. Further, at least in the United States, Congress is so strongly opposed to nuclear proliferation that the Clinton administration would probably be unable to avoid imposing sanctions even if it wanted.

For Ukraine, then, there will be a tension, if not a trade-off, between the nuclear option and its basic grand strategic impulse to integrate with the West. And the potential costs are considerable. Going nuclear will increase the risk of isolation. By breaking its many pledges to denuclearize, including those negotiated directly with Washington, Kiev will have proven its unreliability as a negotiating partner, a fact that will certainly diminish incentives to cut future deals with Ukraine. Moves to expel or suspend Ukraine from international institutions would not be surprising. Its prospects for aid from and trade with the West would be harmed, a setback that has security implications given the importance of economic strength to national power. And even Ukraine's military potential would be hurt, since some major arms suppliers, including the United States, have policies or laws against arms transfers that contribute to a proliferator's military posture.

To be sure, some of these costs would probably be transitory, not all of these measures would necessarily be taken, and not all states would certainly support sanctions. But there would be real, meaningful, unavoidable political, economic and military costs to Ukraine if it exercises the nuclear option.

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Steven E. Miller

THE SEDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR PEACE

THE NUCLEAR-PEACE paradigm has a seductive appeal. It implies a simple and powerful solution to the problem of war. It promises peace and stability where otherwise conflict and confrontation might reign. The small risk of nuclear use, it is claimed, will deter anyone from going to war.

In fact the opposite is true; even a small risk of war despite nuclear weapons makes nuclear proliferation too dangerous to contemplate. Nuclear war is by no means inevitable if Ukraine gets nuclear weapons, and under some circumstances nuclear weapons may promote peace and stability. But embracing the proposition that nuclear weapons cause peace should be leavened with an appreciation of the factors cutting in the opposing direction. Advocates of Ukrainian nuclear weapons are betting that the logic of the nuclear revolution will prevail over the potential dangers of nuclear proliferation. And they could be right. Yet there is also a chance that they will turn out to be wrong. As John Mearsheimer has written, "Mismanaged proliferation could produce disaster, while well-managed proliferation could produce an order nearly as stable as the current order. Unfortunately, however, any proliferation is likely to be mismanaged."[5] When one considers the stakes and the risks involved, the gamble is too great to take.

Fortunately, Ukraine has already opted for the nonnuclear path. This choice enables Kiev to avoid the great costs and risks of nuclear acquisition and leaves it financially better able to develop its conventional capabilities. All things considered, there is no reason to persuade Ukraine to reverse the nonnuclear policy to which it has been explicitly committed since well before it attained independence.

[5] John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Summer 1991, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 37.

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A Profile of Slobodan Milošević

Aleksa Djilas

BANALITY TRIUMPHANT

In 1989 a collection of speeches and interviews of Slobodan Milošević, the president of Serbia, was published in Belgrade. His narrow intellectual horizons and limited vocabulary were obvious; the chapter titles, in their arrogant and hollow "simplicity," were reminiscent of Mao Zedong's Red Book. ("The difficulties are neither unexpected nor insurmountable"; "The difficulties should not be a reason to demobilize, but to mobilize ourselves"; "The future will still be beautiful, and it is not far away"; etc.)

Milošević's dry, overcompressed sentences and his frequent use of ritual formulas made his style mechanical; the use of military vocabulary (mobilization, battle, war) gave the prose a rigid and belligerent tone. This ponderous text seemed to be very much in harmony with the author's large photograph on the book's cover. He appears stiff, inhibited, hierarchical—almost robot-like.

Yet the book was an instant success. A Serbian reading public that considered itself discerning had been seduced by a simplistic, almost naïve book, whose author seemed incapable of presenting a genuine vision of political and social life. To understand why a crude propagandistic tract became a national best-seller is to begin to understand

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Aleksa Djilas, a Fellow of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, is the author of *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919–1953*.

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PHOTOGRAPH BY JONATHAN CARTWRIGHT FOR SABA

Milošević supporters campaigning in Trstenik, Serbia, December 1992.

why a former communist party apparatchik has been able to gain the support and adulation of millions of Serbs across Yugoslavia.

One secret of the book's success was that it addressed in a loud and clear voice the problem of Kosovo, which was of greatest importance to the Serbs. Since the late 1960s Serbs had been emigrating from this predominately Albanian province in the republic of Serbia; between 200,000 and 300,000 had left by the mid-1980s, many forced out by Albanian extremists. Many Serbs believed that the ruling communist party had done very little to stop this exodus.

They also resented the fact that the 1974 Yugoslav constitution had largely separated Kosovo, as well as Serbia's other province, Vojvodina, from Serbia. Kosovo and Vojvodina had their own representatives in the federal, state and party bodies, where most of the time they voted against Serbia. The two provinces also had the power to veto any changes in the Serbian constitution. Since the other five republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia) had complete sovereignty over their territories, Serbia believed that it had been singled out for unfair treatment under the Yugoslav constitution.

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Through the 1980s the communist authorities in Kosovo, Serbia and Yugoslavia publicly acknowledged that interethnic relations in Kosovo were in a critical state, but they would not allow any free and open debate about them and avoided all pronouncements and policies that might stir up Serbian emotions.

Then in 1987 Milošević appeared on the scene. He had been president of the Serbian party for only a little over a year when he began fearlessly to attend mass rallies, give speeches and interviews, and generally excite powerful nationalist passions. Immediately a great number of Serbs—communist, noncommunist and even anticommunist—started to gather around him, determined not only to protect the Serbian minority in Kosovo, but to suppress the Albanians and turn them into second-class citizens. Milošević was soon acknowledged as a national leader. A partly orchestrated but mostly spontaneous cult began to develop around him, accompanied by suitable songs and jingles:

Slobodan, they call you freedom,
you are loved by big and small.
So long as Slobo walks the land,
the people will not be in thrall.[1]

Milošević had learned the secret of demagoguery in post-communist Europe. Far from transcending nationalism, as communism had taught, he embraced it eagerly. Once seen as a functionary of a discredited regime, he was now the voice of Serbian nationalism. As a result, by mid-1988 Slobodan Milošević enjoyed a popularity greater than any Serbian political figure in this century.

THE COMMUNIST LADDER

NOTHING IN MILOŠEVIĆ'S early life suggested he could ever ascend to such heights of power and popular approval. He was born in 1941 in Požarevac, a town in Serbia that had a population at the time of

[1]Quoted from Slavoljub Djukić, *Kako se dogodio vodja: borbe za vlast u Srbiji posle Josipa Broza*, Belgrad: Filip Visnjić, 1992, p. 265. Djukić's book is the most comprehensive study to date of Milošević's rise to power.

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about 20,000. He is of Montenegrin descent; to this day his brother declares his nationality as Montenegrin. Slobodan's father studied Eastern Orthodox theology and taught Russian and Serbo-Croatian language and literature at a local high school. His mother was also a schoolteacher, and in addition a dedicated communist activist. A strict, self-possessed woman, she brought up her children alone after her husband left her when Slobodan was still in elementary school.

Slobodan was an excellent pupil, and teachers considered him serious and reliable. He wore a carefully pressed dark suit to school, a white shirt and a tie, avoided sports and spent little time with friends. He published articles and poems in the school magazine and was politically active. While in high school, this prim loner met Mirjana Marković, his future wife. She came from a leading communist family in Serbia and is still today a true believer.

Milošević's father committed suicide in 1962, when Slobodan was a student at university. Eleven years later his mother did the same. (Her brother, a general, had also taken his own life.) Milošević himself appears to have always been confident and assured, and the hopeful conjectures of his opponents that one day he might commit suicide as well have no foundation.

In his first year at the Faculty of Law, Milošević became a close friend of Ivan Stambolić, a worker turned student who was five years his senior and embarked on a promising political career. In the ensuing years Stambolić would become Milošević's mentor. Together they climbed toward the summits of power in Serbia, Slobodan always just one step behind Ivan.

Those who knew Milošević as a young communist functionary, whether they are today his supporters or opponents, remember him as friendly, reliable and dynamic. He had a long spell in the world of business. He was a director first of a factory and then of a leading bank, commuting between Belgrade and New York. Without outstanding business acumen he was still a credible manager. He had a special talent for organization, and felt very much at home in the party machine. He was orderly and demanded order from his subordinates. He was also a firm believer in Titoist Yugoslav communism, though his loyalty appears to have been without idealism or illusions.

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He simply accepted communism as the only right way to rule and manage, rather than as a set of ideas and ideals, and showed a realpolitiker's keen appreciation of what power was and where it could be found.

The roots of the Milošević phenomenon are to be found in the purge of the early 1970s, when Marshal Josip Tito politically expelled all leading reform-minded communists in Serbia. These so-called liberals were in favor of strengthening the market forces in the Yugoslav economy and allowing greater freedom of speech. They believed the party should withdraw from the realm of arts and culture and should promote young and able people to leading positions. To those democratic dissidents who wanted a European-style parliamentary democracy and a market economy, these efforts were halfhearted, excessively cautious, slow and inconsistent. Still, no one could dispute the fact that after the liberals' dismissal the political situation in Serbia deteriorated: political repression increased, as did the party's hold over the economy.

"Moral-political suitability," that is, membership in the party and dogmatic adherence to Marxism-Leninism, again became, as in preliberal times, a necessary requirement for any career in business, the media or education. Dissidents called moral-political suitability "negative selection," since in practice it meant that careerists and doctrinaires rose to the top. Milošević, who made his career in the 1970s, was both a product and a successful practitioner of this negative selection.

Eliminating those with strong personalities from the Serbian party greatly weakened the opposition, should one man attempt to grab power once Tito was gone. While both the liberals and doctrinaire communists had fought against Serbian nationalism, the liberals had done so with greater intelligence and deeper conviction. When the party finally lost its faith, it was not only too weak to resist nationalism, but could not prevent itself from embracing it. By extinguishing all the creative forces within the League of Communists of Serbia, Tito had paved the way for someone like Milošević to seize power. In a sense, Milošević is a monument to Tito's policies.

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AFTER TITO'S DEATH in 1980, Milošević was a consistent and seemingly convinced defender of Tito's legacy. Especially among the older cadres "little Slobo" had a reputation for being an uncompromising communist. When in 1984 his old friend Stambolić became the president of the League of Communists of Serbia, he appointed Milošević as the head of the Belgrade party committee—a very important post because Belgrade was then the center of democratic dissent in Yugoslavia, and the party considered it full of "anticommunist reactionaries," "bourgeois liberals," "nationalists" and other enemies. Bourgeois liberalism directly challenged the party's monopoly of power and was therefore the most dangerous. But "great Serbian nationalism" was considered a threat too, since it easily excited popular emotions and because any tolerance shown by the party angered the non-Serbian communist leaders, especially the Albanians in Kosovo, but the Slovenian and Croatian ones as well.

Milošević reinvigorated the party by forcing it to embrace nationalism.

Party conservatives were soon pleased with the way Milošević policed this hotbed of opposition. He frequently attacked dissident intellectuals, firmly opposed all demands for liberalization, and punished any manifestation of Serbian nationalism. He also resisted any attempt by reformers to cut the excessive time devoted in schools and universities to the teaching of Marxism, promoted dogmatic professors at Belgrade University, and prevented the publication of books by politically proscribed authors.

In January 1986 Milošević succeeded Stambolić as chief of the Serbian party when Stambolić became president of Serbia. He seemed to everyone a staunch party conservative, a kind of younger and more energetic version of Russia's Yegor Ligachev, ready to fight those communists in Yugoslavia who aspired to be Gorbachevs. By then the Slovenian and Croatian communists were beginning to introduce intra-party elections with more than one candidate, a major step toward multiparty elections. No one dared hope for such changes in Serbia, though only a few years later, there would be freedom of speech and the press in Serbia, as well as free elections. By

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

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

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

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this point the party would become the standard-bearer of Serbian nationalism and Milošević the worshiped national idol.

Milošević's sympathy for the plight of the Serbs in Kosovo was genuine. He is not simply a monster only interested in power, as many of his opponents characterize him. Yet other leading communists were also interested in resolving the Kosovo problem. The difference was that Milošević found the strength to overcome the fear of the masses, so characteristic of any entrenched bureaucrat. Above all, he succeeded because he understood the power of fear and knew how to use it for his own purposes. Milošević fundamentally transformed Serbian politics.

The mass movement of Kosovo Serbs developed spontaneously. It was not openly anticommunist, though it could easily have become so. Milošević only gradually overcame his caution and started supporting it, but he was nonetheless the first leading communist to do so. With the help of the party-controlled media and the party machinery, he soon dominated the movement, discovering in the process that the best way to escape the wrath of the masses was to lead them. It was an act of political cannibalism. The opponent, Serbian nationalism, was devoured and its spirit permeated the eater. Milošević reinvigorated the party by forcing it to embrace nationalism.

THE POLITICS OF FEAR

TITOIST COMMUNISM HAD been moderate compared to its East European, Asian and Caribbean counterparts: its economy was more market-oriented, its cultural policies more tolerant. Yugoslavs could travel freely to the West. But it was still a system based on fear. To challenge it often meant the loss of a job or imprisonment. In the 1980s, however, the press in Yugoslavia, as in other East European countries, grew increasingly iconoclastic; intellectuals became bolder in demanding respect for human rights, and the public was less willing to put up with the privileges and incompetence of its party leaders. The power of party committees was being eroded, and the party bureaucracy was frightened.

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Milošević's energetic way of dealing with issues ("this has to be done, so it is not a problem") and old-style party rhetoric encouraged the cadres. Milošević was also not afraid to dismantle the typical communist forms of rule by party committee and police. He realized that the sheer spectacle of hundreds of thousands of people on public squares, waving flags and shouting slogans, could overpower any opposition and that many would believe that this was freedom. While Tito's communism tried to silence its opponents with fear, Milošević allowed his adversaries to speak freely. He had discovered that nationalist propaganda could control and manipulate the masses even if information was not completely cut off. The media did not have to be censored so long as the major television network and the largest newspaper were under his control. And this he had accomplished by winning over the cadres in leading positions. Finally, he realized that most intellectuals would be reluctant to oppose a leader who appeared to be fighting for national goals.

Milošević seems to have allied himself permanently with the politics of fear. He thrives on it and is always on the lookout for the hostility and conflict that produce it. This is one of the deeper causes of the Yugoslav civil war: Milošević counted on war, the ultimate condition of fear, to unite Serbs around him. That is why he refused to look for political solutions to the persecution of Serbs in Croatia after Franjo Tudjman came to power in May 1990, and to the erosion of the Serbs' position in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović became its president in November 1990. Milošević welcomed the Serbs' increased sense of insecurity and was only too glad to plunge them into a war in which they would have only him for protection.

When Milošević consolidated his power in 1987–88 neither the ordinary people nor the intelligentsia were afraid of him. Everyone, including Milošević, somehow knew that the kind of fear that once existed under Tito could not be restored. Yet among the minority of Serbian intellectuals who were trying to resist Serbian nationalism, a new kind of fear began to spread—a foreboding that Milošević's policies would lead to disaster.

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THE STYLE OF A CONSPIRATOR

IN SPITE OF HIS seemingly effortless mastery of mass demonstrations, since his rise to power Milošević has rarely appeared in public or on television. He actually does not have exceptional oratorical or histrionic skills and knows that his political talent shines brightest in small meetings. He is definitely a "chamber politician" and is often described as the quintessential apparatchik.[2] But while undoubtedly a product of the Yugoslav communist political machine, he lacks the docility and devotion to routine that a true man of the apparat should possess. He resembles, rather, a leader of some revolutionary conspiracy who works in secret, surrounded by mystery, and is permanently busy appointing and dismissing members of the central committee. Indeed, the selection of cadres is Milošević's chief preoccupation. While the main criterion for promotion is loyalty to him, he also often moves people from one function to another to avoid their accumulating too much power. Finally, he rarely attacks his opponents directly, either within his own party or outside it. Like Stalin and Tito, he has his men for that.

At the beginning of 1988, just after Milošević had consolidated his power, the Belgrade youth paper *Mladost* published a carefully compiled list of the hundred most prominent political figures in Serbia. By the beginning of 1993, only a handful of them remained in power. Milošević had disposed of the others as they grew either too assertive or too compromised.[3] But he was not completely ungrateful. He gave most of them important and lucrative positions outside politics, mostly in business, and they continued to support him.

Milošević's ruthlessness and skill in winning intra-party battles by using disposable proxies was most obvious when he eliminated from the presidency his old friend Ivan Stambolić. Without ever directly attacking him, Milošević secretly won over Stambolić's cadres for himself and launched a media campaign against his closest political

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[2]The phrase "chamber politician" was applied to Milošević by the political philosopher Ljubomir Tadić in "Kraj brutalne nepravde," *Borba*, Feb. 17, 1993.

[3]Or in a few cases because they tried to appropriate for themselves his manner of speaking and gesticulating. Milošević loathes people who in this way imitate him, as former Serbian Prime Minister Radoman Božović discovered to his chagrin.

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ally and personal friend. On September 23, 1987, the whole nation watched mesmerized a live television broadcast of the famous Eighth Meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Many leading communists were criticizing Stambolić's protégé, Dragiša Pavlović, a member of the collective party presidency of Serbia and the leader of the Belgrade communists. But through Pavlović, Stambolić's policies were attacked for being insufficiently resolute in protecting Tito's legacy and for not defending Serbian national interests, especially in Kosovo.

After more than 20 hours of debate, Pavlović resigned from the collective presidency, and Stambolić was left in no doubt that the majority of Serbian communist leaders were against him. Soon afterward Slobodan would tell his friend Ivan: "I am sorry, but your position as the president of Serbia has become untenable." In December Stambolić asked the members of the collective presidency of Serbia to vote him out of office; in May 1989 the parliament of Serbia elected Milošević as president.[4]

Five months after Stambolić's fall, his 24-year-old daughter died in a car crash. Milošević decided to attend the funeral. He arrived upset and pale, and the two former friends embraced. (Mrs. Stambolić, however, would not even shake Milošević's extended hand.) But the media, controlled by Milošević, continued its brutal and spiteful campaign against Stambolić.

Milošević's avoidance of direct confrontation is characteristic of all his political activities. He has never, for example, openly acted against anyone who attacks him. Nor has he ever publicly attacked or insulted Albanians or Croats or Bosnian Muslims in his speeches, and only a few of his remarks could be considered as incitements to war.

WINNING OVER THE ARMY

FINDING THE CADRES in the communist party ready to fight his political battles was easier for Milošević than winning over the

[4]Ivan Stambolić's full title was "President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia" and Slobodan Milošević's, "President of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Serbia."

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Yugoslav People's Army. But circumstances helped—the officer corps was about 65 percent Serbian, and the Serbian majority grew as Slovenia and Croatia moved toward secession and their officers left the army. Slovenian and Croatian anti-army pronouncements also drove the army to look for a protector, and Serbia seemed the obvious choice. The anti-Serbian policies of President Franjo Tudjman's Croatian government reminded many Serbian officers, especially those who were themselves from Croatia, of the persecution and massacres of Serbs by Croatian fascists during the Second World War.

Nonetheless, it was a formidable task to transform the Yugoslav People's Army into the fighting arm of Serbian nationalism. The army, which saw itself as the protector of Yugoslavia and not of any national group, believed in the principle of "brotherhood and unity" (proclaimed during the Second World War by communist-led Partisans), and was permeated with Titoist communism.

From the moment he became the head of the Belgrade communists in 1984, Milošević had deliberately adopted a political style meant to appeal to the military. He insisted on a combative spirit and a readiness to make sacrifices. Statements appealing to pride and dignity struck a deep chord both among officers and among the militaristic Serbs in the population. After 1987, when he dominated Serbian politics, the newspapers and television under his control defended the army from often justified criticisms by Slovenia and Croatia for authoritarianism and overspending. The language they used was taken directly from Tito's rhetoric, which helped to reassure the officers.

The army was the most antidemocratic and reactionary of all Yugoslav communist institutions. (It unofficially approved, for example, the attempted coup d'état against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991.) The army was impressed by the slowness with which Serbia under Milošević's leadership was responding to the changes in Eastern Europe and in other parts of Yugoslavia. It was not until July 1990 that Milošević renamed the League of Communists of Serbia—calling it the Socialist Party of Serbia—and not until December 1990 that Serbia held its first free elections, eight months after Slovenia and seven months after Croatia.

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The armed forces are now formally commanded by Dobrica Ćosić, the president of Yugoslavia (which now consists only of Serbia and Montenegro), but Milošević has controlled them since the Yugoslav civil war broke out in 1991. By now he has consolidated his power over the armed forces by retiring about one hundred generals and admirals, though never, of course, openly. He has asked for no resignations nor in any way directly involved himself with the military.

THE YUGOSLAV CIVIL WAR

THE WORLD SHOULD NOT have been so surprised by the outbreak of the Yugoslav civil war. While not inevitable, it was never very remote either. Among the various national groups of Yugoslavia, as among those of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, nationalism has been the most powerful ideology since the middle of the nineteenth century. It has no rival either in mobilizing power or in its capacity to inspire self-sacrifice. Its essence is a pseudo-romantic and mythologizing ethnocentrism, whose corollary is the demand for ethnic homogeneity within a centralized and militarily powerful state.

The main carrier of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe is the intelligentsia. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment reached those parts of Europe only in diluted form and was never fully accepted by the relatively small, educated middle classes. In addition, the main employer of the intelligentsia was the state—as it still is today. Finally, the absence of deeply rooted liberal democratic institutions allowed little room for the development of a genuinely pluralist political culture. All these factors combined to make the intelligentsia less liberal and rationalist than it was in the West, and always ready to sacrifice its liberal democratic aspirations at the altar of "national interest." Pre-civil war nationalist emotions were no more powerful in Yugoslavia than in many other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but because Yugoslavia's groups were territorially more intermixed and because there was no general agreement on where the borders between them should be drawn, once the secessions began the chances for a peaceful solution were minimal.

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Serbian nationalism, in the authoritarianism and exclusivism epitomized by Milošević, is very similar to the Croatian nationalism of Franjo Tudjman and the nationalism combined with Muslim radicalism of Bosnia-Herzegovina's President Alija Izetbegović. All three have contributed to the destruction of Yugoslavia. But Serbian nationalism does have some distinguishing traits. First among them is historical nihilism. The Serbs, more than any other nation of the former Yugoslavia, are fully convinced that history has treated them unfairly. They feel that because they had the largest casualties in the two world wars they deserve special credit for the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 and for its resurrection in 1945. Yet instead of being grateful, their non-Serbian fellow Yugoslavs have conspired against them from the beginning, undermining Yugoslav unity, often at the Serbs' expense. Serbs firmly believe that the ultimate goal of Yugoslavia's other groups was always to create separate states, in two of which (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) the Serbs would become persecuted national minorities.

Milošević has allied himself permanently with the politics of fear.

This nihilistic view, that history has never rewarded the Serbs for their noble idealism, but instead has punished them with humiliation and suffering, has been combined with the conviction that international factors in the contemporary world have also conspired to deprive the Serbs of their legitimate rights.

The foremost creators of this bitter national ideology were the intellectuals. By far the most influential among them was Ćosić, a widely read novelist, prominent dissident and now president of Yugoslavia. It is impossible to know if the intelligentsia realized how much self-pity, anger and hatred its ideas would generate once they reached the Serbian masses. Many intellectuals now complain that their views were distorted by Milošević's irresponsible and opportunistic media. Yet it is clear that an ideology with such a dark vision of history and the contemporary world could only lead to ruthless and cynical policies.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia would have been a major historical shock for the Serbs even under the best of circumstances, and

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they would have had every right to be concerned with the welfare of their kin in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But with a more rational, self-critical and tolerant national ideology, they might have tried to solve their national question through peaceful negotiation rather than by grabbing land with military force.

Although generally a very careful and patient politician, Milošević is ready to take risks. He therefore boldly seized the opportunity and appropriated for himself and his party the nationalist ideology that the Serbian intelligentsia had assiduously developed. Essentially an ideological eclectic and a political opportunist, he had no difficulty changing his political stripes from communism to nationalism and adapting his political style to fit the image of a national leader. He appeared robust and masculine and conspicuously self-confident; he hid his vanity and self-importance under a facade of modesty and austerity. This exaggerated pretense of Roman gravitas worked well with the Serbs only because the intelligentsia had previously imbued them with intense nationalism, and they were seeking an omnipotent leader.

Although Milošević is still the politician with the largest following in Serbia (he won with relative ease the last elections in December 1992), he is no longer a generally accepted national leader.[5] By December 1990 the results of the first free elections made it obvious that he was already losing popularity, and in March 1991 mass demonstrations in Belgrade showed that many opposed his rule. His influence today is largely based on the inability of the opposition to find an effective leader and unite around him. Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia also has the advantage of having inherited all the possessions and political machinery of the communist party, so it is both richer and better organized than its rivals.

Milošević's social base is narrowing. The intellectuals have abandoned him, along with the students. They have both been alienated by his obsession with personal power, obstruction of any attempts to

[5]There were, however, serious accusations both in Yugoslavia and the West that the elections were a fraud. While it is undoubtedly true that there were numerous irregularities, in particular with ballot-counting, future research will have to establish whether they decisively altered the outcome of the elections.

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introduce genuine reforms into Serbia's political and economic system, and above all by the brutality and long duration of the civil war. The workers are also dissatisfied with Milošević's demands that they disregard the spiral decline of their wages for the sake of Serbian patriotism. In general, the younger and better educated city-dwellers are moving away from Milošević, while the pensioners and the countryside still support him.

Paradoxically, Milošević has been helped by the international embargo on trade, air traffic and cultural exchange that the United Nations imposed on Yugoslavia (that is, on Serbia and Montenegro) in May 1992. Even those Serbs free of nationalist passions felt that the Western approach to the Yugoslav crisis lacked balance—it recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992, just a month after it had declared its independence, without any consideration for the rights of Serbs there and, once the war started, disregarded Muslim responsibility for the crisis and the fact that fully one-third of Bosnia-Herzegovina was conquered by the regular troops of the Croatian army.

Milošević is now one of the most mistrusted politicians in the world—Warren Zimmermann, the last American ambassador to Yugoslavia, described him as "the slickest con man in the Balkans." Milošević, who always made careful estimates of the intentions, interests and power of both his opponents and his allies, has apparently underestimated the entire international community. Yet Milošević can be trusted, not because he has undergone a sudden conversion and become a sincere champion of peace, but simply because he is scared.

Milošević now realizes that despite his political acumen and brutal methods, he has failed to unite all Serbs into one state, since the international community is refusing to recognize any changes by force of borders between Serbia and Croatia and between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He is also aware that Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be allowed to keep almost two-thirds of this former Yugoslav republic that they have conquered. Milošević is afraid for his power and perhaps also for his life. That fear, which had been his faithful ally in manipulating the Serbian masses and in win-

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ning over party cadres and the Yugoslav army, has now turned against him.

Essentially an opportunist, Milošević is now ready to make genuine compromises. But it may be too late for that. In spite of his support for the Vance-Owens peace plan, an overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs totally oppose it—as the mid-May referendum clearly showed. The Vance-Owen plan proposes the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten units and gives Serbs considerable autonomy in those units where they would be in the majority. Yet it also demands that Serbs return to Muslims almost half of the territory they now control and preserves Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified state with a multiethnic government.

Bosnian Serbs are undoubtedly greedy to want to keep as much territory as possible. But this is not the main reason for their obstinacy. The fear of living with Muslims and Croats in any form of a common state is a much more important reason. And this fear, for which Milošević bears great responsibility, is proving stronger than either Milošević's authority as president of Serbia, or his threats to cut all transport, except for food and medical aid, from Serbia into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Nationalist extremists in Serbia increasingly consider Milošević a traitor, and yet the numerous Serbs who have been against him are not coming over to his side. The world is skeptical of his newly found role as peacemaker and will expect many more proofs of his peaceful intentions before it readmits Serbia into the international community. The man who not so long ago had united most Serbs around him by the ruthless exploitation of fear has now lost control of that fear and is increasingly alone.

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Invitation To War

William Pfaff

THE MODERNITY OF ANCIENT HATREDS

WAR IN THE BALKANS is widely thought to be atavistic, the product of a perverse time warp that unloads fourteenth-century hatreds at the edge of the Europe of Maastricht, high-speed trains and the Single Market. Its cruelty is imputed to impulses beyond modern grasp or response. This is mystification by history.

The situation in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe is the result of perfectly understandable forces and events of recent times: nineteenth-century romanticism, the emergence of the modern nation state after the French Revolution, the collapse of Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. Yugoslavia itself did not exist until 1918. Its supposedly primordial hatreds are a twentieth-century phenomenon.

The forces at work in contemporary ethnic war are neither ancient for the most part, nor incomprehensible. They are a modern affair, and a great deal could be done to contain their atrocious consequences. The most important step would be for NATO to guarantee against forcible change of those political frontiers in Eastern, East-Central and Balkan Europe that have not yet been violated but are threatened because of ethnic claims and rivalries. This guarantee would have to come from NATO, as the United Nations has lost its military credibility in the course of the Yugoslav affair. Such a guarantee would be politically difficult to organize but is militarily feasi-

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ble. NATO is the true Great Power in Europe today. If this is not done, ethnic conflict risks dominating the course of events in the eastern half of Europe and the former Soviet Union for years to come, with serious jeopardy to the narrow but crucial gains that European (and Western) political civilization has made since 1945.

Already the sanctions broken in the Yugoslav war, the thresholds of law and international convention breached, the conventions of civilized political conduct violated, and the precedents of atrocity thus far set, have undermined that qualified confidence in the future of international relations that seemed to be justified by communism's collapse, political union in Europe, and the achievements of Western political cooperation. It was possible to believe that a new form of international order and cooperation might be extended eastward in Europe, eventually to incorporate the former Soviet Union itself. Instead, the assumption that atrocity is natural to the Balkans has rationalized the United States' and the West's acquiescence in aggressive war and their indirect collaboration in Yugoslavia's ethnic cleansing over the past two years. U.N. humanitarian interventions have in practice facilitated ethnic purge, and the Vance-Owen plan, meant to bring peace to Yugoslavia, would only ratify ethnic cleansing's outcome. New ethnic violence is thus invited elsewhere, outside the former Yugoslavia and inside Serbia itself, where the party that now holds 30 percent of the parliamentary seats demands the expulsion of all the Hungarians, Croatians, Slovenes, Muslim Albanians and Slovaks still inside Serbia's borders. More than 100,000 non-Serbs have already left the province of Vojvodina, largely populated by Hungarians. Hungary itself consequently risks becoming involved in the conflict, as does Albania, which is rightly concerned with the fate of the Muslim minority inside Serbia and Montenegro.

THE DELUSION OF ETHNIC PURITY

THE ETHNIC STATE is a product of the political imagination; it does not exist in reality. Ethnic nationalism is the product of a certain idea of the nation that originated in German romanticism and the German cultural and intellectual reaction to the universalizing

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ideas of the French Enlightenment and Revolution and other revolutionary wars. Romanticism glorified native earth, instinct, the priority of emotion over abstraction and thought, and hence the unity of "race" and state. It has, on the other hand, been the distinctive quality of the liberal democracies that they respect a principle of citizenship that is indifferent to "race." The two contemporary liberal states of which this is not true are Germany and Japan, and the drama of twentieth-century history for each has been closely connected to their traditional conceptions of themselves as racially exclusive. (Germany even now is altering its law of citizenship, in order to move away from the presumption that a German "race" exists.) Lord Acton, the great nineteenth-century liberal historian, wrote that by "attacking nationality in Russia, by delivering it in Italy, by governing in defiance of it in Germany and Spain," France's Revolutionary and Napoleonic armies had "called a new power into existence." Those conquered resisted the foreigner's rule, whatever his claim to be a liberator. "The protest against the domination of race over race ... grew into a condemnation of every state that included different races, and finally became the complete and consistent theory, that the state and the nation must be co-extensive." Thus did the ethnic state originate. The principle of universal national self-determination is, Acton concluded, "a retrograde step in history."

The idea of the ethnic nation is a permanent provocation to war.

No nation in Europe is ethnically pure. All are intermixtures of successive migrations of peoples. The nineteenth-century idea of the ethnic state was nonetheless made the basis of the First World War settlements in East-Central and Southeastern Europe and was enshrined in the U.N. Charter in 1945. The right to self-determination of the ethnic nation has been a principle of American foreign policy (if often observed in the breach) since 1917.

The ethnic definition of citizenship makes citizenship a matter of nature itself, of "race." Serbia's war to create a Greater Serbia is a logical application of the ethnic principle. All Serbs outside Serbia's borders have to be brought into a single state. Until then, the Serbian

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nation is persecuted and oppressed, threatened (to use the vocabulary current today in Belgrade) with "extermination." It equally follows from this principle that Hungarians outside Hungary cannot be allowed to rest until they are reunited with the Hungarians of Hungary proper—which is impossible other than at the expense of four other nations that consider the regions populated by these Hungarians as historically their own, and whose own populations in those regions would in some new, if hypothetical, "greater" Hungary naturally become in their turn national minorities (and no doubt irredentists).

The idea of the ethnic nation thus is a permanent provocation to war. It is an idea that makes spies and prospective insurgents of those who have the misfortune to live outside the shifting frontiers identified with their nationality, inviting their persecution by the people among whom they live, and rationalizing national expansion by the governments to which they are ethnically attached.

The ethnic state's contradictory and potentially catastrophic consequences manifested themselves in the 1930s, were suppressed by Stalin and by the Cold War, and now are liberated—if that is the word—by the Cold War's end. They are the reality of contemporary Southeastern Europe and the Soviet successor states. However, the international community is not helpless before the consequences of this idea. The West's passivity and incompetence in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, hardly inevitable, has been the result of choices made by Western governments.

Yugoslavia's "ethnic war" is waged among three communities possessing no distinct physical characteristics or separate anthropological or "racial" origins. They are the same people. They have distinct histories, which is another matter. Moreover, these histories overlap; they are not exclusive. The notion of an exclusive, and exclusionary, ethnic existence for each of the Yugoslav peoples is an invention. Hungary is the principal state in southeastern Europe that can make a serious claim to be a "race." The Hungarians are a central Asian people who arrived in this region in the ninth century, and whose Finno-Ugric language is linked to Finnish and Estonian and has nothing to do with the languages of Hungary's neighbors.

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The Albanians are a non-Slav people speaking an Indo-European language. The Romanians speak a Latin language dating from their incorporation into the Roman empire. Here and elsewhere the original populations have subsequently absorbed other migrant peoples: Goths, Huns, Avars and others. The Romanians' claim that they are a Roman nation, reemerging, as R.W. Seton-Watson put it, "after a thousand years of silence," requires the most serious qualification. Modern Macedonians are Slavs, not the Macedonians of antiquity—as the Greek government, which opposes Macedonia's recognition as "Macedonia," has recently gone to intemperate efforts to explain. The idea that the origins of modern Greece itself lie in Attic Greece is the invention of wishful Greek intellectuals in the nineteenth century and of romantic English Hellenophiles.

Yugoslavs, Czechs, Slovaks, modern Macedonians and Bulgarians, on the other hand, all are Slavic peoples, whose difference from the Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, etc., is largely a function of the period of their migration into the areas where they now live. The "South Slavs"—Serbs, Croatians and Bosnian Muslims—are all the same people, speaking the same language, although the Serbs write it in the Cyrillic alphabet and the Croatians in the Latin. They are physically indistinguishable. They became separated because in the early Middle Ages larger events put them into different historical camps, when Christianity divided between Rome and Constantinople over the momentous issue of the day: whether the Third Entity of the Holy Trinity "proceeded" or "went forth" from both Father and Son, as a phenomenon of love rather than generation, or from the Father alone, as the Eastern bishops seemed to defend. The Serbs found themselves under Byzantine jurisdiction and the Croats under that of Rome.

What today are the Bosnians were on the eastern side of this divide, and Bosnia's Muslims are generally thought to have at that time been believers in the Bogomil heresy, a dualism or Manicheanism that said that all material creation is evil, and which was linked to the Albigensian or Cathar heresy in southern France. When Bosnia-Herzegovina was overrun by the Muslim Turks in the fifteenth century, these Bogomils are presumed to have concluded

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that, as the Orthodox Church had persecuted them, it was safer to make allies of the Moslem conquerors, which was also a sound career move, placing them in the ruling camp. Orthodox Christianity survived chiefly in the countryside, among Serbian peasants, while the Islamic converts became prosperous and urbanized, as they have remained to the present day. There is a marked element of class war in today's "ethnic" war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A WAR OF HISTORIES AND VALUES

YUGOSLAVIA'S THEN is a war of histories, not ethnicity—unless, of course, the term ethnicity is considered to incorporate history as well, which would seem to rob it of its utility. But while each of the camps in today's war includes people who think they are avenging events from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries (from the battle of Kosovo to the Serbian military settlements' loss of privileges under Austrian rule), the political struggle between Serbs and Croatians is mainly an affair of the twentieth century, and their military conflict began only in 1941. There is no ancient and irrational conflict between them that exempts them from responsibility for their actions or from accountability to the norms of modern international law.

Since their liberation from the Ottoman Empire early in the nineteenth century, the Serbs have tried to unite the South Slavs, claiming primacy among them as the largest of them and the first to win modern independence. However, the Serb minority inside Hapsburg Hungary cooperated politically with the Croatians until the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Then, in 1917, Serbia was chiefly responsible for the creation of Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of the South Slavs, under a Serbian monarch. The French historian of Yugoslavia, Paul Garde, says,

> The first real manifestation of hostility dates from 1902, when the Serbs, proud of the renaissance of their people, began to contest the separate existence of a distinct Croatian nation, and a Serbian journalist in Zagreb, Nikola Stojanovic, published an article with the provocative title, 'Either Your Destruction or Ours,' which caused anti-Serbian riots. Nevertheless ... the gulf did not really open until 1918, when to their mutual unhappiness, the two

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people were united in a single state, the Yugoslav monarchy, where one of them, the Serbs, exercised an absolute domination, and the other was treated as a negligible entity. All the rest has come from that.[1]

The struggle in Yugoslavia has today also become a war of political values, which is the particular reason why it is of importance to the future of neighboring regions. The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo is formally committed to the principles of the nonethnic, secular democratic state, in which all of the communities of the former Yugoslavia could continue to live in association, as they did under Tito. The Bosnian people have, as the novelist Miroslav Karaulac bitterly remarks, "acquired the fatal habit of living together, a quality which the various armies now fighting one another are, by means of a bloodbath, attempting to correct."

The Serbian nationalists who are chiefly, although by no means exclusively, responsible for the war, deny the possibility of living together, insisting that historical fatality makes coexistence impossible. Yet coexistence was the reality of Yugoslavia from 1917 until 1991, with the exception of the four Second World War years, which saw a genocidal assault upon the Serbs by Croatia's fascist collaborationist wartime government—one cause of the atrocities practiced by Serbs in recent months. The Serbian nationalists and irredentists have spent the past 18 months working to turn their assertion of the impossibility of coexistence into fact, and for practical purposes have now undoubtedly succeeded. Hannah Arendt observed 50 years ago in connection with Stalinism and Nazism that it is quite possible, through lies accompanied by violence, to manufacture fact.

THE DANGERS OF TIMIDITY

THE RESPONSE of the international community to the Yugoslav war has been a timid and unsuccessful effort to find a negotiated solution while halting the fighting and atrocities. In the course of this, the U.N. Security Council and the European Community have for practical purposes accepted the results of Serbian and Croatian aggres-

[1] *Le Monde*, Aug. 18, 1992.

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sion and "ethnic cleansing" as faits accomplis. The International Court of Justice at The Hague, the highest instance of international law, has declined to accept the Bosnian government's complaint of international aggression. The United Nations and the European Community have proposed to enforce Bosnia-Herzegovina's ethnic partition by means of a reinforced military intervention to impose observance of the Vance-Owen plan—should that plan ever actually be accepted.

The international significance of these policies lies chiefly in the influence they will have upon the other territorially irreconcilable ethnic claims being made elsewhere. Tension exists between Hungary and several of its neighbors with Hungarian minorities. Hungary's present borders are those of the Treaty of Trianon of 1920, which partitioned Austria-Hungary in order to create the new ethnic states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and to reward Romania for having fought on the Allied side in the First World War—as well as for having invaded Hungary in 1919 to overthrow the communist seizure of power there, led by Béla Kun.

The Vance-Owen plan could only intensify insecurities and perpetuate national revanchism.

There were, until recent events in Vojvodina, 350,000 Hungarians inside Serbia, two million in Romania, 600,000 in Slovakia, and 170,000 in Ukraine. The Hungarians in Serbia now experience the apparent overture to active ethnic cleansing. There are serious difficulties between Hungarians in Romanian Transylvania and the Romanian authorities, particularly those at the local level. Hungary's concern to defend these Hungarians abroad is usually interpreted in the other countries as a potential threat to their territorial integrity. This can scarcely be thought surprising when the Prime Minister of Hungary, Jozsef Antall, a Christian Democrat with the reputation and record of a moderate, claims that he is "prime minister in the soul of fifteen million Hungarians"—there being only 10.5 million Hungarians inside Hungary. In January the Hungarian minister of defense, Lajos Für, declared that "fifteen million Hungarians have their eyes fixed on us. We must prove ourselves worthy of this historic challenge."

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The implication is that the Hungarians of Romanian Transylvania, of Vojvodina in Serbia, and those in southern Slovakia and Ukraine are not unqualifiedly the citizens of the countries in which they live, but "in their soul" give their allegiance to the prime minister of Hungary. Equally implicit in the Hungarian officials' statements is that someday Hungary will have to do something about this situation of Hungarians abroad. The Hungarians have refused thus far to include an engagement of mutual respect for the existing frontier in a projected new treaty with Romania. The danger in all of this is obvious. There is serious risk in the deteriorating and persecuted condition of the Albanian majority in the province of Kosovo in Serbia, and in Sanjak, near Montenegro, provoking instability on the Albanian and Macedonian borders of the new, truncated Yugoslavia, with Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey all interested parties.

Any new attempt to find solutions based on the principle of ethnic self-determination is likely to prove as vain, if not destructive, as it has been in the past. The insecurity of ethnic minorities and majorities cannot be eliminated by redrafting maps, as in the Vance-Owen plan, since no map can satisfactorily separate the nationalities of the region and satisfy their ambitions and historical claims. These are the reasons why the Vance-Owen plan could only intensify insecurities and perpetuate the intellectual, political and moral corruption of national revanchism and ethnic revindication. No attempt to rework the territorial divisions of the region on ethnic lines or to put minorities under U.N. protection can be expected to work other than through internationally imposed population transfers of an utterly unacceptable scale and nature.

The Vance-Owen plan would not even make peace in Bosnia, since the Bosnian Serbs consider themselves cheated by its terms, and remain determined eventually to link the newly designated Serbian cantons with Serbia proper, so as to create a Greater Serbia. The other communities rightly regard themselves victimized by the Serbs and will await their opportunity for revenge. It is at best a plan for an armistice, during which the United Nations will attempt to protect the Bosnian Serbs against their victims, and at the same time prevent them from extending their holdings. This military assignment is far

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more daunting and open-ended than a direct military intervention to halt the aggression would have been two years ago, or even in summer 1992. A military intervention to impose the Vance-Owen settlement upon a population that is virtually unanimous in rejecting it is a task without practical limits or a reasonable prospect of success.

THE SANCTITY OF BORDERS

SMALL WARS in the Balkans do not directly threaten the West's security today because Great Power Europe is not, as it was in 1914, a tinderbox awaiting a light. The danger that comes from successful aggression and ethnic purge in Yugoslavia is primarily moral and political, since these events contradict the reign of order and legality produced in Western Europe, and among the democracies as a whole, since the end of the Second World War. An effective international guarantee of existing frontiers in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, so as to deprive transnational ethnic rivalry of its political and military explosiveness, could provide one substantial form of defense against the spread of violence and disorder. Such a guarantee would undoubtedly have to be implemented by NATO, itself a model of multinational cooperation among nations whose history until 1945 was of hatreds and war. This guarantee would give the governments of Eastern Europe the assurance, warning and relief of knowing that the Western powers have collectively undertaken to prevent any new frontier change in the region that has not been peacefully negotiated by the interested parties and condoned by international consensus.

The guarantee would have to be credible. Any violation or threat to a frontier should produce a NATO deployment in the threatened country in support of its territorial defense. The NATO force must be given a mandate to fight if necessary. There would also have to be diplomatic intervention and generally a more activist and interventionist Western policy in defense of national minority rights in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The precedents and legal basis for this already exist in the institutions of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. They are not yet effectively used.

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It is a policy on which agreement seems achievable, reuniting the Western powers divided by the Yugoslav tragedy, by giving them a common positive program. It is capable of recovering for the West moral as well as political ground lost by their fiasco in Yugoslavia. It could lay a base of stability for the construction in Eastern Europe of interstate relations of security and confidence, freed of the threat of transnational ethnic claims, offering the possibility for a peaceful clarification and improvement of the status of ethnic minorities, and perhaps opening the way to an eventual mutual security arrangement among the East European governments themselves, possibly in a new association with NATO.

One speaks of such a new association with reference to Southeastern and Eastern Europe alone, and not the Soviet successor states, because political realism, a sense of what is attainable, so dictates. The ethnic conflicts of the ex-Soviet states are beyond the competence of the Western powers to influence constructively (rather than destructively), and for the most part are beyond their practical reach. The West effectively has already decided to make no attempt to interfere in conflicts in the ex-Soviet Confederation of Independent States, other than, probably, the case of an attempt by Russia to reincorporate the Baltic nations. There is little the West can actually do about the outcome of struggles between Azeris and Armenians, Tajik Muslims and National Communists, the peoples of Ingushetia and Northern Ossetia, and those of Southern Ossetia and Georgians. These also may reasonably, if cruelly, be judged to be of slight consequence to the West, except as they may destabilize Russia's recovery.

The Balkan and East European situations are different. An enlarged Balkan war, potentially involving Greece and Turkey, both NATO members, or Hungary, a candidate for European Community membership, or Bulgaria, could not be without serious consequences for Germany, Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Russia, which has historical and emotional links to Bulgaria and Serbia—therefore affecting the security of the United States as well.

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THE MORAL PRECEDENT

NOTHING RATIONALIZES the horrors inflicted on and by the peoples of former Yugoslavia during the past 18 months. Certainly history does not justify them. These atrocities have been possible only by a deliberate submission by the individuals involved to a collective nihilism of essentially ideological origin. This fact is apparent in the chronic drunkenness of militiamen who live with the knowledge that they have murdered and raped their neighbors and friends. It is evident in the lies coolly spoken by the Bosnian Serb physicians and university professors who, from their headquarters in the hills over Sarajevo, direct their campaign of ethnic purification. For all of them the passage to a radiant future (or a radiant past, as it has been better put) passes through a darkened tunnel of repudiation of what they have been until now, as citizens of the Yugoslav state that existed since 1918 and as professionals and intellectuals, men and women. They are deep in this tunnel now, and many are frightened to emerge. It is visible in their faces.

The same thing can certainly happen elsewhere, as it has happened before—and not that long ago. The West has managed to survive the totalitarian experience and the horrors then committed, constructing a novel community of liberal states that has seemed to contain in it a promise of expansion from its Atlantic and West European core, so as to bring other states into a moral as well as political community in which war has been ruled out as an agency of national interest. What has gone on in Yugoslavia constitutes a savage challenge to this order. If events in Yugoslavia are allowed to set the precedent for the conduct of other peoples caught up in the passionate fictions of ethnicity, the consequences will be very bad for everyone. This does not have to be so. But there is little evidence yet of a Western willingness to do the practical things that might prevent so dark an outcome.

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A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing

Andrew Bell-Fialkoff

REVISITING THE SINS OF ANTIQUITY

THE SERBIAN CAMPAIGN to "cleanse" a territory of another ethnic group, while gruesome and tragic, is historically speaking neither new nor remarkable. Population removal and transfer have occurred in history more often than is generally acknowledged. The central aim of the Serbian campaign—to eliminate a population from the "homeland" in order to create a more secure, ethnically homogeneous state—is in some ways as old as antiquity. Moreover, despite greater international attention and condemnation, such campaigns have only intensified in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Despite its recurrence, ethnic cleansing nonetheless defies easy definition. At one end it is virtually indistinguishable from forced emigration and population exchange while at the other it merges with deportation and genocide. At the most general level, however, ethnic cleansing can be understood as the expulsion of an "undesirable" population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.

Under this definition, then, the slow dispersal and annihilation of North America's indigenous population was indeed ethnic cleansing. In their efforts to gain and secure the frontier, American settlers

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"cleansed" most Indians from their lands, even though the process was slow and, until the nineteenth century, carried out mainly under private initiative. On the other hand, the removal of thousands of Africans from their home continent, however harsh and despite the fact that it denuded many regions of their original inhabitants, would not be considered ethnic cleansing. The aim was to import a desired slave population, not to expel any particular group.

Ethnic cleansing has taken many forms. The forced resettlement of a "politically unreliable" population—one conquered and incorporated into an empire yet still likely to rebel—dates from the eighth century BC. That practice was revived, however, as late as the 1940s in the Soviet Union. As part of a general process toward greater homogeneity within states that began in the Middle Ages, "ethnic" cleansing took on medieval notions of religious purity, targeting minorities of "nonbelievers," whether Catholic or Protestant, Muslim or Jew. With the profound secularization of the modern world, cleansing later manifested itself in political ideology, namely as part of communism and fascism.

Nationalism, too, as a kind of modern religion, contains quasi-spiritual aspects that lend to its most extreme manifestation a desire to "purify" the nation of "alien" groups. The important difference between modern ethnic cleansing and the patterns established in the Middle Ages is that in religious cleansing a population often had the choice of conversion. In purely ethnic cleansing that option does not exist; a population must move or die.

FROM ASSYRIA TO SERBIA

HISTORICAL CONTEXT should help illustrate ethnic cleansing's long evolution, motivations and various expressions, as well as its return to Europe on the cusp of the 21st century. Many of today's liberal democratic states have, at some point in their histories, conducted campaigns to displace religious or ethnic minorities, events from which virtually no European nation has been exempt.

The earliest example was cleansing carried out by Tiglath-Pileser III (745–727 BC), the first Assyrian ruler to make forced resettlement

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a state policy. Under his reign about half the population of a conquered land would be carried off, and its place taken by settlers from another region. Tiglath's heirs continued this policy and, over the centuries, so too did the Babylonians, Greeks and Romans, although not always on the same scale and often for the prevailing economic reason of slavery.

Once these ancient empires had rent the organic links among ethnicity, belief and political citizenship, religion became the primary basis of collective identity. In the Middle Ages cleansing was thus applied primarily to religious, as opposed to ethnic, minorities, as medieval Christianity attempted to impose orthodoxy on nonbelievers. Despite prior episodes of religious suppression, such as early Christians in Rome or the persecution of non-Zoroastrians in Persia in the fourth century, it was only during the Middle Ages that persecution of religious minorities became fully institutionalized for substantial periods.

Massacre and expulsion were the most common methods of religious cleansing, which tended to target Jews, the only sizable minority in most countries. Jews were thus expelled from England (1290), France (1306), Hungary (1349–1360), Provence (1394 and 1490), Austria (1421), Lithuania (1445), Cracow (1494), Portugal (1497) and numerous German principalities at various times. Spain was unique among European countries because of its sizable Muslim population. Having "tried" massacre in 1391, Spain expelled its Jews in 1492, then its Muslims in 1502, forcibly Christianizing the remaining Muslims in 1526 and finally expelling all Moriscos (converted Muslims) in 1609–14.

In 1530 the Confession of Augsburg had explicitly laid down the principle of religious homogeneity as the basis of political order. *Cuius regio, eius religio* meant in effect that medieval states had begun to shape an orthodox citizenry. Thus by revoking the Edict of Nantes in 1685, France indeed initiated a process of "self-cleansing," as thousands of Protestant Huguenots fled once denied freedom of worship. In this way, the Confession can be considered the ideological cornerstone of modern cleansing, a process only possible in centralized, absolutist states capable of enforcing "purity."

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Although still couched in religious terms, the first cleansings based primarily on ethnic discrimination were carried out by England. In the 1640s and 1650s, when war and plague swept away half the Irish population, England seized the opportunity to expel most of the remaining Irish Catholics from Ulster until, by 1688, 80 percent of their land was owned by English and Scottish Protestants. London's motivation was primarily strategic: to prevent Catholic Ireland from offering Catholic Spain or France a base of operations. Displacement of the Irish population thus completed a kind of historical cycle, as cleansing returned to patterns formerly established by the Assyrians and Romans.

Only in the nineteenth century did the complete destruction of an ethnic group manifest itself as the goal of a state.

In North America, meanwhile, those survivors of the sweeping removals of native Americans conducted in the 1830s were settled in the Indian Territory. Then the 1862 Homestead Act opened up much of the remaining Indian lands to white settlers. In the two decades after 1866 the federal government proceeded to assign Indian tribes to reservations. Those previously unconquered—the Sioux, Comanche, Arapaho and others—resisted and were subsequently crushed.

It was only in the nineteenth century that the complete destruction of an ethnic group manifested itself as the goal of a state, when Turkey began directing cleansing efforts against Greeks and Armenians. Having come to view those minorities as enemies within, the Turkish sultan Abdul Hamid II encouraged Kurdish depredations on Armenian villages until hostilities grew into a veritable war. By 1894 Turkish regular troops had joined with the Kurds, and about 200,000 Armenians were killed. In the 1915 holocaust, Armenians lost an estimated 1.5 million people—more than half their population—as well as about 90 percent of their ethnic territory. Despite the strains brought about by the First World War, that genocide was clearly the continuation, on a larger scale, of ongoing Turkish attempts to eliminate the entire Armenian population.

By the middle of the twentieth century cleansing was indeed car-

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ried out on purely ethnic grounds, an outgrowth of paranoid fascist nationalism that viewed "alien" groups as a threat to ethnic "purity." It is with the Nazi campaigns against Jews that ethnic cleansing reached its height: annihilation. Although Jews had for centuries been the victims of various forms of religious persecution, twentieth-century nationalism lent Central and East European anti-Semitism a largely ethnic character.

The Nazi campaigns were an ethnic cleansing in the sense that they were intended to remove Jews from territories of the Reich. The German term *Judenrein*, "clean of Jews," which was used to designate areas from which all Jews had been deported, testifies to this fact. But the Holocaust was much more. It combined elements of deportation, expulsion, population transfer, massacre and genocide. In that way it was "complete," truly a final solution. Altogether about six million European Jews were murdered between 1933 and 1945. About 250,000 Gypsies and an equal number of gays were also killed by the Nazis.

The Germans also practiced cleansing through deportation alone, without (immediate) extermination; for instance the Germanization of Polish territories incorporated into the Reich. Starting in October 1939 at Gdynia, expulsion orders were often issued without warning and implemented at night. Deportees were given between 20 minutes and two hours to collect what was usually limited to one suitcase containing personal effects. German authorities made no provisions for these deportees either on their way to or in those Polish areas not incorporated into the Reich, where they were dumped. In the first two years of German occupation 1.2 million Poles and 300,000 Jews were transferred from these incorporated territories in the largest, but by no means only, cleansing implemented by the Germans.

Hitler also carried out a kind of reverse cleansing in his effort to consolidate the Reich. Ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) were in effect cleansed from Eastern Europe as they were recalled and resettled in Hitler's occupied territories, especially western Poland. By spring 1942 more than 700,000 Germans (and non-Germans claiming German origin) had been transferred from the Baltic states, Bukovina, South Tyrol and elsewhere, and resettled in territories Hitler sought to Germanize.

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After Hitler's megalomaniacal efforts began to collapse, advancing Russian armies in turn forced most Germans back in their path. What ensued was the largest and most sweeping ethnic cleansing in history: the removal of over ten million Germans from Eastern Europe. The final decision to remove German populations from Eastern Europe was taken by the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain on August 2, 1945, in Potsdam. It is impossible to give exact figures, but it is estimated that nearly 12 million Germans were cleansed from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia after World War II. About 2.1 million of these died from a combination of war, hunger, cold and disease.

Germans were not the only group slated for cleansing. The Czech government, with Stalin's consent, expelled 25,000 to 30,000 Hungarians by the end of 1945. For various reasons, the Czech government later preferred to settle "the Hungarian problem" through population exchange. A 1946 agreement between Hungary and Czechoslovakia allowed for the eventual exchange of 31,000 Magyars for 33,000 Slovaks. After both countries were communized the exchange ceased.

Within its own borders, the Soviet Union also cleansed about 600,000 people from regions that had proved themselves "unreliable" in the war, such as the autonomous Kalmyk, the Checheno-Ingush republic and the Karachaev region in northern Caucasus. During the war Crimean Tartars formally requested permission from Romania, the occupying power, to exterminate all Russians remaining in the peninsula. When that request was denied, the Tartar Council organized a mass slaughter on its own, killing between 70,000 and 120,000 Russians. Consequently, Tartars too were transferred en masse by the Soviets after the war.

Twentieth-century communist ideology introduced yet another type of cleansing, that of economic class. The destruction of propertied classes in Stalinist Russia or Maoist China bore all the markings, including vocabulary, of an "ethnic" cleansing. Marx applied Christian rejection of the Jew, once based on religion but during his time transformed into racialism, to class analysis and the elimination of certain "parasitic" groups. In this way, the patterns of "self-cleans-

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ing" established in the Middle Ages had returned yet again, this time manifested in the modern totalitarian state's own mechanism for ensuring "purity," the purge.

THE BALKAN TRAGEDY: ACT II

EVENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA cannot be fully understood without their historical antecedents. Especially in the Balkans, ongoing cycles of tragedy and atrocity remain historically fresh and provide not only the context but the basis for today's brutal cleansing campaigns. The gruesome events being played out in former Yugoslavia are merely the second act of a tragedy that opened in April 1941.

Only about fifty years ago—that is within the lifetime of an individual—Croatian nationalists carried out massacres of Serb civilians in a Nazi puppet state comprising most of today's Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ustashi, as these nationalists were known, regarded Croatia's more than two million Serbs as a threat to national integrity. The Croatian minister of education, for example, speaking at a banquet in June 1941, remarked that "one-third of the Serbs we shall kill, another we shall deport and the last we shall force to embrace the Roman Catholic religion and thus meld them into Croats." This policy was officially enunciated later the same month by the governor of western Bosnia, Viktor Gutich. In a speech at Banya Luka, Gutich urged that the city, and all of Croatia, be "thoroughly cleansed of Serbian dirt."

What followed was less a cleansing than a wholesale massacre. The list of atrocities is staggering and seemingly endless. In one instance, in August 1941 in the small Bosnian town of Sanski Most, two thousand local Serbs were killed in three days of executions. In other villages Serbs were rounded up and burned in their churches. Those trying to escape were gunned down. Others were killed along ditches and then buried, or dumped into rivers. So many corpses were thrown into the Danube in the summer of 1941 that German authorities were forced to close the river to swimming. Some atrocities defy belief. The Croatian führer, Ante Pavelich, is supposed to have shown the Italian author Curzio Malaparte a 40-pound basket of human

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eyes gouged from his Serbian victims. Between May and October 1941 it is estimated that the Ustashi killed between 300,000 and 340,000 Serbs.

The extermination of Serbs was part of a wider campaign by Germany and its allies. Hungarians who occupied parts of Yugoslavia massacred the Serbian population of two large villages on the Serbian Orthodox Christmas in January 1942, and killed another 15,000 Serbs and Jews in Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina. About 2,000 of these were thrown alive into holes in the frozen Danube. Bulgarians too obliterated several villages in southern Serbia. Altogether about 750,000 Serbs, 60,000 Jews and 25,000 Gypsies were annihilated. Others were expelled. In a clear example of cleansing, Bulgaria uprooted 120,000 Serbs, and Hungary 70,000, from their portions of occupied Yugoslavia. The deportees were given 24 hours' notice and allowed one suitcase and about six dollars.

When the Croatian army finally surrendered in May 1945, the British promptly turned over their prisoners to Marshal Josip Tito's Partisans. The Croats were immediately marched south into Yugoslavia. Some 5,000 were shot just within the borders of Slovenia, and over the next few days an additional 40,000 were killed. Serbs marched several "death columns" across the country on foot, denying their prisoners either food or water. Villagers along the route were forbidden to offer the Croats food or drink, and all those who could not complete the journey were shot. The exact number of Croats who died is uncertain, but it is estimated at about 100,000. Such was the Serbian revenge.

To some the horrors of a half-century ago may seem remote or unreal, but to many in the Balkans these atrocities remain vivid to this day. One Serb in ten died in that war, virtually every family lost someone, and many of the survivors are still living. Thus even before the country collapsed, population transfers were discussed extensively in the Yugoslav media. In 1991 the popular Serbian magazine *Nin* featured an article about (voluntary) population exchange between Serbia and Croatia. Bosnia and Krajina (a Serb enclave in Croatia), it said, would remain in Yugoslavia. Serbs living in areas with a Croatian majority would resettle in Vojvodina and other areas where

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the Serb component had to be strengthened. Croats from Bosnia and Krajina would settle in Croatia in houses abandoned by the Serbs. The *Nin* article appeared along with the first violent clashes in Croatia, which started in Pakrac on March 1, 1991. Already at that early stage—before Croatia had even declared independence, before full-scale war had even begun—about 20,000 Serbs fled Croatia, most for Vojvodina.

Before full-scale war had even begun about 20,000 Serbs fled from Croatia.

Massive population transfers swelled as fighting intensified among Yugoslavia's various factions. By the beginning of 1992 there were 158,000 refugees in Serbia alone, the vast majority ethnic Serbs. Within one month of Bosnia's declaration of independence on March 3, 1992, some 420,000 people had fled Bosnia or were forced from their homes. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, by the end of that July the number of displaced persons had reached 2.5 million. By August one-third of all Serbs who had resided in Croatia had left; the number of ethnic Croat refugees was estimated at about 10 percent of that republic's Croat population. There were also 50,000 ethnic Magyars who fled to Hungary.

While there are indeed extraordinary numbers of people who have been displaced, not all of them have been technically "cleansed." From the very start, fear itself created large numbers of refugees. There are thus those who fled "voluntarily," like the initial 20,000 Serbs who "moved" to Vojvodina. There are others who, once their towns were taken by enemy forces, were simply too afraid to stay. Such was the evacuation of Jajce, which fell in October 1992, whose 25,000 survivors went to Travnik. These people are technically "voluntary" refugees, but the line separating them from the cleansed has worn increasingly thin.

The thousands who have been forced to leave their towns by partisans in the war, especially those made to leave even after an area has been militarily secured, belong unequivocally to the category of ethnic cleansing. These people are removed for ethnic and strategic considerations and are clearly victims of cleansing campaigns. In the

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Sanjak, for instance, some 70,000 Muslims out of a prewar population of 200,000 were terrorized into fleeing their homes. In another case, Serb guerrillas encircled the village of Turalici, cut off all communications and went door to door, throwing out everyone they could find before setting the village afire. This was a "gentle" cleansing; no one was known to have been killed or raped. Often those carrying out a cleansing loot all they can find—TV sets, washing machines, bicycles. Cleansing thus has economic motivations as well.

These campaigns to create ethnically homogenous regions are, in the history of ethnic cleansing, unique in only a few regards. First, much ethnic cleansing has been carried out not by regular government troops but rather by irregular civilian forces. This is perhaps inevitable in what may be considered a "civil" war. But the fact also attests to the very personal nature of the animosities in many areas of the Balkans, with some families resuming feuds that were frozen since the end of World War II. Civilian fighters have carried out what they understand to be their "duty as patriots," sometimes committing atrocities on their own initiative, even if aware of higher-level, official and semiofficial encouragement and expectations.

Another "innovation" has been the creative use of prisoner of war camps. While the men are held in camps, the women are presented with an ultimatum: the prisoners will be released only if families agree to leave the territory. Some 5,000 Muslim families from Bihac "expressed" such a desire, according to Bosnian Serb authorities, and signed kinds of affidavits to that effect. In August 1992, Croats and Muslims estimated at 70,000 the number of prisoners held by Serbs in some 45 camps; Serbs claimed that 42,000 compatriots were detained in 21 camps, where 6,000 prisoners had died. Since the Serbs control most of Bosnia, they are in a position to conduct much of their cleansing in this manner.

There is also overwhelming evidence of mass rape perpetrated against mostly Muslim, but also Croat, women. The number of women raped is estimated to range from 30,000 to 50,000. Although rape has long been a concomitant of war, organized rape is fairly rare. In the Second World War, for instance, Japanese authorities kidnapped thousands of Korean and Filipino women to serve in army-

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run brothels. In Yugoslavia thousands of women, many of them minors, have also been interned in rape camps. Female refugees have testified to this and other mistreatment, and large numbers of these reports have been documented. The pattern of rape is too consistent and widespread to be dismissed as propaganda or mere lapses in the discipline of individual soldiers. Some Serbian fighters claim they were ordered to rape, just as they were also ordered to kill (mostly male prisoners) in order to "toughen" themselves up.

It is possible that, at least initially, rape was not intended as an instrument of ethnic cleansing. As in many wars, rape may have been viewed with a blind eye, permitted in order to "boost morale" or "reward" the soldier or to inflict lasting humiliation and demoralize the enemy. Cleansing per se may have been an unintended effect. But as the stigma of rape was seen to be effective in driving away women and their families from the lands that Serbs sought to conquer, rape indeed became a new and gruesome weapon in the ancient quiver of ethnic cleansing.

SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLEANSING

THE FORCES THAT DRIVE such atrocities are of course larger and far less scientific than "simple" strategic motivations. The attitudes and emotions that define the relations between different peoples are extraordinarily complex. Discrimination and prejudice provide the thread that ties together the long history of religious and ethnic cleansing.

In the Balkans, too, bigotry has fueled the fighting on all sides. While grudgingly acknowledging that Croats have a higher standard of living—that they are in effect more "European"—Serbs may dismiss them as effete or submissive, a people that has willingly served stronger Austrian or German masters. Likewise, Serbs may regard Bosnian Muslims as the descendants of Slavic "turncoats" who converted to Islam under Turkish rule, a time when it was most opportune. In contrast, the perception is passed among Serbs themselves that they are a heroic, independent and virile race, a tenacious fighting people who were among the first to throw off 400 years of

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Ottoman domination. These historic feats, as well as Serbia's well-established claims to statehood, entitle it to lead the other (often ungrateful) South Slavs, who in turn regard the Serbs as domineering brutes seeking continually to impose their will and to infuse nastiness into their relations with other peoples.

The hollowness and exaggeration of these claims are revealed as each side will alternately emphasize their common roots when it indeed suits its purposes. Before the war, for example, when the Serbs still hoped to keep Bosnia in Yugoslavia, the media frequently highlighted similarities with the Muslims, while Croats often stressed that Bosnia had been part of historical Croatia and that most Bosnian Muslims were originally of Croatian descent.

The difficulty of bridging prejudice will only be compounded by this wellspring of fresh atrocities.

The difficulty of bridging prejudice will only be compounded by the wellspring of fresh atrocities that this latest Balkan war provides. Particularly troubling, if the abuse is indeed as widespread as reported, is how a generation of "half-breed" children, spawned of rape and "corrupted" with the blood of another ethnic group, will be received and cared for among populations that will have concluded a brutal war in which the purity, and indeed the very survival, of nationalities has been held so consciously in the fore.

Ultimately, whether compelled by deliberate attempts at cleansing or by the "voluntary" flight of refugees, the processes that have shifted thousands of lives in the Balkans will accomplish the same end. War, prejudice and a desire, finally, to be left in peace will have transformed the peninsula into a land more closely resembling other parts of Europe that have already undergone their own tragic upheavals. The Balkans too may become a patchwork of ethnically distinct territories. With no sizable minorities left within any state and with the warring factions securely walled off behind "national" boundaries, the best that can be hoped for is that the motors of conflict will be disabled and the fatal cycles of violence that have marred Balkan history will finally have reached their end.

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The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia

Theodor Meron

THE NEED TO ASSERT INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE CREDIBILITY of international humanitarian law demands a war crimes tribunal to hold accountable those responsible for gross violations in the former Yugoslavia. Opponents in the bitter ethnic and religious conflict have subjected civilians to summary execution, torture, rape, mass internment, deportation, destruction or confiscation of property and other violations of their rights. Many thousands have died.

A war crimes tribunal, sought by the U.N. Security Council, would be the first since the Nuremberg and Far East trials following World War II. The Security Council's decision, embodied in U.N. Resolution 808, derives its binding authority from the U.N. Charter's Chapter VII provisions regarding threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. The Security Council's determination that violations of international humanitarian law constitute a threat to international peace and security and that the establishment of the tribunal would contribute to the restoration and the maintenance of peace is of ground-breaking importance. Considered from a different perspective, the Security Council's decision to establish a war

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crimes tribunal reflects the failure of the Security Council's primary mission to end the conflict and the atrocities.

Reaffirming the Nuremberg tenets and the principle of accountability should deter those in Yugoslavia and elsewhere who envisage "final solutions" to their conflicts with ethnic and religious minorities. A war crimes tribunal could also educate the general public not to accept egregious violations of human rights and humanitarian norms. Above all, there is a moral imperative to rigorously prosecute the offenders, given the deliberate, systematic and outrageous nature of the violations in the former Yugoslavia.

WAR CRIMES HISTORY

THERE IS NOTHING new, of course, in prosecuting offenders against the laws and customs of war as reflected in national military codes. For centuries military commanders—from Henry V of England, under his famous ordinances of war in 1419, to the American military prosecutions of soldiers involved in the My Lai massacre under the U.S. Code of Military Justice—have enforced such laws against violators. In other cases, states have brought to trial captured prisoners of war for offenses committed against the customary laws of war. Thus both the accused's own state and the captor state have standing to prosecute. Neither system, however, has functioned with any degree of efficiency. Except in the case of a total defeat or subjugation—for example, Germany after World War II—prosecutions of enemy personnel accused of war crimes have been both rare and difficult. National prosecutions have also been rare because of nationalistic, patriotic or propagandistic considerations.

The Versailles Treaty after World War I illustrates the case of a defeated but not wholly occupied state. Germany was obligated to hand over to the allies for trial about 900 persons accused of violating the laws of war. But even a weak and defeated country such as Germany was able to effectively resist compliance. The allies eventually agreed to trials by German national courts of a significantly reduced number of Germans. The sentences were both few and clement. The Versailles model proved to be clearly disappointing.

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On the other hand, after the four principal victorious and occupying powers established an international military tribunal (IMT) following World War II, several thousand Nazi war criminals were tried either by national courts under Allied Control Council Law No. 10 or by various states under national decrees. Nuremberg's IMT, before which about 20 major offenders were tried, and the national courts functioned reasonably well; the Allies had supreme authority over Germany and thus could often find and arrest the accused, obtain evidence and make arrangements for extradition.

Despite the revolutionary development of human rights in the U.N. era, no attempts have been made to bring to justice such gross perpetrators of crimes against humanity or genocide as Pol Pot, Idi Amin or Saddam Hussein, perhaps because the atrocities in Cambodia, Uganda and Iraq (against the Kurds) did not occur in the context of international wars. Internal strife and even civil wars are still largely outside the parameters of war crimes and the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva conventions.

The Persian Gulf War, as an international war, provided a classic environment for the vindication of the laws of war so grossly violated by Iraq by its plunder of Kuwait, its barbaric treatment of Kuwait's civilian population, its mistreatment of Kuwaiti and allied prisoners of war and during the sad chapter of the U.S. and other hostages. Although the Security Council had invoked the threat of prosecutions of Iraqi violators of international humanitarian law, the ceasefire resolution did not contain a single word regarding criminal responsibility. Instead, the U.N. resolution promulgated a system of war reparations and established numerous obligations for Iraq in areas ranging from disarmament to boundary demarcation.

This result is not surprising, for the U.N. coalition's war objectives were limited, and there was an obvious tension between negotiating a ceasefire with Saddam Hussein and demanding his arrest and trial as a war criminal. A historic opportunity was missed to breathe new life into the critically important concept of individual criminal responsibility for the laws of war violations. At the very least, the Security Council should have issued a warning that Saddam and other responsible Iraqis would be subject to arrest and prosecution

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under the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva conventions whenever they set foot abroad.

NORMS OF DUE PROCESS

TO BE CREDIBLE, an ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia must respect impeccable legality and fairness. For better or worse, the precedent of such a tribunal will be invoked in future situations. The tribunal must comply with the basic norms of due process, including the right of the defendants to counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence and, going beyond the procedural guarantees of Nuremberg, to appeal to an appeals court. The defendants' right to participate in their own defense should preclude in absentia trials, which are inherently vulnerable to abuse.

The rejection of in absentia trials need not, however, lead to the conclusion that nothing should be done. An independent and credible prosecuting authority, acting under the Security Council's mandate, could request arrest warrants from the new tribunal for suspected offenders and call on all states to hand over those persons for trial. Such warrants could clash with the accused's claims of diplomatic or sovereign immunity. Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII must, of course, trump such claims.

Atrocities have been committed by all parties. Fairness and credibility require that the Serbs, although reportedly responsible for most violations, not be the only group prosecuted. Muslims and Croatians who have committed war crimes—or anyone else for that matter—should thus be equally investigated and prosecuted.

The marshaling of evidence strong enough to support convictions in criminal cases will prove difficult, especially as regards senior ranks. The U.N. Kalshoven Commission of experts charged with providing evidence of violations has negligible resources, consisting of only two lawyers and no investigators of its own. Fortunately Canada and the Physicians for Human Rights provided some investigators, but this is hardly enough. In contrast, the prosecution at Nuremberg employed hundreds of lawyers and investigators.

The Kalshoven interim report states that, while grave breaches

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have indeed been committed, tangible evidence has yet to be obtained. There is a world of difference between reliable reports on the events and evidence establishing individual guilt. The Kalshoven database contains information on places, dates, times, victims, types of violations and the identity of the militia involved, but rarely does it include the identity of perpetrators. Weaving together the Kalshoven information with data known to U.N. peacekeeping forces would help, but not overcome the underlying weaknesses. Moreover, proof of command responsibility will be very difficult. In many cases, different and at times obscure militias reporting to unknown or little-known authorities have been involved in successive stages of fighting and violations. In several areas there has been not just one, but several, conflicts between different groups.

A successful tribunal for Yugoslavia will enhance deterrence in future cases; failure may doom it.

In the absence of cooperation by those in control of areas where offenses have been committed, and because the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cannot disclose information incriminating individuals, gathering evidence will remain extremely difficult. If it is not already too late—for evidence might not be preserved much longer—the United Nations and member states must provide the Kalshoven Commission with the necessary resources, and evidence already obtained by other bodies must be fed into the system.

Critics of the Nuremberg trials censured as retroactive the rules of international humanitarian law that formed the basis for the prosecutions. However, the principle of individual responsibility of persons committing or ordering grave breaches of humanitarian law is now generally accepted, as is the list of treaty and customary provisions defining war crimes. In addition, both Nuremberg jurisprudence and the post-Nuremberg international law clearly reject the act of state defense and, except as possibly mitigating circumstances, the defense of superior orders. It is equally evident that the complaint that Nuremberg was a case of victors' justice is irrelevant to the new tribunal.

Although the definition of war crimes is now well developed, the

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same is not true of the penalties provided for the various crimes. The Geneva conventions define offenses but let the contracting states determine the penal sanctions. Under the conventions' universal jurisdiction system, all offenders already are subject to both the jurisdiction and the system of penalties of any state having custody of the offender. The terms of imprisonment imposed by the tribunal should not exceed the penalties stated in national laws implementing the Geneva conventions, especially those of the former Yugoslavia, with which the accused would be familiar. The accused, therefore, could not persuasively argue that they are being subjected to retroactive penal sanctions.

Warnings of war crimes trials have been unsuccessful deterrents in past wars and may prove no more effective in the case of the former Yugoslavia. The precedent and moral considerations for the establishment of the tribunal require action in any event. Furthermore, several factors may yet strengthen deterrence. First, modern media ensures that all actors in the former Yugoslavia know of the steps being taken to establish the tribunal. Second, the tribunal will probably be established while the war is still being waged. Even the worst war criminals involved in the present conflict know that their countries will eventually want to emerge from isolation and be reintegrated into the international community. Moreover, they themselves will want to travel abroad. Normalization of relations and travel would depend on compliance with warrants of arrest. A successful tribunal for Yugoslavia will enhance deterrence in future cases; failure may doom it.

THE LAW TO BE APPLIED

THE 1907 FOURTH Hague Convention, which codified the principal laws of war on land and provided the normative core for the post-World War II war crimes prosecutions, applies to international wars only. Likewise, the other principal prong of the penal laws of war, the Geneva conventions' and Protocol I's grave breaches provisions, is directed toward international wars. Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva conventions, which concerns internal wars, do not

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constitute grave breaches giving rise to universal criminal jurisdiction. Were any part of the former Yugoslav conflict deemed internal rather than international, the perpetrators of even the worst atrocities could not be prosecuted for grave breaches or war crimes but only for the crime of genocide, which is much more difficult to establish, and for crimes against humanity.[1]

Although the war in the former Yugoslavia has been both internal and international, broad consensus outside the region views the fighting to be an international armed conflict to which the totality of the laws of war is applicable, including, of course, the rules governing war crimes. This conclusion is shared by the Kalshoven Commission and by the U.N. secretary general. It is entirely possible, however, that should any trials be held, an individual defendant might try to argue that the conflict was internal and that he or she could not be accused of war crimes under international law.

The first international tribunal established by the international community since World War II should apply only those provisions of international law that are clear and generally accepted and establish the individual criminal liability of persons, not just the civil responsibility of the state. The tribunal's charter should be patterned on Nuremberg, supplemented as necessary by the law developed since. The Nuremberg charter listed three classes of offenses: crimes against peace (which are not relevant here), war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Nuremberg's charter defined war crimes as violations of the laws and customs of war by soldiers and civilians. They included murder; ill-treatment or deportation of a civilian population for slave labor or any other purpose; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas; killing of hostages; plunder of public or private property; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages; and devastation not justified by military necessity. The Nuremberg tribunal decided that these acts had already been recognized as crimes prior to World War II under customary international law, which was codified in the

[1]This may be of particular importance in Kosovo, which is still seen as an internal affair, should conditions there deteriorate further.

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Fourth Hague Convention and the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929.

The 1949 Geneva conventions further codified war crimes by listing violations of certain fundamental norms as "grave breaches," subject to the universal jurisdiction of each contracting party. The conventions contemplate trials by national courts but do not preclude trials before an international tribunal.

Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is of special importance to the prosecution of crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, lists as grave breaches willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer, unlawful confinement, depriving a protected person of the right of a fair and regular trial, the taking of hostages, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

The violence in former Yugoslavia against religious or ethnic groups gives rise to a strong case for genocide.

Croatia and Serbia, in the pact concluded on November 27, 1991, and all the parties involved in the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict, in an accord reached on May 22, 1992, agreed to apply most of the protective provisions of Additional Protocol I, except those concerning grave breaches. Both agreements specified a limited number of applicable articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention, again excluding those listing grave breaches. For the most part, however, the Fourth Geneva Convention concerns customary law and, in many respects, even peremptory norms that cannot be excluded by agreements. The case for applying the grave breaches provisions to the Yugoslav conflict is strengthened by the fact that all states involved have agreed to honor the obligations of the former Yugoslavia under the Geneva conventions. All states have also accepted the "Statement of Principles" approved by the London Conference on Yugoslavia on August 26, 1992, concerning compliance with international humanitarian law and personal responsibility for violations of the conventions.

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Crimes against humanity were defined in the Nuremberg charter as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds. Control Council law No. 10, adopted by the occupying powers as a charter for war crimes trials by their national courts, expanded the list to include rape. A possible option for the Security Council would be to adapt the Nuremberg or Control Council concept of crimes against humanity to the circumstances of Yugoslavia.

The Nuremberg jurisprudence suggested that war crimes, if committed in a widespread, systematic manner on political, racial or religious grounds, may also amount to crimes against humanity. Proof of systematic governmental planning of alleged acts was a necessary element of crimes against humanity. There is no such requirement for war crimes; crimes against humanity are therefore more difficult to establish. The character and systematic nature of some of the atrocities, especially mass murder and ethnic cleansing, make it imperative that appropriate prosecution be based on crimes against humanity and that a precedent be established.

The U.N. Convention on the Prevention or Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines it to include "killing members of the group," "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." The convention requires proving intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. The violence in the former Yugoslavia targeted against religious or ethnic groups, especially in cases of mass killing and ethnic cleansing, gives rise to a strong case for genocide.[2] The crime of genocide is not based on a link to war and is thus equally applicable in times of peace. It is not

[2]On March 20, 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted (civil) proceedings in the International Court of Justice against Serbia and Montenegro for violating the Genocide Convention. On April 8, 1993, the ICJ issued an order calling upon Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to "take all measures within its powers to prevent commission of the crime of genocide" and to ensure that any armed units, organizations and persons that may be subject to its control, direction or influence do not commit any acts of genocide.

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necessary to demonstrate that the perpetrator was acting on behalf of a state.

In its advisory opinion of May 28, 1951, the International Court of Justice stated that the principles underlying the Genocide Convention were "recognized as binding on states even without any conventional obligation." The former Yugoslavia is in fact a party to the Genocide Convention, but the convention's norms applicability can in any case be derived from its customary or peremptory law character. The invocation of the crime of genocide by the international penal tribunal would have importance transcending the case of the former Yugoslavia. Because genocide is not limited to international wars, prosecuting this crime could become a significant deterrent to future atrocities.

DO THE VIOLATIONS FIT THE LAW?

SUMMARY EXECUTIONS, TORTURE, arbitrary mass internment, deportation and displacement, taking of hostages, inhuman treatment of prisoners and destruction or confiscation of private property not justified by military necessity would all be covered by war crimes under customary international law and by the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva conventions. When committed on a mass scale, such violations would also give rise to charges of crimes against humanity and of genocide, provided that the Genocide Convention's requirements are met, and should be prosecuted as such.

Under the weight of the horrifying reports of abuse against women, readiness to clarify the status of rape as a crime under international law has rapidly formed. Despite the fact that rape is not listed among the grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention or Additional Protocol I, it is explicitly prohibited by both. The ICRC and the U.S. government have thus stated that rape can amount to a grave breach of the convention and to a war crime under customary law. A recent ICRC aide-mémoire discussing the systematic abuses committed against the civilian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that the grave breach of "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" obviously covers rape.

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There is no reason why rape should not be seen as torture or inhuman treatment under the Geneva conventions as well. Because of the mass and systematic practice of rape as an instrument of ethnic cleansing, it can also be prosecuted as a crime against humanity.[3]

Ethnic cleansing consists of harassment, discrimination, beatings, torture, summary executions, expulsions, forced crossing of the lines between combatants, intimidation, destruction of secular and religious property, mass and systematic rape, arbitrary arrests and executions, deliberate military attacks on civilians and civilian property, uses of siege and cutting off essential supplies destined for civilian populations. Many of these methods, considered in isolation, constitute a war crime or a grave breach. Considered as a cluster of violations, these practices also constitute crimes against humanity and perhaps also crimes under the Genocide Convention.

THE NECESSITY AND UTILITY OF A TRIBUNAL

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S response to alleged war crimes in the former Yugoslavia must include the establishment by the Security Council of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal. The risks and difficulties of establishing such a tribunal require that the international community be cautious to avoid unrealistic expectations.

Despite its desirability, it is probable that the tribunal will not be very effective. This stark assessment is based on several considerations. First, as the situation now stands, there is insufficient evidence for prosecutions to begin. A major source for gathering evidence thus far has been nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which do not always have expertise in marshaling evidence for criminal proceedings. In fact, the information normally gathered by NGOs and the evidence necessary to secure a criminal conviction are significantly different. The Kalshoven Commission has tried to gather informa-

[3]The draft charters of the tribunal proposed by the United States, Italy and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as well as the Statute of the International Tribunal proposed by the U.N. secretary general on May 3, 1993, consider rape a crime against humanity.

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

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

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
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

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tion but has been frustrated by a lack of funding and personnel. NGOs, the Kalshoven Commission and other U.N. organizations, the European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are all handicapped by the fact that the rules of evidence that will be applied by the future tribunal have yet to be established. Further problems will arise because, without the cooperation of the authorities, physical evidence cannot be properly preserved.

A second complication relates to the issue of custody. It is recognized that persuading states and authorities to carry out arrest warrants will be difficult and compliance will be negligible unless compelled by the international community. Further, in contrast to Nuremberg, the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia will probably not enjoy the cooperation of the authorities controlling the territory in which the crimes were committed. Also, in contrast to the German practices in World War II, there is not likely to be a paper trail clearly linking the perpetrators to the crimes. Furthermore, the effectiveness of deterrence and the prospects of prosecutions are weakened by the need to negotiate with alleged perpetrators who may insist on assurances of immunity as part of a future agreement. If more of Bosnia and Herzegovina falls into Serbian hands, the international community's will to vindicate international law will be severely tested, especially since continued Russian cooperation in the Security Council remains uncertain.

Despite these obstacles, the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal is a laudable and necessary goal. The Security Council has already established the Kalshoven Commission to gather facts. By U.N. Resolution 808 the Council decided in principle on the establishment of the tribunal and requested the U.N. secretary general to submit proposals for implementation. Accordingly, there are already fairly high expectations in the international community in this regard. Abandoning the tribunal now would have a negative impact on the behavior of the parties to the conflict as well as adverse repercussions on general principles. On the ground, those committing war crimes would infer that regardless of their past or future violations they will not be held criminally accountable by the international community.

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As a matter of principle, abandoning the ad hoc tribunal would erode the values of Nuremberg. Additionally, it is important to try individuals responsible for crimes if there is to be any real hope of defusing ethnic tensions in this region. Blame should not rest on an entire nation but should be assigned to individual perpetrators of crimes and the responsible leaders. Confirmation of the principle of accountability might also discourage those in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere who envisage "final solutions" to resolve conflicts within their countries, and would serve to promote justice and the effectiveness of international law.

Given the desirability of establishing an ad hoc tribunal, serious efforts are necessary to reduce the risks involved. There should be an energetic collection of information and evidence by both the international community and by states acting separately. Specifically, the budget and staff of the Kalshoven Commission should be drastically augmented to achieve this goal, and the prosecutorial arm of the future tribunal should be given all the required resources. Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council could specify a system of measures requiring states to cooperate with the enforcement of arrest warrants. It should request that those involved in the conflict arrest and hand over for trial any of the accused whose arrest is sought by the tribunal and that all claims of immunity be denied. The offenders would be placed on an international "most wanted" list and would be subject to arrest the moment they enter a foreign country. Further, the international community must condition the resumption of normal relations with the states concerned on the handing over of suspects for trial before the tribunal. Finally, sanctions must be continued at least partially until those countries concerned comply with warrants of arrest. The Security Council should require other states, under Articles 48 and 49 of the U.N. Charter, to provide all necessary assistance to the tribunal.

Despite its desirability, it is probable that the tribunal will not be very effective.

States have been reluctant to exercise the universal jurisdiction granted them by the 1949 Geneva conventions in large part because of the perceived political price of prosecution. It is possible that the

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added factor of a Security Council demand for cooperation could provide the impetus needed to prosecute these crimes in national tribunals. This would serve to link the process in national tribunals to the continued development and revitalization of humanitarian law as a result of the work of the international tribunal.

The establishment of an ad hoc tribunal should not stand alone, however, as a sole or adequate solution. The world has failed to prosecute those responsible for egregious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Uganda, Iraq and Cambodia. To avoid charges of Eurocentrism this ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia should be a step toward the creation of a permanent criminal tribunal with general jurisdiction. The drafting of a treaty on a permanent tribunal, on which work has begun by the U.N. International Law Commission, should be expedited, providing an opportunity to supplement the substantive development of international law by an institutional process.

Though the risks attendant upon an ad hoc tribunal are substantial, they are outweighed by the detrimental effects that would result from abandoning this prospect. The Security Council and the international community must now accept the challenge and create the precedent for a more rigorous enforcement of humanitarian law. This step does not diminish the primary task of the Security Council, thus far unrealized, to bring about a conclusion of the conflict and to diminish the level of violence and atrocities while the conflict endures.

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The Next Great Arms Race

Michael T. Klare

DANGER ON THE PACIFIC RIM

DESPITE THE END of the Cold War—perhaps because of it—the nations of East and Southeast Asia are engaged in accelerating arms races with significant implications for regional and international security. The recent sale of American F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan and Russian Su-27 fighter jets to China are part of a larger arms acquisition effort as both countries also upgrade their own military production capabilities. Other countries in the region—Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the two Koreas—are also involved in major arms acquisition programs and the development of high-tech military industries. Although these nations have generally managed to avoid direct combat with one another since the Vietnam War (the short border conflict between China and Vietnam in 1979 being the sole exception), continuing tension in Korea and a number of territorial disputes in the South China Sea area could provide the sparks to ignite a regional conflagration.

The acceleration of regional arms races is made more worrisome by the absence of any regional arms control talks, such as those now under way in the Middle East, and by the growing technological prowess of the leading Asian powers. While most of the NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries are reducing their military expenditures and slowing the development of new weapons, many East Asian countries are raising their military outlays—in some cases by a

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significant percentage—and investing in the procurement of modern munitions. Even more significant, many of these countries are developing domestic arms industries that are expected to compete on equal terms with those of the more advanced Western countries in the early years of the 21st century.

It is the emphasis on technology imports that sets the East Asian arms races apart from those in the Third World. While the nations of Africa, Latin America and the Middle East tend to import finished weapons systems from their major suppliers, the Pacific Rim countries generally seek the technology with which to manufacture arms of their own. Hence Taiwan will produce and assemble many F-16 components while it proceeds with development of its Indigenous Defensive Fighter and a domestic variant of the Patriot missile. China seeks foreign technology to upgrade its J-7 and J-8 fighter planes and is negotiating with the Russians for licensed manufacture of the MiG-31. Japan produces the F-15 under license from McDonnell-Douglas and is proceeding with codevelopment (with the United States) of its Fighter Support Experimental. South Korea has begun domestic production of the F-16 and manufactures many of its other combat systems.

In addition to basic combat gear, the Pacific Rim nations also manufacture many of the communications, electronics and surveillance systems used by their militaries. Drawing on their increasingly sophisticated civilian industries, countries such as Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea are poised to become major suppliers of these systems in the late 1990s and early 21st century. Advanced electronics played a decisive role in the allied victory in Operation Desert Storm, and the ability to produce such systems will invest Pacific Rim nations with a significant advantage in future military encounters.

Not all these countries will develop at the same rate, of course, and not all can afford to acquire large supplies of sophisticated systems. Nevertheless the growing accumulation of modern arms by the Pacific Rim powers at a time of diminishing military expenditures elsewhere is a matter of great concern. This concern might be mitigated somewhat if these countries were engaged in comprehensive security negotiations of the sort now being pursued under U.S. spon-

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sorship in the Middle East, but that is not the case: there are no such negotiations taking place in Asia (except for the on-again, off-again dialogue between North and South Korea), and there is no evidence that these countries are prepared to undertake such discussions anytime soon. Hence the arms races now under way in Asia are unencumbered by any braking mechanisms and show every sign of accelerating in the years ahead.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

CLEARLY THE GROWING military potential of the Pacific Rim countries is closely tied to their rapid growth in economic power. Propelled in most cases by an export-driven industrial strategy, these countries have achieved impressive gains in GNP over the past two decades, while the economies of most other nations have declined. Between 1979 and 1989 the combined GNP of China, Japan and the so-called little tigers—the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand—increased by 166 percent, from $1.5 trillion to $4 trillion, while the total GNP of the world increased by only 109 percent.

The steady rise in GNP in these countries has provided their governments with access to increased economic resources, which many have chosen to invest in the expansion and modernization of military infrastructures. Total military spending by Japan and the six NICs rose from $31.7 billion in 1979 to $51.4 billion in 1989, an increase of 62 percent.[1] More recent data suggest that military spending by these countries, excluding Indonesia, continued to rise in the early 1990s (see map).[2] Although reliable data on China's military outlays are difficult to acquire (because so much of it is hidden in nonmilitary accounts), available information suggests that such spending declined slightly in

[1]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990*, Washington, (DC): Government Printing Office, 1991.

[2]Although the data on Indonesian military spending indicates a decline in recent years, these figures must be viewed with caution as official military spending is supplemented (by as much as 50 percent) with revenues from the vast commercial holdings of the Indonesian military.

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

the mid-1980s but has soared since 1989, rising by 10 to 15 percent in each of the past three years. In all of these countries, moreover, increased military spending has been accompanied by stepped-up purchases of imported weapons and increased investment in domestic arms production capabilities.

The burgeoning economic power of the Pacific Rim countries is related to their military potential in other significant ways. As trading nations that are highly dependent on seaborne commerce for imports and exports, these countries naturally have a strong interest in the free movement of maritime trade—an interest that is manifest in their growing investment in naval forces. Japan, for instance, is building four or more Aegis-class destroyers, plus a fleet of modern frigates and submarines; Taiwan has ordered six Lafayette-class frigates from France and is building eight PFG-class frigates under license from the United States; Singapore is building five Type-62 corvettes under license from Germany; Malaysia has ordered two missile frigates from Britain; Thailand has acquired six Jianghu-class frigates from China; and Indonesia has purchased 39 former East German naval vessels (including 12 guided missile corvettes) from Germany.

To finance continued economic growth these countries seek to harvest the oil and fishing resources of their offshore territories; and because the boundaries of these offshore regions—or "exclusive eco-

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nomic zones" (EEZs)—are in many cases overlapping and contested, there is a growing risk of territorial conflict. This risk is most acute in the case of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, two groups of islands in the South China Sea that are subject to competing claims by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. Because the islands are thought to sit astride vast oil reserves, each country has resisted efforts by the others to claim and occupy the islands, and each has periodically sent naval vessels into the area to assert its respective claim—on some occasions producing armed clashes. More recently, China has built a military airstrip (capable of accommodating its Su-27 fighters) and naval facilities on Woody Island in the Paracels.

Economic growth in the Pacific Rim is closely tied to technological development, and this too has significant military implications. To sustain their economic growth into the 21st century, many countries have invested in the development of modern electronics, communications and aerospace industries. While the products of these industries are intended for civilian markets, these technologies also have significant military uses—especially the development of high-tech weapons of the sort used with such dramatic effect in the Persian Gulf conflict. As these industrial efforts mature, therefore, the Pacific Rim countries will be in a strong position to manufacture advanced military systems and components.

Of course, the nations of the Pacific Rim will not benefit equally from the accumulation of wealth and technology in the region. Some, like Cambodia, North Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam, have benefited very little from the economic growth of the 1980s and are not likely to make significant gains in the near future; others, like China and Indonesia, have generated significant pockets of prosperity but still retain large reservoirs of poverty and underdevelopment. This disparity in the distribution of wealth could itself prove a significant source of conflict, especially when the divide between rich and poor coincides with ethnic or religious differences, or when disputed territories (such as the Paracel and Spratly islands) may provide significant sources of future wealth.

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FEARS AND INSECURITIES

As memory of the Cold War recedes, and with it fear of the Soviet Union (and its successor states), regional security concerns will increasingly be shaped by worry over the potential military threat posed by China and Japan, the two most powerful nations in the area, and by other regional antagonisms.

China has recently increased its military spending and appears to be placing greater emphasis on preparation for regional conflict—an emphasis that has understandably generated anxiety in neighboring countries, especially Taiwan. These two states have greatly increased their bilateral trade and have initiated direct political consultations, but neither one has repudiated its historical claim to the territory of the other and both have increased their investment in military preparedness. Indeed, the China-Taiwan nexus probably constitutes the most vibrant arms market in the world today, with leaders of both countries signing multibillion-dollar contracts for the acquisition of modern weapons. By agreeing to sell F-16s to Taiwan, the United States has emboldened other Western suppliers—notably France and Germany—to offer late-model aircraft and warships to Taipei despite threats of economic retaliation by Beijing. The Chinese, for their part, have been taking advantage of hard times in Russia by acquiring a wide range of sophisticated Soviet weapons at rock-bottom prices; among the items mentioned in recent reports of Chinese bargain hunting are MiG-31 interceptors, Tu-22 bombers, T-72M main battle tanks, A-50 airborne warning and control planes, and S-300 ground-based antiballistic missiles.

Equally worrisome is Beijing's military buildup on Hainan and Woody Island, signaling an inclination to dominate the South China Sea area by force rather than to negotiate shared control with other claimants to the Spratly and Paracel chains. From this perspective, China's recent acquisition of long-range aircraft and in-flight refueling technology from the former Soviet Union is considered particularly menacing. Should Beijing continue to acquire advanced weapons and technologies at its current pace, it will undoubtedly spur neighbors such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to accelerate their own arms-acquisition efforts and to place further emphasis on

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the development of high-tech arms industries.

While Japan has publicly eschewed any intention of building up a large, offensively oriented military capacity, its neighbors retain such traumatic memories of the Japanese conquest and occupation during World War II that any sign of increased military activity by Japan inevitably generates anxieties throughout the region. Thus, Tokyo's recent decisions to send (noncombatant) peacekeeping forces to Cambodia—the first overseas deployment of Japanese troops since World War II—has provoked much concern in Southeast Asia. Also worrisome to some neighbors is Japan's planned procurement of large tank-transport ships and long-range transport aircraft—acquisitions that suggest an interest in power projection capabilities of a sort the Japanese have not possessed since 1945. Should Tokyo proceed with these plans, it will surely rekindle fears of Japanese expansionism and thereby spark increased arms spending by other Pacific Rim nations.

The China-Taiwan nexus probably constitutes the most vibrant arms market in the world today.

Regional tensions have also been fed by North Korea's apparent pursuit of nuclear weapons and its continuing refusal to open suspect nuclear facilities to international inspection. Although Pyongyang's nuclear activities are of greatest concern to South Korea and the United States (which still stations 35,000 troops in Korea), they also menace other countries in the area, especially Japan, and are an added spur to regional arms buildups.

No other Pacific Rim countries pose a threat on a scale comparable to China, Japan and North Korea, but other regional rivalries abound and are contributing to the widespread increases in military spending. With 700,000 troops, the Vietnamese army remains a potent military force, and is often cited by Thailand as a justification for its continuing arms buildup. Similarly, the military buildup in Malaysia evokes understandable concern in neighboring Singapore, as does the steady improvement in Indonesian capabilities. All of these rivalries are balanced by growing trade and political links within the region, but are nevertheless likely to figure in the long-term security planning of Pacific Rim states.

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THE MILITARY BUILDUP

FOR ALL OF THESE reasons, the Pacific Rim nations are likely to continue the expansion and modernization of their military capabilities in the years ahead. These enhancements will take several forms. First is the development of modern air, naval and ground forces with a significant capacity for power projection—that is, the ability to project military power to neighboring countries or to offshore locations. Second is the importation of modern weapons and combat-support systems. Third is the development of domestic military industries. And for some countries, this process could entail a fourth dimension: the development or enhancement of weapons of mass destruction and their associated delivery systems.

No doubt the most significant development in military organization is the transformation of the Chinese military from a large manpower-intensive force with relatively obsolete equipment to a smaller but much better equipped force. The total strength of the People's Liberation Army has dropped from approximately four million troops in the mid-1980s to roughly three million today, while more money has been channeled toward the development and production of modern missiles, air and naval craft. In 1985 China's Central Military Commission directed the PLA to shift its primary strategic focus from preparation for all-out war with the U.S.S.R. to preparation for regional conflicts on China's periphery. In line with this shift, the Chinese are upgrading their power projection capabilities and have deployed additional forces at bases in Zhanjiang on the southern coast and on Hainan Island in the South China Sea.

While the total strength of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is likely to remain quite modest (under 250,000 soldiers), reflecting both internal and external concerns over the possible revival of Japanese militarism, the SDF is acquiring increasingly capable equipment and, under pressure from the United States, has extended its maritime defensive screen to 1,000 nautical miles from the main islands. Taiwan and South Korea are also placing greater emphasis on their long-range air and naval capabilities, procuring hundreds of new combat planes from the United States and building dozens of new frigates and destroyers. North Korea, unable to compete with

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South Korea in high-tech conventional arms due to its financial straits and the collapse of the U.S.S.R., appears to have placed greater emphasis on the development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

In the southern area, regional powers—notably Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand—are developing modern multi-service military forces with significant power projection capabilities. These countries had until recently emphasized the counterinsurgency capabilities of their militaries and thus lagged behind the northern powers (China, Japan, Taiwan and the two Koreas) in the development of modern air and naval forces. To make up for this deficiency and to enhance their capacity for power projection these countries are investing in the development of "blue water" navies (that is, forces capable of oceanic rather than merely coastal operation) as well as in the formation of mobile combat forces and long-range bomber/attack squadrons.

Characteristic of these efforts are plans by Malaysia to acquire two modern frigates (with more likely to follow) from Britain and to create a division-sized rapid deployment force equipped with mobile artillery and antitank weapons. Singapore is also constructing a blue-water navy (to be organized around the Type-62 corvettes now being built) and, like Malaysia, is creating a division-sized RDF. Meanwhile, Thailand is modernizing its navy and air force and building new air and naval facilities on its southeastern coast, giving Bangkok a greater military presence in the South China Sea. Indonesia is also expanding its blue-water naval capabilities and, like Singapore and Thailand, has ordered F-16 fighters from the United States.

To equip their new forces and to enhance the combat capabilities of existing units, the Pacific Rim countries are buying significant quantities of modern weapons and support systems. Total spending on imported arms by the major Pacific Rim powers (China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the two Koreas) rose from an average of $2.5 billion per year in 1979–81 to $4.6 billion in 1987–89 (in current dollars), an increase of 84 percent.[3]

[3]ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990*, Table II.

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More recent arms import statistics are not yet available, but press reports from the region suggest that the trend toward ever-increasing levels of weapons spending has continued into the 1990s.

The data on arms transfers also indicates that many of the Pacific Rim countries are acquiring sophisticated radar and electronic gear, airborne reconnaissance and patrol planes and other high-tech equipment. Military officials in these countries are acutely aware of the impact of modern technology on combat operations and are determined to provide their forces with as much high-tech equipment as their budgets will allow. Thus Japan, Singapore and Taiwan have all purchased E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft from the United States (Japan will also acquire two Boeing E-767 Airborne Warning and Control System planes in 1998), and both Taiwan and Japan have drawn on domestic and imported technology to develop advanced radar systems of their own.

HOME-MADE WEAPONS

To a greater degree than in any other arms importing area of the Third World, acquisitions in the Pacific Rim have been accompanied by "offset" agreements entailing the transfer of military technology from supplier to recipient and by direct government investment in military research and development and production. All the NICs, plus China, Japan and North Korea, are now producers of at least some military equipment, and many have invested considerable resources in the establishment of modern naval and aerospace production facilities. As a result these countries are becoming increasingly self-sufficient in the production of advanced weapons systems and, in some cases, have emerged as major arms exporters.

The development of domestic arms industries by emerging industrial powers is not unique to the Pacific Rim area. What makes the situation in the region so significant, however, is the combination of growing economic resources with which to pursue these plans and the emergence in many of these countries of civilian industries with considerable scientific and technological expertise. Because the more advanced Pacific Rim countries are able to finance their military

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endeavors through growing trade surpluses and can draw upon domestic firms for necessary technical know-how, they are likely to outstrip all other Third World producers in the early 21st century and to move much closer to the advanced industrial powers.

Currently the Pacific Rim countries with the most elaborate arms production capabilities are China and Japan. China has long produced a wide variety of military equipment, much of it based on Soviet designs of the 1950s and 1960s. In recent years the Chinese have attempted to upgrade their equipment with imported technology and have begun to produce missiles and electronic systems of a relatively modern design. Some of this technology has come from the West, through both licit and illicit channels.[4] Recently, China has sought to benefit from economic hardship in Russia by buying Soviet weapons and technology at bargain-basement prices. Japan, although not normally known as a major arms producer, has become self-sufficient in many combat systems and is producing a host of advanced weapons under license from the United States.

South Korea's defense expenditures rose from about $10.6 billion in 1990 to an estimated $12.4 billion in 1992, an increase of 17 percent, and are expected to rise by similar amounts in the years to follow. Moreover, the proportion of its defense budget devoted to research and development is scheduled to grow steadily throughout the 1990s, from 1.5 percent in 1990 to 3 percent in 1996 and 7 percent at the beginning of the next century. These funds will be used to develop indigenous military-technological capabilities and to attract foreign technology through arms-related offset programs. Ultimately, Seoul seeks to become self-sufficient in the production of basic combat systems and to rely on domestic sources for all but the most advanced technologies.

Taiwan's development plans look much like South Korea's, spurred by a similar goal of achieving self-sufficiency in the production of all but the most sophisticated weapons systems by the year 2000. As in South Korea, Taiwanese defense spending is expected to rise in the

[4]U.S. officials have recently confirmed that China has illegally acquired Patriot missile technology from a third country (possibly Israel).

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

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Glosario bilingüe

This glossary defines words only in the context as they appear here in BOLD. The symbol ◊ indicates an idiomatic phrase.

a fines de ◊ towards the end of
acabar de ◊ to have just
atentado nm. attack
ayuda nf. aid; help
comenzar v. to begin
detuvo (detener) v. arrested
en cuanto a ◊ regarding
estadounidense adj. American
herido/a nm/f. injured (person)
integrista nm/f. reactionary
pronunciar un discurso ◊ to deliver a speech
supuesto/a adj. alleged
Torres Gemelas ◊ Twin Towers

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years ahead, with much of this increase devoted to the enhancement of indigenous research and development and production capabilities. To promote greater self-reliance in the development of military-related technologies, Taipei has funneled vast sums into government laboratories and private research and development firms and has financed the education of thousands of Taiwanese scientists and engineers—many of them at advanced educational institutions abroad, especially the United States.

Although similar to the South Korean arms program in many respects, the Taiwanese effort differs from South Korea's in the degree to which it relies on government facilities rather than private firms. Hence, the design and development of the aircraft and missilies is largely the responsibility of the government-owned Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, while the actual production of such systems is performed by the air force's Aero Industry Development Center. Similarly, major ship construction is conducted by the state-owned China Shipbuilding Corporation.

After China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the most ambitious arms production endeavors in the Pacific Rim area are to be found in Indonesia and Singapore. Since the mid-1970s the Indonesian government has devoted considerable resources to the development of a domestic aerospace and shipbuilding capacity. Until now these firms have concentrated on the acquisition of foreign technology through licensing and coproduction ventures; like South Korea and Taiwan, however, Indonesia is increasing its investment in military research and development and seeks to become more self-reliant in the development of key military technologies.

Singapore, in line with its policy of promoting export-oriented industrial growth, has developed a diversified defense industry with a strong research and development base. As in Taiwan, the state has played a key role in the development and management of domestic arms firms. Major projects at present include the overhaul and modernization of military aircraft, assembly of Italian S-211 jet trainers and French AS-332 Super Puma helicopters, and licensed production of German Type-62 missile corvettes. In addition to producing arms for domestic use, Singaporean companies also assemble and manu-

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facture a wide variety of military systems for export.

Given the current limitations of their scientific-industrial infrastructures, Indonesia and Singapore are not likely to achieve the high degree of military self-sufficiency expected of South Korea and Taiwan in the early 21st century. The same, of course, can be said for Malaysia and Thailand. Nevertheless, these countries are enjoying high levels of economic growth and are placing greater emphasis on the development of high-tech industries. If these trends continue for another 10 or 15 years, many of these countries will be capable of producing a wide variety of modern weapons with substantial indigenous design input.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

ALTHOUGH THE MAIN thrust of military development has focused on conventional weapons, Pacific Rim nations (especially those of the more heavily armed north) have also explored various options in the nuclear and chemical area. Only China now possesses a fully developed nuclear capability. Its nuclear arsenal currently consists of eight intercontinental ballistic missiles, 60 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the Xia, equipped with 12 sea-launched ballistic missiles; in addition, China has a force of some 200 nuclear-capable bombers. The Chinese are also allegedly enhancing their ballistic missile potential and developing a new missile submarine, but progress on these fronts is reported to be slow. (The recent series of large underground nuclear tests at China's Lop Nur test site are presumably related to these efforts.) While China's nuclear forces are certainly modest by superpower standards, they do endow Beijing with a strategic capability unmatched by any other regional power—a capability that China appears very reluctant to give up, as indicated by its historical antipathy to nuclear arms control efforts.

Although no other Pacific Rim nation now possesses an operational nuclear weapons capability, North Korea has actively pursued such a capability, and both South Korea and Taiwan have engaged in nuclear weapons research in the past (although these countries have

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denied any intention of acquiring nuclear weapons).

Of these three, North Korea has reportedly come closest to developing a nuclear weapons production complex. Since 1987 it has been operating a 30-megawatt gas-graphite research reactor at Yongbyon, and spent fuel from this reactor has reportedly been reprocessed at an adjacent facility in order to extract small quantities of weapons-grade plutonium. Although North Korean officials insist that the plutonium will be used for research purposes only, Western intelligence experts believe that the reprocessing facility was established as part of a long-term effort to acquire nuclear weapons and that the North Koreans may already have extracted (and hidden) a sufficient quantity of plutonium for one nuclear device. Under pressure from the West, North Korea signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985 and began opening its facilities to international inspection in 1992. Recently, however, the North Koreans blocked inspections of some facilities and on March 13, 1993, Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT—thus precipitating a major crisis in international nonproliferation efforts that remains unresolved.

China, Taiwan and the two Koreas are all developing chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.

South Korea reportedly launched a secret effort to acquire the technology for nuclear weapons production in the early 1970s, following a 1970 U.S. decision to begin withdrawing its forces from Korea in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. When U.S. officials learned of these efforts in 1974, Washington applied pressure on Seoul to abandon its nuclear aspirations and to sign the NPT, which it did in 1975. There is, however, evidence that South Korea continued to pursue weapons-related research after 1975, and that acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability remains an objective of at least some South Korean military officials. Indeed, North Korea's announcement that it would withdraw from the NPT has spurred renewed talk of nuclear weapons development in Seoul.

Like South Korea, Taiwan first initiated a nuclear weapons research effort in the early 1970s, and, like Seoul, was subsequently pressured to abandon this endeavor by the United States. In 1987,

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however, U.S. officials discovered that Taipei had begun construction of a small plutonium extraction facility and was planning to reprocess spent fuel from a 40-megawatt research reactor at Lung Tan. Pressure was again applied by Washington, and Taipei agreed for a second time to abandon its nuclear weapons research. Still, there are periodic reports from Taipei that government laboratories are continuing to conduct secret research on nuclear weapons.

The nuclear equation in Northeast Asia is further complicated by the fact that China, Taiwan and the two Koreas have all engaged in the development of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear or chemical warheads to the territory of their principal adversaries.

China possesses a number of IRBMs and jet bombers that could be used for nuclear strikes anywhere in the region. North Korea now produces the Scud-B, with a range of 280 kilometers (sufficient to reach most of South Korea), and has developed a longer-range version, the Scud-C, with a range of 600 kilometers; a 1,000-kilometer missile, the Nodong-1, is reportedly in development. Taiwan has developed the Chieng Feng missile, with a range of 130 kilometers, and has experimented with a longer range missile, the Tien Ma. And South Korea has developed a ballistic missile in the 250-kilometer range, the NHK-1. Moreover, both South Korea and Taiwan have indicated their intention to develop modern space-launch vehicles—a capability that, once developed, would enable them to produce IRBMs as well.

The continued development of ballistic missiles by these countries has obvious implications for security relations in the Pacific Rim area. Even when filled with conventional explosives, such weapons may pose a critical risk to urban centers and strategic targets—including nuclear reactors and military facilities. More worrisome, of course, is the possibility that they would be used to deliver nuclear warheads (an option currently enjoyed by China alone) or chemical munitions (an option now open to North Korea and possibly to South Korea and Taiwan as well). The existence of these potent capabilities—unconstrained by any existing arms control agreements—represents one of the greatest threats to regional stability in the Pacific Rim area.

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THE URGENCY OF ARMS CONTROL

VIEWED TOGETHER, these developments present a deeply troubling picture. Not only are the Pacific Rim countries expanding and modernizing their inventories of modern weapons, but they are also reconfiguring their military forces in such a way as to enhance their capacity for power projection and regional conflict. Given that there are many unresolved disputes in the region and that no forum now exists for the development of regional arms control and security measures, these military developments provide sufficient cause for concern that at least some disagreements will be resolved through armed combat.

It is essential that the nations of the Pacific Rim give arms control and regional security higher priority.

Given this danger, it is essential that arms control and regional security be given higher priority by the nations of the Pacific Rim and by their friends and trading partners in other regions. Until now, Europe and the Middle East have been the major sites for such efforts, and the Far East has been largely neglected. If, however, the Pacific Rim does become the main engine of global economic growth in the 21st century—or even if it remains but one of several centers—such neglect could have devastating international repercussions. Arms control in the Pacific Rim must therefore be accorded the same degree of attention as similar efforts in other parts of the world.

Preventing further proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and eliminating existing stocks of nuclear and chemical munitions are especially important. Continuing pressure should be applied to the North Korean government to remain within the NPT and to open all suspect facilities to international inspection. Pressure must also be maintained on Taipei and Seoul to refrain from any nuclear weapons activities, and adequate safeguards should be imposed to ensure that any civilian nuclear technologies supplied to these countries are not diverted to military use. In the chemical area, all of these countries should be urged to sign the recently completed Chemical Weapons Convention and to destroy their stockpiles of chemical warfare agents.

Other initiatives are needed to slow the pace of conventional arms

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acquisitions. The United States must exercise greater restraint in its military sales to Taiwan, China must be discouraged from pursuing new arms purchases from the former Soviet Union, and Washington and Beijing should meet in order to discuss the resumption of the Five Power conventional arms control talks that were suspended in 1992. Most important, these countries should be encouraged to engage in regional peace and security negotiations of the sort now under way in the Middle East, and to resolve outstanding territorial and political disputes peacefully. Unless fresh arms control efforts are undertaken soon, the Pacific Rim could be the site of periodic military convulsions in the 21st century, as Europe was in the twentieth century.

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The Plutonium Genie

George Perkovich

PUTTING IT BACK IN THE BOTTLE

PLUTONIUM IS ONE of the most dangerous materials on earth. Ten pounds are enough to make a crude nuclear weapon; one-thirty-thousandth of an ounce will cause cancer if inhaled. Plutonium's lethality is measured in millennia, not decades or days. Its most prevalent form has a half-life of 24,000 years.

With plutonium, the odds are against humankind. If nation states continue the costly production and use of plutonium, they risk weapons proliferation, environmental devastation and human health damage. These odds should banish plutonium as too dangerous to continue being produced. Building on the international nonproliferation regime and current practices in the nuclear industry, a more comprehensive and specific regime must be constructed to manage plutonium and speed its elimination.

All forms of plutonium can be made into weapons, although some mixes of isotopes are less desirable to weapons designers. The release of plutonium into the environment poses health and environmental risks. These risks might be more tolerable if plutonium held unquestionable economic value in the foreseeable future. But no proven technology exists to generate electricity from plutonium at economically competitive costs.

Countries determined to remain on the commercial nuclear path need not use plutonium; fuels made of low-enriched uranium suffice. Unlike plutonium or highly enriched uranium, these fuels are not

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weapons-usable. Nor do they pose comparable health, environmental and security hazards. The lodes of low-cost, low-enriched uranium accessible worldwide may run out, but not before the late 21st century, and then only if nuclear energy use increases markedly without eliciting increased supplies from either more efficient uranium handling or new reserves. Such an outcome is unlikely for economic reasons. Plutonium for long-term research and development programs will always be available in the form of spent fuel, even after the large surpluses of separated plutonium are reduced.[1]

Plutonium has proliferated since its creation as a war child of the Manhattan Project in 1942. Twenty-two countries possess or control separated plutonium in various forms and amounts, either for military or commercial use. Roughly 1,000 metric tons of the material exist today.[2] Approximately 260 tons of that stockpile are in deployed or surplus nuclear weapons. American and former Soviet arsenals account for almost 90 percent of those weapons. Of the roughly 650 tons of plutonium that exist in commercial programs, approximately 530 tons are contained in untreated spent reactor fuel, while roughly 120 tons are stored in weapons-usable form or recycled as fuel awaiting potential future use.

Of course, history hovers over any proposal to get comprehensive international control over plutonium. The ghosts of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report of 1946 and the failed Baruch plan haunt the discussion. In the 1970s, the Carter administration stumbled in its ill-conceived effort to wean the international community from plutonium. Today, however, different conditions prevail. The nuclear arms race is not accelerating as it was in the late 1940s and again in the late 1970s; rather, it is being reversed. The Cold War is not dividing and closing off countries from each other; openness and cooper-

[1]Plutonium is produced by irradiating natural uranium in reactors, and then using remote-controlled facilities to chemically separate the plutonium from the other elements of spent fuel.

[2]Long-standing governmental and commercial secrecy make stockpile estimates highly uncertain. Plutonium inventory figures and other data in this article come from Berkhout, et. al., "Disposition of Separated Plutonium," *Science and Global Security*, 1992, vol. 3; and Albright, Berkhout and Walker, *World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

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ation in nonproliferation matters are increasing. And unlike in the 1970s, plutonium is not seen as the millennial solution to the energy needs of America's allies or as the salvation for the international nuclear power industry. Today, plutonium is increasingly perceived as a global problem that must be solved globally.

AVAILABILITY AND HAZARDS

CURRENT INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS do not prohibit the acquisition and use of plutonium for peaceful purposes under safeguards. Moreover, those nations that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—such as Israel, India and Pakistan—can acquire and use plutonium however they see fit, except where safeguards are imposed on materials and equipment imported from parties to the treaty. All states, regardless of various international guidelines on physical protection, can without sanction treat and handle plutonium according to their own standards of human health, environmental protection and security. Under these loose conditions, domestic regulation has not proved sufficiently safe in any country from which historical data is available. A few instances from American and Russian experience suggest the danger.

The Rocky Flats facility in Colorado was shut down in 1989 as a result of mismanagement and violations of environmental and worker safety standards during the period when plutonium metal was purified and manufactured into weapons cores. The Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington state for plutonium production and chemical separation will cost an estimated $50 billion to clean up once the appropriate technology is invented.

In April 1992 an explosion at a Russian nuclear plant in Siberia caused small amounts of plutonium to leak. Radioactive hot spots may now exist in the contaminated area of 46 square miles around the Tomsk-7 military reprocessing plant 1,800 miles east of Moscow. In 1957 the Kyshtym plant exploded and blanketed 15,000 square kilometers with radioactivity, causing a still-secret number of immediate casualties and exposing at least 400,000 people to heightened radiation doses. The Mayak plutonium complex has released into a lake

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thirty times the amount of radioactivity released in the Chernobyl disaster, and thousands of citizens have suffered lasting damage.

The heightened potential for bankruptcy, instability, revolution or dissolution in states that currently control plutonium poses additional threats. The dissolution of the former Soviet Union and attendant fears of "loose nukes" underscore the new collective vulnerability. Since 1989, European police have arrested black marketeers selling nonweapons uranium and other nuclear materials stolen from the former Soviet Union. Ukraine and Kazakhstan have not agreed to relinquish nuclear weapons based on their soil or to sign the NPT as nonnuclear weapon states. Each possesses plutonium-laden spent fuel that is not safeguarded. Similar potential for nuclear disorder lies in India, the Korean peninsula and possibly Pakistan. Terrorist acquisition of plutonium always remains a threat.

Terrorist acquisition of plutonium always remains a threat.

Most studies to find safe, secure and affordable options for managing the coming glut of the material define their objective with a minimal question: What should be done with the plutonium scheduled to be extracted from American and former Soviet weapons? This limited approach neglects the hundreds of tons of nonweapons plutonium that will be coursing through a number of nation states with uneven capacities to manage it safely, securely and efficiently. Even as the United States and Russia work quickly to reduce their military stockpiles, plans must be made for a comprehensive plutonium regime that would encompass all plutonium—civilian and military.

The character and challenge of a strengthened international regime to manage plutonium will depend on the scale of production, separation, use and transportation. As such activity increases, the difficulty and expense of securing society from danger will become greater. In theory, other nations could decide unilaterally to abandon plutonium production and separation, as the United States has done. Short of a global agreement to ban commerce in and use of plutonium, at least two international decisions are vital to contain the risks posed by the material. First, the six countries that have not already done so—Britain, France, China, India, Israel, Pakistan—should

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commit themselves to cease production of plutonium for military purposes. This would cap their weapons programs. Second, further separation of plutonium for commercial purposes should be ended by all nations. This would halt the growing surplus, while allowing for disposal of the plutonium already on hand.

While the United States has cut off production of fissile materials for weapons and Russia has pledged to do so by the year 2000, Britain resists and the French and Chinese positions are unclear. China's decision will be pivotal. It apparently possesses enough separated plutonium for its planned nuclear arsenal and therefore might be induced to cease further production. There is hope and some expectation that a domino effect would then halt further production in India and Pakistan, while increasing pressure on Britain and France to stop producing and separating plutonium for their nuclear arsenals. In this climate, Israel would experience internal and external pressures to reciprocate. Some Israeli decision-makers reportedly have already seen the benefits of halting plutonium production and have asked their nuclear establishment to prepare for it. Each of the declared and threshold nuclear powers has more plutonium than it could need under any viable military threat scenario.

Cessation of commercial separation is more likely as decision-makers and analysts begin to recognize the economic and international security drawbacks of plutonium use.[3] Although Japan and Germany have helped finance plutonium separation plants in Britain and France and constitute the major demand for their services, German electric utilities are having second thoughts due to high costs and troublesome transportation and storage. German utilities are willing to pay large penalties to escape plutonium separation contracts with Britain and France. Japan also is questioning an energy plan based on plutonium. Amid mounting evidence that plutonium breeder reactors are unreliable and uneconomical, the Japanese

[3]Six countries operate or plan to operate facilities to manufacture plutonium fuel—Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Germany and Japan. A number also have manifest plans to use plutonium for electricity—France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Belgium and Switzerland—though each is now subject to grave economic doubts and public opposition. India's plutonium plans are more speculative.

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Science and Technology Agency is reassessing the nation's nuclear programs. Japan's decision was reinforced by international demonstrations against the 17,000-mile shipment of plutonium from France to Japan. Also complicating Tokyo's calculations are its neighbors' fears over the nuclear weapons potential signified by Japan's stockpiling of plutonium. And within Japan an antinuclear constituency is mobilizing against still-active government plans for a plutonium economy, pressing its case on environmental, health and pacifist grounds. But the most telling cause is economic—plutonium-based production of electricity has yet to be commercially viable.

Nations cling to their plutonium despite its negative economic value; it has become a toxic fool's gold.

A handful of states are still bent on plutonium use—due to bureaucratic inertia, reluctance to abandon sunk costs, lack of alternative energy sources or, in some cases, ambitions for nuclear weapons capability. Russian leaders, for example, will find it difficult to override the Ministry of Atomic Energy's ambitions to make plutonium a central element in the nation's mix of energy sources. The Russian nuclear establishment, like its counterpart in other countries, remains emotionally attached to using plutonium, reflecting decades of work, expense and sacrifice. These feelings have overwhelmed rational analysis proving that plutonium has negative economic value and should be treated as waste—toxic fool's gold. In India, similar attitudes have led the powerful nuclear bureaucracy to see plutonium development, currently in the research and development stage, as a status symbol and a source of economic and military independence.

Britain and France, with signed contracts for reprocessing from many countries, also retain vested interests in plutonium fuel. These countries, which separate most of the world's civilian plutonium, each plan to bring a new reprocessing facility on-line this year, adding billions to the cost of their facilities. Operating at planned levels through the 1990s, the new plants would yield an additional 100 tons of surplus separated plutonium. Almost all of this would be for foreign consumption; Britain has no plans to "burn" plutonium in fuel, and France's modest plan to use mixed oxide fuel remains in doubt.

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HOW A REGIME COULD OPERATE

ONCE THE PLUTONIUM problem has been bounded, an international regime can manage the storage and reduction of existing plutonium. Reduction can occur through direct disposal as waste, or more expensively and insecurely through irradiation in power reactors. By regulating and facilitating waste disposal and other environmental and safety matters, the international regime would go beyond current nonproliferation and industrial arrangements.

If an international plutonium regime could be based on the International Atomic Energy Agency, time and effort would be saved. Dormant provisions of the IAEA statute, if activated, authorize many of the requisite functions of a plutonium regime. The often mentioned tension between the IAEA's role as a facilitator of nuclear energy development and as an advocate of nonproliferation need not come into play because plutonium is not necessary for nuclear power for at least a century. The IAEA could rigorously manage an international regime that seeks to phase out separated plutonium while aiding the peaceful and effective use of low-enriched uranium fuels. However, in order for the IAEA to be effective in the proposed regime, or even in an extension of its current nonproliferation role, its governors must seek to conduct more extensive and rigorous verification activities than in the past. If the IAEA governors oppose this more robust mission, an independent institution should be created.

A plutonium management regime would evolve in stages—perhaps region by region—with each stage creating confidence among participating nations that greater safety and security was being achieved, thereby allowing for further extension and oversight. Such a regime would not require countries to join all at once or to sacrifice sovereignty. The regime's basic rules and procedures would be the product of agreement by the participating sovereign states. Over time, the regime might take on more authority, but always with the approval of the governed.

The analogy of a five-story escalator can help describe how an international plutonium regime would function. States would come in at different levels on the escalator and move to higher stages of international management, with all reaching the top floor at some

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distant decade. Between each major stage, a state could heighten the transparency of activities covered by the regime, thus begetting confidence. Indeed, the regime should aim to overcome the secrecy that all nuclear establishments have used to hide corruption, mismanagement and danger.

A combination of pushing and pulling forces would move states into the regime. Push could come from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund factoring in a country's plutonium policies in decisions to offer financial assistance. Additional force could come from diplomatic pressure and public movements demanding improved environmental and security practices. States would also be pulled into the regime by example-setting practices of key nuclear powers. Moreover, an enlightened nuclear power industry could consign plutonium to research and development and concentrate instead on low-enriched uranium fuels, recognizing that plutonium's economic and security liabilities damage the industry's general credibility. The caretakers of the plutonium regime could even assist the development of renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency. Promoting these technologies would replace the anachronistic "Atoms for Peace" quid pro quo of nuclear power promotion for nonproliferation.

At the ground floor, where the escalator begins, no safeguards or obligations would be required. All but three nuclear states—Israel, India, Pakistan—are already beyond this level. These threshold countries, which have the capability to construct and deploy nuclear weapons even if they have not openly done so, would have to forswear the export of plutonium or plutonium-related technologies to other states. With skillful outside management, each could be readily persuaded to do this, recognizing its national interest in stemming proliferation to other countries.

The five declared nuclear weapons states would enter the regime one flight up by ceasing the production and separation of plutonium for military purposes. They would then ask the threshold nuclear states to join them, in effect winning declarations that subsequent plutonium production and separation in India and Israel—the two key cases—would not be for military purposes. Allowance would be

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made for unsafeguarded remanufacturing and other handling of plutonium by declared or undeclared military programs whose stockpiles were obtained prior to the cutoff.

The second floor of the regime would then extend safeguards to all plutonium stockpiles and facilities outside of the narrowly circumscribed military sphere. In addition, all states, starting with the United States and Russia, would be required to declare and exchange full data on their complete inventories of separated plutonium, including their military programs. Such disclosure requirements and safeguards have already been put in place by all nonnuclear weapons states in the NPT, as well as Brazil and Argentina, although inventory data is closely held by the IAEA. The aim is to end discrimination and apply the same rules to the civilian programs of the five declared nuclear powers and to the threshold powers. Their avoidance of comprehensive safeguards was accepted in the past because the nuclear states were producing and separating such massive quantities of plutonium for military purposes that it would make little difference to safeguard their civilian activities.

Security establishments would lack valid justification to refuse disclosure and safeguards once plutonium is stopped for military purposes and the nuclear arms race is capped. The five nuclear powers also recognize the growing threat that proliferation and mismanaged nuclear facilities pose to their security. This threat should heighten their incentives to construct a strong plutonium regime. If political interests in the declared and threshold nuclear weapons states require a closer measure of control, they could devise bilateral or narrow multilateral safeguards in coordination and consistency with the broader international regime.

The American bureaucracy currently resists bilateral and international safeguards on plutonium because it does not want to foreclose military options to reuse plutonium from decommissioned nuclear weapons, and because it dislikes the inconvenience of accommodating international inspectors. Neither position is defensible. Japan and Germany, along with 147 other nonnuclear weapon states, accept international inspectors and safeguards at all their nuclear facilities. Russian leaders have expressed the willingness to do the same. The

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United States (along with China, Britain, France, India, Israel and Pakistan) lack valid arguments to be excepted from this norm. Furthermore, the plutonium scheduled to be removed pursuant to the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the reciprocal withdrawals of tactical nuclear weapons and the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is not needed for any foreseeable military contingency. If, after START II were implemented, the United States and Russia became reluctant to undertake further nuclear reductions for fear of relinquishing the resultant plutonium to international safeguards, an accommodation could be made. The two states could create a "national buffer stockpile" of plutonium safeguarded under bilateral agreements. Designated neither civil nor military, this material could potentially be reused for weapons, but in the meantime it would be monitored and safeguarded.

By accepting international accounting and safeguards on their own plutonium-related activities and facilities, the United States and Russia would undercut the arguments of Israel, India and Pakistan that the international nonproliferation regime is discriminatory. Moreover, the designation of a national buffer stockpile along the lines proposed for Russia and the United States could be applied to the nuclear threshold nations, allowing them to retain the deterrence power provided by their capabilities to construct nuclear weapons, but requiring them for the first time to disclose and safeguard their stockpiles. Categorizing the material as buffer (neither peaceful nor military) would allow these countries to preserve their present ambiguity and thus their political options eventually to become nuclear-free zones. Meanwhile, all their nuclear material would be monitored, even if they still refuse to join the NPT. The regime would benefit them by making it politically more difficult for their neighbors to acquire nuclear weapons material, and by heightening advanced nations' willingness to provide technical assistance in the energy field.

At the third level, international standards for safety, health, environmental and security practices would be extended to all plutonium-related facilities, with monitoring and enforcement by the international regime. These standards and new safeguards would be extended to spent-fuel management and disposal.

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Direct international management would start at the fourth stage. Facilities for storing and disposing of surplus plutonium would be managed by an international institution, preferably a refashioned and well-endowed IAEA. A fifth stage might transfer ownership and management of all facilities and their output of separated, weapons-grade fissile materials to an international agency.

THE CORNERSTONE

CENTRAL TO THE creation of an international plutonium regime is giving priority to gaining control of surplus stockpiles of separated plutonium that could be most readily diverted (or reintroduced) into weapons. The difficulties lie not in the mechanics but in the politics of international storage and ultimate disposal.

Because it will take time to determine how and where to dispose of plutonium, safe and secure storage must be addressed at once. Participating states must define what constitutes surplus plutonium subject to international storage. While all plutonium inventories, whether in international storage or not, would be declared, some states would be reluctant to define surplus broadly and thereby "internationalize" greater amounts of the material, which may be a symbol of national sovereignty. A similar challenge would be to specify for what purposes and under what conditions states may withdraw surplus plutonium from international storage.

As a basic principle, all separated plutonium not needed for near-term fueling of currently operating reactors should be deemed surplus, as should plutonium withdrawn from weapons. Less obvious rules would have to be negotiated to determine how much plutonium should be allowed out of international storage for research purposes and for buffer stocks to supply current or nearly on-line reactors. The security objective of international storage will only be accomplished if all states, particularly the declared and threshold nuclear weapons states, accept verification of plutonium end use, regardless of whether such use is in reactors, storage, research and development, disposal or weapons of buffer stocks.

An international storage system, relying primarily on existing

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facilities, would result in Britain, France and Russia having major international storage centers, for both civil and military surpluses. The United States would host largely military stores. Likely regional stores would be China, Japan and India, which have the most extensive nuclear establishments in Asia and current or projected plutonium stockpiles. Strengthening the international regime would cost less than maintaining current and planned national storage.

Spent fuel is another category of surplus plutonium that should be internationally accounted for and monitored, although it is less problematic. Technical difficulties and costs associated with separating plutonium from spent fuel make it difficult to convert this material into nuclear weapons without detection, as the extreme case of autarkic North Korea indicates. Moreover, once further separation of plutonium is proscribed, illicit diversion and separation of spent fuel would be still more readily detectable. Under a plutonium regime, spent fuel could be accounted for and monitored at local reactor sites until it is ultimately disposed of.

Enforcement, always a problem, must be addressed in advance, although it would not be practical to predetermine sanctions. By establishing clear norms and procedures for dealing with plutonium, the regime would minimize the ambiguity that now surrounds many nuclear activities. Significant violations would alert the international community to a state's bad intentions. An international regime could define major violations as threats to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which could warrant internationally sanctioned military responses.

INCENTIVES TO JOIN

ASIDE FROM THE "pushing"and "pulling" forces to enter the plutonium regime, a major inducement for participation could be the promise of cooperation in solving the disposal problems that confront all countries. No country has yet designed and operated a permanent system for disposing of its plutonium, be it in the form of radioactive waste or separated as warhead pits or oxide.

By internationalizing the disposal problem, the plutonium regime

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could provide a forum for scientists, engineers, environmentalists and others to examine the world's technical capabilities and geography in order to identify the best possible options for disposing of plutonium and other radioactive materials. International management of waste and disposal would provide a powerful incentive for countries to join the plutonium regime. In return for unburdening themselves of the spent fuel, separated plutonium and other wastes that plague them, countries would be required to participate in all other stages of the regime. At the same time, the regime would have to provide compensation to the people on whose territory the waste is recommended for disposal. The politics would be difficult and the price high, but not compared to the alternatives.

Given the technical nature of this problem and the narrow time horizon of political leaders, the impetus to create an effective international regime for controlling and disposing of plutonium must come from those closest to the problem, the small circle of IAEA consultants and nonproliferation specialists. These specialists, working in conjunction with nongovernmental arms control and environmental organizations, must keep the need for comprehensive management of plutonium on the agenda. Plutonium policy will become increasingly susceptible to influence by arms control and environmental nongovernmental organizations as the dangers mount and the material's economic viability drops. If political leaders choose to work in harness with these people progress can be rapid.

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Superpower Without a Sword

Alan Tonelson

GRAND GOALS AND DWINDLING BUDGETS

PHASE ONE OF THE great debate on post-Cold War American foreign policy is over. The Clinton administration's proposed fiscal 1994 defense budget makes it clear that, although the president may continue to affirm America's position as a superpower, he has denied the nation the military resources that role requires, even in a world with no Soviet rival. In other words, the "declinists" have won.

The Clinton budget presents recommendations for defense spending levels through 1998 and would leave the nation with military capabilities that in effect accept the declinists' fundamental argument: that the country's best strategy for long-term security and prosperity is to scale back an overextended foreign policy. That means defending fewer countries, doling out less foreign assistance and focusing more on consolidating national power than on shaping the international environment. Equally important, the president's budget reflects the post-Cold War national priorities revealed in the 1992 presidential vote. The electorate's message was clear: in a time of fiscal austerity, when the nation's preeminent goals are domestic economic and social revival, significant resources must be shifted from foreign policy programs.

But the country has yet to face the challenge of adjusting to a shrinking defense budget. Clinton's proposals have allowed that

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debate to begin. Some demand that the gap between America's bloated international commitments and dwindling resources be closed by restoring defense spending to pre-Clinton levels. Others, the president included, insist that no means-ends gap in fact exists. Still others believe that the nation should simply be prepared to live with one.

The best course on the merits, as well as the most expedient in terms of domestic politics, is to narrow the gap by seeking more modest foreign policy objectives. The superpower role that America has played since 1945 is now not only too expensive and risky for the public taste, but it is also unnecessary. Even in an increasingly turbulent world, a geopolitically secure, militarily powerful and economically competitive country like the United States can attain safety and prosperity by carrying a significantly lower international profile.

Still, retrenchment alone will not produce foreign policy success. If the American public has indeed decided that spearheading the creation of a new world order is not worth the candle, it will eventually need a wholly new strategy for pursuing security and prosperity. Otherwise the nation will find itself in the dangerous position of hinging its fate on objectives that have become unattainable, because the assets that it expects can achieve them no longer exist.

DOWNSIZING FOREIGN POLICY

A STRONG CONSENSUS for reordering national priorities and downgrading foreign policy crystallized early in the 1992 presidential campaign. Despite the fact that both George Bush and Bill Clinton defeated less internationalist rivals in party primaries, polls found that foreign policy continued to rank low among voter concerns. Not only did Clinton's internationalist positions attract little voter attention but fully 19 percent of the electorate opted for Ross Perot, the one candidate who made assailing traditional free trade policies, foreign lobbyists and free-riding allies central to his campaign.

Clinton continues to speak, as he did during his campaign, of the need to maintain America's global leadership—to "build a world of security, freedom, democracy, free markets and growth"—but his first defense budget submission is inadequate to such a grand task. His

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foreign aid budget—notably the portion dedicated to ensuring the success of reform in the former Soviet empire—also falls far short of the resources required for its still ambitious goals. Nonetheless, the most worrisome means-ends gap is opening with respect to defense spending, which represents the vast bulk of national security resources.[1]

During the campaign, Clinton promised to cut Pentagon spending by fiscal year 1997 by $60 billion more than President Bush. The new Clinton defense plan proposes cutting yet another $67 billion. Consequently, in the unlikely event that Congress leaves the administration's request intact, 1998 defense budget outlays will have shrunk to $252.5 billion, a more than 34 percent drop in real terms from their 1989 Reagan-era peak. Military spending, which accounted for 27 percent of federal spending in 1987, would be cut to 13.5 percent. As a share of GNP, defense spending would fall from 6.5 percent in the mid-1980s to 3 percent, a level not seen since before World War II.

These cuts will come despite the administration's decision to increase taxes substantially. Although most major categories of domestic spending are scheduled to remain level or increase only slightly, in fiscal year 1994 alone real defense budget outlays will fall by 6.6 percent, or $12.7 billion, and the pace of the cuts is scheduled to accelerate. None of the new revenue, in other words, is going to the military.

The spending cuts proposed by the Bush administration had already resulted in real reductions in American conventional forces. Between fiscal years 1992 and 1994, the number of active Army divisions was scheduled to decline to 12 from 14, Navy ships to 413 from 443, active deployable aircraft carriers to 12 from 14, and active Air

[1]This analysis of U.S. defense spending and force structure is based largely on the testimony of Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell before hearings of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the fiscal 1994 Defense Authorization Bill; Aspin's *An Approach to American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options*, an unpublished report from 1992; *U.S. Forces in Europe: Military Implications of Alternative Force Levels*, Edward F. Bruner, Washington (DC): Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Sept. 28, 1992; "The Changing Strategic Environment," *Defense*, November-December 1992; and *U.S. Military Force Reductions: Capabilities*, John M. Collins, Washington (DC): Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Jan. 8, 1992.

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Force fighter wings to 13.3 from 16.3. Although the Marine Corps remained relatively untouched, reserve units from all services were scheduled to undergo comparable shrinkage. American nuclear forces, of course, are scheduled to be reduced according to the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction treaties and President Bush's 1991 decision to denuclearize America's forward deployed forces.

Because the Clinton administration had so little time to prepare its first budget, the military force structure through 1994 will essentially remain that proposed by Bush. President Clinton will await a comprehensive defense review before announcing his intentions for later years. Clinton has already stated, however, that the Bush administration's target of 1.6 million regular troops will be cut by an additional 200,000 personnel. Another clue to the administration's intentions is the defense plan endorsed in February 1992 by then-Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin, now Clinton's defense secretary. That blueprint would, by 1997, have left the military with nine active Army divisions, two active Marine Corps divisions, 340 Navy ships, 12 aircraft carriers and ten active Air Force wings. Budget Director Leon Panetta has publicly stated that the administration's current budget closely follows that 1992 plan.

Secretary Aspin has provided the most comprehensive explanation of what these resources are expected to accomplish. In presenting the administration's budget request, he stated that the resulting forces were expected to counter threats to U.S. interests from regional aggressors such as Iraq, from the global spread of weapons of mass destruction and from the consequences of failed democratic transitions, including possibly those in the former Soviet Union. Defense spending, Secretary Aspin also stated, would be used to enhance the economic strength central to America's national security. Plainly, however, that responsibility will fall most heavily on domestic programs and international economic policy. Yet not only is the administration's defense spending unlikely to produce a force capable of meeting its stated objectives, but those objectives themselves fall short of the superpower capabilities to which, unfortunately, Americans have grown accustomed.

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THE ASPIN AGENDA

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION claims that, despite making larger cuts than under Bush, its budgets will bring just as many benefits to America. Most defense savings, Secretary Aspin insists, result from the pay freeze and pension payment limits imposed on federal employees and from an improved inflation forecast, which means that defense goods should cost less than previously expected. Aspin argues that Bush's defense blueprint was drawn up at a time when the Soviet Union, however weakened, still existed. The Soviet breakup is irreversible, he contends, and although Russia's nuclear arsenal remains potent, the United States can rule out the return of anything approaching the old Soviet conventional threat. In fact, for the foreseeable future, Aspin sees no single military challenger stronger than pre-Desert Storm Iraq and no prospect that a more powerful coalition will form.

Secretary Aspin's position is that the U.S. military should simultaneously be capable of meeting the following challenges: fighting a Persian Gulf War-sized regional conflict; participating in a similar conflict where U.S. allies are using their own considerable ground forces (say, in Korea); undertaking naval air action in America's own hemisphere or an operation comparable to that which ousted Panamanian dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega in 1989; carrying out a humanitarian relief operation the size of the Kurdish rescue; maintaining enough land and air forces for a "rotation base" able to sustain the initial Desert Storm-sized deployment; maintaining a "foundation block" consisting of everything from strategic nuclear forces to forces for defending U.S. territory to research and development to procurement to operations and training.

His confidence that U.S. forces under the proposed budget can carry out these missions hinges largely on two considerations: the new budget's higher funding for air and sea lift to increase America's actual, rapidly deliverable military punch; and a separate budget line for peacekeeping to enable U.S. forces to participate in such actions without cannibalizing regular operations and maintenance accounts.

But Secretary Aspin's analysis contains too many wild cards to serve as a sound basis for prudent defense planning. Even congres-

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sional Democrats have warned that a big spending (or big investing) administration could quickly change the inflation outlook. Military pay and benefits frozen for too long would cripple long-term recruiting, and shortchanging operations and maintenance spending would lower levels of readiness. Much savings therefore will depend on making significant cuts in weapons programs, and these are jealously guarded by many in Congress for generating valuable jobs for constituents. Moreover, there is nearly unanimous agreement that Bush projections may have underestimated the costs of weapons programs and overestimated, by at least $10 billion annually, the savings achievable through management reform. Most revealing, Clinton's projected 1997 funding levels are very close to those that Secretary Aspin, in

FORCE STRUCTURE	FY 1994 REQUEST	FY 1998 REQUEST	1992 ASPIN PREFERRED	1992 ASPIN FALLBACK
MARINES				
Active Divisions	3	N/A	2	2
Reserves	1	N/A	1	1
ARMY				
Active Divisions	12	N/A	9	8
Reserves	8	N/A	6	2
AIR FORCE				
Active Wings	13.3	N/A	10	8
Reserves	11	N/A	8	6
NAVY				
Total Ships	413	N/A	340	290
OUTLAYS (*billions of 1993 dollars*)	276.9	252.5	270	246

How Much is Enough?

his 1992 analysis, calculated would buy a force considerably smaller and less capable (column four, table) than the one he endorsed that year (column three).

Secretary Aspin himself has conceded numerous problems with the Clinton plan. The five-year defense spending totals in Clinton's economic blueprint were "essentially built upon a macroeconomic basis, not on a threat analysis basis," he told the House Armed

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Services Committee. They were "just kind of pulled out of the air, or very close to being pulled out of the air," he added. While insisting that "the '94 number is doable," he acknowledged that "we're worried about where we're going beyond." Even for 1994, Secretary Aspin conceded that the new $300 million peacekeeping budget "probably is not enough." The defense secretary has promised to seek new funds if the inflation and efficiency savings fall short or if the strategic review reveals the need for larger forces. But in the current political and fiscal environment, simply holding the line on defense will be difficult enough.

LESS BANG FOR FEWER BUCKS

IT IS TEMPTING to dismiss criticism of the Clinton defense budget as the latest and least excusable outburst of hawkish alarmism. Secretary Aspin counters critics neatly: "You can get a $50 billion cut out of the defense budget when the Warsaw Pact disappears (as the Bush administration concluded); you can at least do a $60–80 billion cut when the whole Soviet Union disappeared. After all, the whole defense budget of the United States was geared to the Soviet Union." Moreover, as he and many others have observed, the United States tolerated a wide means-ends gap throughout the Cold War, and survived handsomely. Indeed, at the height of the Cold War, Washington even sent half its Europe-based combat forces to fight a regional war in Southeast Asia.

Yet today these Cold War realities are less comforting than they initially appear. If America's Cold War forces were indeed incapable of carrying out all of their assigned missions, then Clinton-style cuts could simply produce another means-ends gap, but this time at lower force levels. Moreover, there are ample reasons to think that such gaps are less tolerable in the post-Cold War world. Even if the administration's projected budgets could buy the larger force structure that Secretary Aspin endorsed in 1992, it is doubtful that those forces would suffice for creating a pax Americana out of the disorderly world of the future. American military capabilities were already strained in recent years, despite larger Bush administration budgets.

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

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BY PATRICK LOW



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

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For example, although Desert Storm won a quick victory against Iraq, the war revealed important causes for concern. Aspin himself noted that a relatively small percentage of America's major air and naval combat units were used in the Persian Gulf, but the war nonetheless required roughly half the Army's combat forces and much of the services' support capabilities. Moreover, a strategy that relies on building a "Desert Storm equivalent" largely from America's forward deployed forces in Europe (which were on the whole four days closer to the gulf) will become far more difficult. By late 1996 total U.S. troop strength in Europe is to be cut to 100,000, which is less than half the number of U.S. ground troops that fought in Desert Storm.

The Clinton defense plan would use reserve forces at historically unprecedented levels.

John Collins of the Congressional Research Service has provided evidence that the crunch will be more severe under Clinton's proposed budgets. Using Bush budgets, he estimated that a future Desert Storm-sized war would require 66 percent of Army divisions, 50 percent of carrier battle groups, 66 percent of Air Force fighter-attack wings, and 66 percent of Marine divisions and air wings. Much of America's reserve force would be needed as well. Even assuming that Clinton's budget can support all the military capability promised, the ratios under the proposed force structure would almost surely be higher—if only because Secretary Aspin's definition of a "Desert Storm equivalent" leaves out numerous U.S. forces actually deployed to the Persian Gulf, as well as all of the allied units that saw action.

In fact, under the Clinton defense plan reserve forces would be used at even higher, and historically unprecedented, levels. A sweeping and rapid call-up would be needed even in the early stages of a conflict. And Secretary Aspin's own 1992 calculations indicate that in order to mobilize an equivalent amount of air power for a simultaneous modern Korea-style conflict the United States would have to deploy a substantial portion of its total air resources.

The Pentagon's 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment tends to support this analysis. It stated that even Bush's budgets would enable America to handle Persian Gulf- and Korea-style contingencies

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simultaneously only by calling on most of the nation's reserves. In addition, the Pentagon maintained that handling two such contingencies simultaneously even in quick, low-risk conditions might still require economically disruptive steps such as partial mobilization or "a priority call on resources and industrial production."

Such heavy reliance on reserves of uneven quality is difficult to square with the doctrinal and domestic political imperatives of fighting short wars, which have only grown stronger in the post-Cold War era, for two reasons. First, by the mid-1990s American forces simply will not be able to fight long, intense Desert Storm- and Korea-style wars at the same time. Because reserves would need to play such a decisive role so early, adequate numbers of fresh units would not be available to relieve forces that had become depleted or fatigued. Supplies of smart bombs, other weapons and spare parts, moreover, would soon dwindle. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell gave one indication of just how thin U.S. forces are already spread telling Congress that an operation as small as the Somalia intervention had forced a reduced tempo for the Navy's Pacific operations.

Second, the American people appear in no mood for protracted conflicts. Presidents will apparently continue to face strong pressures to win fast victories with overwhelming force, rather than entering protracted and messy wars. But the reserve-heavy U.S. military of the near future will be hard-pressed to land two early knockout blows at once. Moreover, achieving these objectives while also waging a large air or ground campaign or major peacekeeping operation in a region such as the Balkans would be out of the question. At least one of these goals would have to be sacrificed.

It is true that President Clinton is counting on help from other industrialized countries for peacekeeping operations. Yet it is also true that these countries are seeking their own peace dividends. Declining military budgets abroad reveal much about not only the resources America's allies will make available for maintaining peacekeeping operations, but also their enthusiasm for participating in such actions at all.

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THE WIDENING GYRE

UNLESS THE OBJECTIVES of American foreign policy change dramatically, the means-ends gap is likely to widen throughout the 1990s for several reasons. First, the end of the Cold War means the emergence of more independent actors in world politics. The Soviet Union not only financed and armed anti-American states such as Iraq, North Korea and Libya, but it also exercised some control over them. This restraint is now gone. In this regard, Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milošević may not be the last disturbers of peace unleashed by the collapse of the Soviet empire. Indeed, Secretary Aspin's "enemies list" scarcely mentions China and Iran, states possessing far greater military-industrial potential than any Iraq or Serbia. In addition, America's West European allies may be uncomfortable to learn of the defense secretary's stated conviction that Russian conventional forces will never threaten them again.

Second, even if the United States retained Cold War-level military capabilities, these newly independent international actors would have considerable reason to doubt America's willingness to counter every transgression they may contemplate. Because the end of the Soviet threat has deprived many countries of their strategic significance to the United States, the likelihood of America actually risking lives and resources to protect them from local thugs has plainly diminished. It was one thing to believe that the United States would respond to a Soviet attempt to overrun a major industrial region like Western Europe or to aggression in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. It is something else entirely to assume that post-Cold War aggressors eyeing strategically marginal targets, even in Bosnia, could expect major and sustained American opposition. The projected Clinton defense cuts can only bolster the confidence of these countries. America will probably remain able to deter or defeat challenges to its own security in priority regions, especially if they are not simultaneous. But major U.S. contributions to the broader cause of world order on top of that will not be possible.

Third, just as the number of potential regional aggressors has increased, so has the appetite of American politicians and opinion leaders for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. The

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U.S. military currently has 20,000 personnel in the Persian Gulf to enforce two no-fly zones over Iraq and a U.N. economic embargo. U.S. naval aircraft are enforcing a no-fly zone over Bosnia as well. Several thousand members of a U.S. force that once numbered 28,000 still remain in Somalia. In recent months, American military personnel have handled relief operations from Bangladesh to south Florida. And peacekeeping operations or military intervention are being considered, officially and unofficially, for Bosnia, Haiti, Cambodia and even the Golan Heights. Individually, most of these operations could probably be handled by a few thousand soldiers. But as the Somalia intervention has shown, these operations tend to drag on, and several at once could easily overwhelm a force of 1.4 million that will already be heavily reliant on reserves to handle whatever challenges emerge elsewhere. Further, as Secretary Aspin has observed, political pressure is likely to increase to use peacekeeping forces for "nation-building" once a minimum degree of order is restored, a challenge, as Vietnam proved, that can be excruciatingly difficult.

The Clinton administration's heavy reliance on reserve forces might also widen the means-ends gap by affecting America's own politics of intervention. In this way, it conforms to and reinforces the "Total Force" concept developed by the Army and Air Force after Vietnam. The idea was to reduce the odds that Washington could fight a war without first mobilizing strong public support or popular sacrifice. For that reason the Total Force concept presents a strong break on foreign policy interventionism. All else being equal, it can only limit the number of American foreign military involvements and the nation's role in preserving international order.

Finally, the very ease of Desert Storm may have a similar effect. America's three-month, 600-casualty victory could engender a popular revolution of rising military expectations, creating broad public support for the use of force abroad—but only with minimal casualties. Conversely, any intervention that might require higher tolls could turn out to be a political nonstarter.

Worse still, a means-ends gap may pose greater problems for America's stated "new world order" objectives than it did for its Cold

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War aims. The Cold War gap in theory could be bridged by nuclear weapons, but these will be of little use against the Serbias of the world, either militarily or for deterrence. In Desert Storm- or Korea-like contingencies, nuclear weapons could conceivably come into play principally to deter the adversary from using the same. If American and allied forces in the Persian Gulf or Korea were on the brink of disaster, first use of nuclear weapons is also conceivable, with no real prospect of retaliation from Moscow. American nuclear weapons, moreover, might still be a credible deterrent to a Chinese move against treaty allies such as Japan and South Korea. But their credibility is much lower if China or any other regional aggressor moves against strategically less important targets, such as the Spratly Islands or even Taiwan.

Clinton's defense plan takes a surprisingly narrow view of a superpower's global military requirements.

Perhaps even more important, Clinton's defense plan takes a surprisingly narrow view of a superpower's global military requirements. First, it makes little allowance for deterrence by intimidation, which has always been critical to America's status. If America is determined to stave off international chaos, let alone to help build a stable international system, it will need, among other things, the sheer power to deter challenges from being mounted in the first place and not merely, as is Secretary Aspin's focus, to react to specific threats once they have materialized. A clear preponderance of force is necessary to create the psychological conditions needed abroad for America to play a superpower role. And even at home, the public is likeliest to support the costs and risks of world leadership if America is strong enough that those costs and risks appear slight.

Nor does the Clinton defense plan take into account how military preponderance has enabled the United States to achieve a broad array of more specific foreign policy aims, which the Clinton administration apparently still values highly. During the Cold War, America's superpower status enabled it—at staggering costs, to be sure—not only to contain the Soviets, but to smother the diplomatic independence of Germany and Japan, to pressure them to follow America's

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economic policy leads, to provide the security environment needed to sustain an open world economy, to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and to exert influence in the United Nations and other international organizations.

Significantly smaller defense budgets may well make many of these goals impossible to achieve. Being obvious to friend and foe alike, these slimmer budgets will inevitably weaken the credibility of American defense guarantees, especially in Western Europe and the Far East, where the administration is both reducing forward deployed forces and wishing away Russian and Chinese threats. Moreover, they will significantly reduce the leverage that the Clinton administration and its predecessors have depended upon for pursuing a host of economic and other goals on its international agenda.

GIVING AMERICA WHAT IT NEEDS

EVEN IF AMERICA'S leaders persist in ignoring the implications of declining national security resources, the rest of the world will not. Moreover, the means-ends gap will eventually influence American foreign policymaking, as is already the case. The declining availability of troops and money, reflecting the wishes and common sense of the American people, will increasingly narrow America's foreign policy options or, quite simply, rule many of them out.

The danger is that an administration and a loyal opposition still addicted to globalism and leadership on the cheap may yet bloody the country's nose or warp its economy by pursuing world order in Bosnia or elsewhere. Worse still, America's leaders could become so bent on stabilizing an irremediably unstable world that they will fail to strengthen the nation's ability to survive and flourish amid considerable instability. That is to say, they will fail to adjust to the lower national security spending the public desires.

In an increasingly turbulent world in which challenges are inherently less predictable, a consolidated military, strong economy and healthy society are essential for creating the multiplicity of options and the freedom of action that are the keys to foreign policy success. Domestic renewal also represents the nation's best hope of achieving

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favorable outcomes at the various international political, economic and environmental bargaining tables at which America will surely sit.

The new approach would generate dramatic changes in U.S. foreign and economic policy.[2] For example, America's leaders would recognize, as their constituents already have, that in the post-Soviet era, few international conflicts will directly threaten the nation's territorial integrity, political independence or material welfare. America can now afford to steer clear of various regional conflicts—unless the public agrees to support those interventions through tax increases, domestic spending cuts or perhaps even popular military conscription. For adequate access to foreign markets, America would rely not on its diminishing alliance-leader clout, but on making internationally competitive products. That goal requires productivity-enhancing domestic policies and reciprocity-based trade and investment policies. Rather than fielding expensive Desert Storm equivalents to fight periodic wars in the Persian Gulf, the nation would finally focus on its energy problems by sharply reducing its reliance on oil.

An approach to national security that uses America's limited resources not to raise a new world order but to protect and complement domestic vitality would also shape military priorities that contrast markedly with those of the 1992 Aspin blueprint. American forces would focus primarily on deterring old and new nuclear powers, protecting against small-scale nuclear strikes with a thin missile defense system, defending its territory against conventional attack largely with the strategic nuclear deterrent, and maintaining the flow of reasonably priced Persian Gulf oil until a serious national energy plan is put in place. Under this approach, with the right deployment strategies, the United States would even have adequate resources for a force, supplemented by modest reserves, that could provide token hand-holding units to bolster stability in Europe and East Asia, as well as the beginnings of units capable of using conventional precision-strike weapons launched from air and naval standoff platforms to destroy weapons of mass destruction owned by rogue states. Also

[2]These policies are described in depth in *An Economic Strategy for America: A Blueprint for Economic Revitalization*, Washington, (DC): Economic Strategy Institute, Jan. 20, 1992.

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desirable, and attainable, would be a small fire-fighting unit to handle evacuations, hostage rescues, etc.

This new strategy suggests a much different role for the nation's foreign policy analysts. Rather than dreaming up new missions for forces and resources that soon will no longer be available, rather than railing against the supposed parochialism and irresponsibility of the American people, and rather than trying to bridge the means-ends gap with gimmicks such as "soft power" and collective security, they might consider accepting political reality and strategic common sense, and help flesh out this new approach. This more modest role may be less appealing than grand strategizing with nonexistent assets, but it beats being ignored, as any declinist can tell you.

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Reviews



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Auto workers picket a Toyota dealer to protest imports, February 1992

"Critics of Clinton's trade policy have fired their shots prematurely and at the wrong targets."

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Clinton's Emerging Trade Policy

Act One, Scene One

Jeffrey E. Garten

Computer Wars: How the West Can Win in a Post-IBM World. BY CHARLES H. FERGUSON AND CHARLES R. MORRIS. New York: Times Books, 1993, 272 pp. $23.00.

The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of The Next Security System. BY WAYNE SANDHOLTZ AND OTHERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 262 pp. $29.95 (paper, $11.95).

The Next Battleground: Japan, America, and the European Market. BY TIM JACKSON. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993, 332 pp. $22.95.

By the close of the administration's first 100 days, President Bill Clinton's trade policy had come under heavy fire at home and abroad. Referring to the international shouting matches over computer chips, steel, minivans, aircraft manufacturing and government procurement contracts, *The New York Times* wrote of "a growing tension in trade relations provoked by President Clinton's new and more confrontational approach to international negotiations." *The Wall Street Journal* accused the administration of caring "less about principle than about making a political deal." *The Economist* called Washington's approach "at best incompetent and at worst a step down a slippery path towards protectionism." And *The Financial Times* urged Europe to side with Japan against America's new trade initiatives.

European Community ministers talked of America's "unilateral bullying" and of "having to grope in the dark" to figure out what the new Clinton team was trying to do. Japan's ambassador to the EC was more polite, saying only that America's top trade

JEFFREY E. GARTEN, senior adviser to The Blackstone Group, teaches international finance and economics at the Columbia Graduate School of Business. He is the author of *A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy.*

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negotiator, Mickey Kantor, "is very new to trade matters." Jagdish Bhagwati, economic adviser to the director general of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), said: "This should be a spring of hope, and instead we get a nuclear winter."

In retrospect, such charges are not surprising. Fundamental policy changes are never easy to accommodate, and big changes should have been expected. Well before he was elected, Clinton was promising to recast the entire intellectual basis of U.S. trade policy. Trade was to be an integral part of creating competitive industries and high-wage jobs. It was to be placed at the center of foreign policy, becoming at least as important as political and security questions. Clinton had promised to remove the ideological blinders that caused government and industry to regard one another as antagonists. He had committed his administration to putting the issues of environmental and labor practices into trade negotiations. And so it has gone.

The fact is that critics of Clinton's trade policy have fired their shots prematurely and at the wrong targets. The administration's accomplishment in changing the national mind-set on trade policy dwarfs in significance the mini-crises, rhetorical jousting and inevitable inconsistencies that have emerged in these early days. The president has focused on the most basic problems affecting America's international position. He has riveted the country's attention on the federal government's fiscal solvency, a cancerous threat to the long-term vitality of the American economy. He has given priority to improving worker productivity. He has proposed a technology policy to bolster university research, upgrade vocational training and improve the way America transforms basic inventions into commercial products. In his speeches, news conferences and meetings with foreign leaders, Clinton has put other nations on notice that America will no longer make trade concessions in deference to the NATO or U.S.-Japanese security relationship. Clinton and his trade policy makers have done all this in an astonishingly short period of time, and they have based it on the assumption that America's economic trajectory has been arching in the wrong direction for well over a decade. The Clinton team has acted as if the United States has no choice but to make bold departures from existing policies, and that the risk of inaction is greater than the dangers inherent in dramatic change. They are dead right.

THE POTENTIAL REWARDS

The gains from a successful policy could be an essential spur to domestic renewal and to the development of the new, post-Cold War foreign policy that the administration seeks. It is not just that exports have been the most important ingredient in the expansion of America's GNP these past few years, but that almost all the growth of high-wage manufacturing jobs has been attributable to sales abroad. It is not just that some 14 million workers now owe their jobs to exports, but that we will have to do much better than that if today's economic stagnation is not to undermine the very fabric of our society. A vigorous trade policy, which gains greater access for American firms to foreign markets and keeps open our markets to others, will help ensure a competitive economy at home—essential for growth with low inflation. A more effective international economic policy, based heavily on increased trade competitiveness, will enhance U.S. influence

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around the world at a time when our military assets will be deployed with decreasing frequency. It will also give America the resources and the confidence to make its rightful economic contributions to assist Russia and Eastern Europe in their historic transformations, and to lead in efforts to promote development in Latin America and elsewhere. Viewed from another perspective, a trade policy that fails because it does not result in greater U.S. sales abroad, or because it descends into protectionism, would be a disaster for America and the world. Such are the stakes.

THE RISKS

The benefits of a vastly reinvigorated trade policy should not obscure the dilemmas to be confronted or the pitfalls to be avoided. In foreign policy, an aggressive emphasis on commercial diplomacy is essential, but it promises to transform radically the rules, patterns and relationships between America and virtually every major power. Despite the restrained rhetoric of summits and other high-profile gatherings, intense trade competition untempered by the need to band together against a common, Cold War enemy is likely to lead to conflict with all U.S. allies, the implications of which can only be dimly perceived.

So influential is the United States in the world trading system that a highly aggressive American trade policy will have reverberations on all the rules and patterns of international commerce. For over four decades America pushed a trade regime based on multilateral rules, including most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and nondiscrimination. These were American principles, and they only survived because America championed them. The United States, moreover, kept the system going by being, in effect, the market of last resort for everyone else. While it should be a major American objective to build a trading framework based on multilateral rules—as would be furthered by completion of the Uruguay Round and development of the GATT—from Washington's perspective, today's aggressive bilateralism, resort to selective managed trade and refusal to accept the continuation of America's disproportionate openness are all understandable. But these departures from the original Bretton Woods ideals are likely to lead to a fundamental revamping of the trading systems as other nations react to our actions. As in foreign policy, the implications are far from clear.

A more cooperative relationship between business and government is long overdue, but establishing such a partnership is not easy. An emerging test case is the manufacture and sale of automobiles, where Washington and Detroit are talking about cooperating in development of environmental technology and nearing an apparent consensus on a strategy for better market access in Japan. Americans have little experience in making this kind of experiment work without a considerable drain on the public purse. On the other hand, business has a legitimate concern that government involvement be consistent and not driven by capricious political interests. There is a risk as well that unless the business expertise of the federal government is upgraded, the best plans will falter for lack of skilled management in Washington.

In addressing the problems of the American economy, the administration is rightfully trying to play catch-up for years of underinvestment in infrastructure, labor and technology. During the rebuilding

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phase, some industries are sure to ask for a temporary respite from foreign competition. Clinton, like his predecessors, will listen and is likely occasionally to grant trade relief, especially in the face of the continuing employment recession. The real question is not whether there will be some protection, but whether Washington has the courage and skill to demand and create shape-up measures for the firms being shielded. Protection without adjustment only undermines future prospects, but again, there is little experience to rely upon.

Clinton's emphasis on export competitiveness is critical, given the importance that foreign sales now play in our GNP growth and job creation. There is occasionally a sense in Washington, however, that exports are good but overseas investment by American firms is bad, because the latter exports jobs and not products. That view needs qualification: more than 25 percent of American exports go to overseas subsidiaries of U.S. firms. In addition, U.S. companies will not be competitive unless they can set up in foreign markets, be near their customers and engage in local research. In the future, Washington will be under simultaneous pressure to keep firms at home and to help them move abroad (or at least not stand in the way). Striking the right policy balance will be difficult, but crucial.

The effort to integrate trade and domestic policy will require great care. Opening foreign markets is essential to the long-term health of the U.S. economy. But hard-won victories can be quickly nullified if American firms are loaded down with new regulatory and financial burdens. The administration will have to ensure that the new costs of health care, worker retraining and additional taxes do not cripple U.S. industries. This is a difficult task, for nowhere is the balance between legitimate domestic and international goals more difficult to manage.

Consistency and coherence in trade policy could also be a problem. In abandoning the rhetoric of Adam Smith, President Clinton only recognized the reality that totally free markets are a myth. But without the kind of clear ideological direction that free market theory provides, actions will often seem inconsistent and subject to the political winds of the moment. President Reagan could exalt the "magic of the marketplace" while protecting automobiles, steel and machine tools, and still appear consistent. President Bush's image as charter member of the friends-of-GATT club allowed his chief trade negotiator, Carla Hills, to brandish a crowbar at America's trade partners with nowhere near the outcry that has greeted Clinton's get-tough message. The administration talks about substituting "pragmatism" for ideology, but pragmatism is too ambiguous a term to garner public support. A better message is called for.

In its new approach to trade, the administration is gambling on cooperative congressional behavior. In the past, the House and Senate have generally taken a harder line on commercial matters than has the executive branch. Clinton is surely hoping that an administration that shows itself to be highly aggressive in trade will be able to lead Congress without stirring up even more hawkish sentiments. It will be a delicate balance.

NEW BOOKS ON TRADE

Current literature and policy seldom mirror one another. Judging from several

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recent books, however, the administration's outlook on trade is rooted in many of the prevailing intellectual arguments for greater government activism. In *Computer Wars*, for example, authors Charles Ferguson and Charles Morris look at the future after the demise of IBM. They conclude that American computer firms—the companies on which so much of U.S. industrial leadership rests—face fierce competition from Japan, but there is no reason why they cannot survive and prosper if there are fundamental changes in U.S. patterns of savings and investment, and, in particular, if there is a stronger technology policy. In *The Highest Stakes*, several professors from the University of California at Berkeley claim that the national security threat "no longer refers to tanks and missiles but also to the control of markets, investment and technology." They worry that U.S. dependence on foreign sources for key industrial technologies like robotics, precision tools and magnetic components has serious military significance. *The Next Battleground* looks at competition for the European market, but spotlights many of the same preconditions for national or corporate competitiveness.

These are all good books, their arguments grounded in thorough research. As aids for public understanding, they are valuable because they are so clearly written. Given the pace of change in the world today, however, it is difficult for any author to be ahead of the policy curve. Moreover, none of these books analyzes a problem or industry in depth or puts it in the full context of broader trade policy. While these writings are not strong on strategy and tactics—which is not their purpose in any event—together they do raise some thoughts about a host of critical issues.

A WOUNDED EUROPE

Start with Europe. Not too long ago the United States saw the formation of a single European market as a major opportunity for American exports. This view was bolstered by a steadily rising U.S. trade surplus with the EC. But that trend may be over as intra-European trade grows faster than trans-Atlantic commerce, and as Washington loses political leverage in trade negotiations as a result of Europe's reduced need for American military protection.

Europe's economic future, meanwhile, looks bleak because of its declining competitiveness. The EC's economic problems were camouflaged by the euphoria over Europe 1992, but they were mounting nevertheless. Most European firms have never really established effective pan-continental operations. The culture of monopoly and cartels has been dismantled too slowly. Too few jobs have moved to the high-technology industries. Massive subsidies have continued to pour out for "old" industries—agriculture, steel, shipbuilding and coal. Industrial policy that tried to pick national champions has proved to be expensive and disastrous. In *The Next Battleground*, Tim Jackson describes the failure of European industrial policies in automobiles, computers and consumer electronics, and he explains how European companies have fallen behind the United States and Japan in the battle for the European market. This point is underscored in *Computer Wars*, which bluntly asserts that in the computer industry "the Europeans are no longer a factor and show no signs of becoming one.... What is remarkable is not the failure of each country's national champion but ... the astonishing speed and devastating extent of such failure."

U.S. firms may be tempted to gloat and

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see clear sailing in a foreign market of some 400 million relatively well-off consumers, but this would be a mistake. As *The Next Battleground* notes, Japanese firms could be in a better position than their U.S. counterparts to take advantage of European weakness. And there is no chance that Europe will cede its national markets willingly. A strong defensive response, characterized by a slower-than-usual approach to trade liberalization and selective but heavy government intervention, is more likely; trade is too integral to Europe's economic, social and political fabric for there to be any other outcome.

THE RIGHT BALANCE WITH JAPAN

If Europe's weakness presents a problem, so does Japan's strength. If there is one argument reinforced in these three books, it is that Japan's industrial momentum will continue, its current recession notwithstanding. All these books take note of Japan's enormous investments in technology and work force training, as well as its constant upgrading of manufacturing techniques. What should America do about Japan? Few American experts still advocate a totally hands-off, free-market approach. Almost everyone agrees on the need to vigorously enforce U.S. trade laws. While an increasing number of Americans accept the idea that most of their competitive problems are home grown, after that, opinions diverge. Some want to attack Japan's institutional structure, such as the interlocking relationships among its firms (*keiretsu*), which keeps out foreign businesses. Others want to follow a managed–trade strategy in which Japan commits to targets for the market shares of foreign companies in particular industries, such as the well-publicized goal of 20 percent in semiconductor sectors. Some believe that the key is a much stronger yen, which would make Japanese exports more expensive and encourage more imports into Japan. Some look for Japan to grow faster, spend more on public investment and consumer goods, and thereby increase its demand for foreign products. In practice, U.S. pressure on all these fronts will be required, but even that will not constitute a completely adequate policy.

Beyond taking a tough line with Tokyo, there is a need to pool the respective strengths of the two economies—to build on existing links in finance, investment, technology and research, for example. Private markets and firms are moving in this direction (regardless of the barroom bluster among trade negotiators). In *The Next Battleground*, Jackson argues that Europe should also deal with Japan not by pushing it away, but by joining forces with its firms. Daniel Burstein's recently published book, *Turning the Tables*, makes important proposals for a more closely knit trans-Pacific economic community. The balance between pressure and cooperation is, of course, the most difficult issue for a policymaker.

THE WORLD BEYOND

Judged by the noise level in Washington and the thrust of the books reviewed here, it would seem that U.S. interests outside of Europe and Japan are distinctly secondary. But some of America's most significant commercial opportunities lie in other parts of the world. The World Bank, for example, estimates that growth in the developing world over the next decade will average about 4.7 percent annually, which is twice the rate of the industrial countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation

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and Development. The books waiting to be written, and the policies yet to be developed, concern strategy toward these once peripheral but now crucially important regions.

The most dynamic area of the world is the East Asian rim, not just China but the entire region from Seoul to Sydney. In fact, by the turn of the century, East Asia outside of Japan will account for about one-third of the economic output of the entire developing world. With the exception of Taiwan and China, U.S. trade deficits with these countries are small. Given the projected growth rates in countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, there are great opportunities for rapid growth of American sales in the entire area. From automobiles to theme parks, the demands for new goods and services are phenomenal. But penetrating and holding these markets against Japanese and local competition will require not only that U.S. firms be competitive exporters, but also that they set up operations on site.

Latin America, with the huge consumer markets of Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina and others—collectively estimated at well over 400 million people—is projected to grow at twice the rate it did in the 1980s, but it is dangerous to assume that historical preference for U.S. goods and services will continue. A broad approach to cooperation on trade, investment, capital market development and regulatory liberalization will be particularly important in maintaining the momentum American firms have built there in recent years.

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics represent challenges totally different from Asia and Latin America. They may well turn out to be major markets and excellent locations from which to produce and distribute goods, but they will require uncharacteristically long-term horizons on the part of American firms and Washington.

Among the most vexing problems facing trade liberalization—and ones not dealt with in the books under review here—are the differences in national regulatory structure. So much of the public brouhaha over trade policy deals with such concepts as market access, dumping and fairness. But different national traditions relating to antitrust, financial regulation, environmental concerns, patent protection and similar policies underlie so many of the real obstacles to international commerce. To call these "non-tariff barriers" is to understate the problem; the various national systems constitute different kinds of longstanding bargains among domestic groups in each society.

There are two reasons why these obstacles will loom larger in the years ahead. On the one hand, tariffs and quotas have been substantially reduced, putting other barriers more clearly in the sights of negotiators. In addition, from America's standpoint, the export of services—as opposed to raw materials and manufactured goods—is booming, with a trade surplus on the order of $60 billion in 1992. But because such industries as construction, insurance and the practice of law have been so local in nature and so removed from international trade, it is in these areas that foreign regulations have evolved quite differently from our own. If the post-World War II efforts to liberalize trade have seemed tortuous to date, we have seen nothing compared to what is coming.

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TRADE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

In Europe, Japan and the rest of East Asia, the nexus of trade, foreign policy and national security will cause the administration severe headaches. It is one thing to acknowledge the connection between these competing interests, as *The Highest Stakes* does, but it is another to deal effectively with a wide variety of situations. In addition to relationships with Europe and Japan, America's economic policy will drive some of the most sensitive foreign policy issues: whether to condition trade and aid with Russia on cooperation with the United States on Bosnia and other matters that come before the Security Council; whether to renew MFN status for China in light of its human rights violations and arms sales policies; whether to normalize relations with Vietnam so that American firms can do business alongside the Japanese and Europeans. When the issues involve high technology—as an increasing number will—still more complications arise, as when American aircraft manufacturers seek to join with Asian and European firms to pool valuable technologies, or when certain dual-use technologies could help outcasts like Libya develop weapons. Many of these issues are not new per se, but they will unfold in an environment where commercial considerations are likely to weigh more heavily on Washington than ever before, creating acute foreign policy dilemmas.

THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS

In the end, President Clinton's biggest challenge in creating a new trade policy is to further the nation's changing domestic and foreign priorities without abandoning America's postwar role in pushing the world trading system toward greater openness. Pursuing these goals in the next year, when slow growth and unemployment remain problems at home, and when Europe and Japan are mired in recession will be an awesome task.

It was much easier for America to champion a liberal, multilateral trading order when the nation was so economically dominant, but it would be a mistake to believe that the objective is not still in U.S. interests, or that American economic assets are no longer up to the task. Of the three books reviewed, only *Computer Wars* gives sufficient attention to the country's economic dynamism. Much of that dynamism is evident in the recent increases in American productivity and the lead that many American companies have over their foreign counterparts in restructuring their operations and work forces to meet new competition. In addition, financial problems in Japan over the next few years give the administration some breathing room before Toyota, Hitachi and others come roaring back, as they will.

President Clinton's first 100 days in office were no more than the opening act of a new trade policy. It was an important start. The president could not have been expected to do more, either as a newcomer to the Oval Office or as a leader attempting to reorient the basic thinking about trade in Washington and throughout the nation. Daunting as the initial challenge was, however, the road ahead is much tougher.

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Review Essay

The Stain of Vietnam

Robert McNamara, Redemption Denied

Douglas Brinkley

Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara. BY DEBORAH SHAPLEY. Boston (MA): Little, Brown, 1993, 734 pp. $29.95.

Can we honor and respect Robert McNamara? From the time the young California native left a teaching position at Harvard Business School to join the Army Air Corps during the Second World War, McNamara has been a tireless improver and rationalizer of military and industrial institutions, even of the world. But as Deborah Shapley makes abundantly clear in *Promise and Power*, her eminently readable and cleverly crafted biographical study of McNamara, what the nation needed during the Vietnam War era was not a whiz kid, not a supreme bean-counter, but a leader of vision, moral courage and scrupulous honesty. And here McNamara's flaws overwhelm a lifetime of achievements, for the portrait that emerges from Shapley's book is of a man who was the primary culprit in America's ill-fated military engagement, a historical assessment that is likely to stick no matter how many nuclear arms reduction speeches and articles he churns out. The McNamara story is one of tragedy, for a dedicated public servant and for America, fueled by our frustration that a man of such promise chose, out of a misguided sense of mission, not to tell the American people what he knew about the dim prospects for victory in the Vietnam War when it might have made a difference.

EARLY SUCCESSES

McNamara's government career began successfully; with a few notable exceptions, his record as President Kennedy's secretary of defense was exemplary. J.F.K. had campaigned on a platform charging that the Eisenhower administration's obsession with budget balancing had severely weakened America's conventional and nuclear military strength, and "flexible response" was the Kennedy administration's remedy to Republican policies.

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McNamara was seen by Kennedy as the ideal implementer of his program, a corporate manager with a well-established reputation for cost-cutting and efficiency to preside over the expansion of military outlays Kennedy's program called for.

McNamara's aggressive efforts to modernize the armed forces and make the Pentagon more efficient were desperately needed antidotes to eight years of laissez-faire management. Upon taking office in January 1961 McNamara immediately demonstrated nerve, mastery of detail and Kennedyesque vigor in trying to weed out waste in the armed services. What other Cold War defense secretary had both the common sense and the iron disposition to say, while in office, that "the military feels it has to have every bright shiny new gadget that comes along no matter how much it costs. I think we ought to buy what we need!" Meanwhile, from 1961 to 1964, he presided over the largest peacetime buildup in U.S. military history.

Following his natural bent for efficiency and cost-effectiveness, first displayed as a hotshot executive with Ford Motor Company in the 1950s, McNamara began his seven years at the Pentagon by refusing to spend funds appropriated for the development of the RS-70 bomber (the pet project of General Curtis LeMay). He went on to veto the construction of nuclear power plants for naval vessels; grappled with powerful congressional conservatives in an attempt to merge the National Guard and the Army Reserves; offered the Tactical Fighter Experiment contract to General Dynamics, even though the military selection boards favored Boeing; and seriously ruptured relations between Washington and London by cavalierly canceling the promised Skybolt mission.

McNamara's ability to shrug off the collateral damage of his policies to domestic and international politics allowed him to be presented in a flattering light by the press. The more the public learned of his hard-driving intelligence during the Kennedy years, the more they liked him. From Shapley's account of McNamara's smooth performance during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis, one feels grateful that our nation had such a careful and pragmatic tactician at the Pentagon's helm. By August 1963, when the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by Kennedy, Harold Macmillan and Nikita Khrushchev—an event Shapley wrongly discounts as of little consequence—McNamara was in top form, the most respected and powerful secretary of defense since the cabinet position was created in 1947. McNamara had his detractors then, but they were a cracked chorus of fiscal conservatives and disarmament liberals who saw through the image of penny-pincher and charged that the Kennedy administration's flexible response deterrence strategy, which increased conventional forces by more than 300,000 troops, was profligate.

Yet as Vietnam would demonstrate, McNamara was more of an accountant than a global strategist, more of a technical manager than a man of vision. It is a painful irony that the man who preached the gospel of cost-effectiveness for the nuts and bolts of military hardware failed to comprehend that the Vietnam intervention would become the least effective and most costly military venture in American history. Between 1965 and 1967, spending on the Vietnam War escalated from $1 billion to $20.6 billion. Robert McNamara, it turned out, was penny wise and pound foolish.

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THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM

Flexible response, many historians have recently argued, was not only a miserable Cold War deterrent strategy, but a policy that vastly inflated the national debt and led to the Vietnam War. McNamara disagrees. He has countered that the Cuban missile crisis is a textbook study of how flexible response can work, and that just because Vietnam turned sour does not mean the strategy was flawed. Perhaps he is right. It was not the Kennedy administration's flexible response that inevitably led to the Vietnam War, but the Johnson administration's fateful decision in July 1965 to deploy troops in Southeast Asia. One may argue, not very usefully, that had Johnson not had such a large conventional force at his disposal, he would not have done what he did. The more compelling argument is simply that Southeast Asia was the wrong place to deploy them.

McNamara was from the beginning a true believer in the necessity of American intervention in Southeast Asia. "I think it is a very important war," McNamara wrote in April 1964, "and I am pleased to be identified with it and do whatever I can to win it." McNamara got his wish. Historians, likewise, will always identify him with the Vietnam War, and since America failed to win it, McNamara will always be judged a failed secretary of defense, the man most responsible for what historian Paul Kennedy calls "strategic overstretch." What is worse—and it is a point Shapley implies time and time again—McNamara, a profile in courage during the Kennedy years, became during the Johnson years a bookkeeper of a military policy he knew was doomed to failure.

How can future generations of Americans learn to respect McNamara when historians like Shapley point out that as early as November 3, 1965, the secretary of defense knew that the Vietnam War was "unwinnable militarily"? As Shapley puts it, "he chose to deceive the American people by hiding the bad news while raising troop levels to 400,000, then 500,000, when he could have resigned, told the—'truth' and stopped the American involvement."

Getting information about the Vietnam War out of McNamara is like pulling teeth, although Shapley occasionally succeeds. "I didn't want to bomb Hanoi; I didn't want to withdraw," McNamara told her. "I didn't have the answers. All I knew was we were in a hell of a mess." Yet even though he recognized "the mess," his knee-jerk Cold War response was that resisting communist aggression in Vietnam might be difficult, but the effort was necessary. McNamara had the opportunity to do the right thing, and salvage his personal and historical reputation in the process, in late 1967, when L.B.J. forced him to resign. Robert Kennedy pleaded with McNamara to speak out against the war, but instead of coming clean, McNamara, in Shapley's words, "retreated into silence, confusion, and remorse, which would propel him into his next life and world, in denial instead of self-knowledge."

THE DO-GOODER

Leaving government did not mean the end of Robert McNamara's public life. He went on to become the president of the World Bank, dragging Vietnam around like a ball and chain, particularly after the publication of *The Pentagon Papers* and David Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest*, both of which tarnished his days overseeing the Defense Department. McNamara

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tried to repackage himself as the ethical good guy selflessly helping Third World nations launch green revolutions in the battle against global poverty, but to a growing segment of the American public he was the villain of Vietnam. If L.B.J. was seen as a tormented president, face buried in his hands, McNamara was Dr. Strangelove—the cold-blooded, calculating computer of death, speaking matter-of-factly in terms of "kills," "body counts" and "search-and-destroy missions." The more people asked for answers about his role in Vietnam, the more McNamara became aloof and silent.

The difficult question Shapley confronts is why an honorable man like McNamara seems to want to obfuscate the public record about Vietnam with evasive rhetoric and the artful dodge. For all her probing, Shapley elicits few illuminating insights from her subject, only a few confessional quotes:"The greatest failure of all was Vietnam." If it were not for the horror and futility of the Vietnam War, one might wish Shapley would just give up and leave McNamara alone.

The more McNamara equivocates about Vietnam, the more it will haunt him. His writings on nuclear issues will ring hollow until he stands up and confronts the war he wanted and lost. Whenever McNamara is asked about Vietnam, his stock answer is, "Let the historians sort it out." If he continues to remain silent, historians like Shapley will sort it out for him. The result may be that over time Robert McNamara will be seen less and less as an enigma and more as an ambitious and disingenuous political operator. That would be a pity, for despite it all, Robert McNamara is one of his generation's finest public servants. ❦

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Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

ANDREW J. PIERRE

The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. BY CHRISTOPHER SIMPSON. New York: Grove Press, 1993, 399 pp. $24.95.

An investigative reporter and teacher of journalism, Christopher Simpson has long been interested in the Nazi period, having earlier written a book on America's alleged recruitment of war criminals after World War II. Now he looks at genocide, first of the Armenians by the Turks in 1915-18, but mostly the Nazi holocaust. He focuses on the American response to each, at high levels of the U.S. government. The research is serious and comprehensive. The resulting picture is not attractive. For a variety of reasons, which he condemns, humanitarian concerns are given a lower priority than other war aims. In confronting genocide, international law can offer only a rebuke. It is up to society, the author argues, not to offer rationalizations, as was done, and not to keep one's mouth shut. The reader's mind will immediately turn to Bosnia; a very timely book.

Culture and Imperialism. BY EDWARD SAID. New York: Knopf, 1993, 416 pp. $25.00.

The distinguished author is a Columbia University professor of English and comparative literature, of Palestinian Arab origin, and a frequent commentator on the Arab–Israeli conflict. This unusual man writes unusual books. Here he builds upon his widely acclaimed earlier work, *Orientalism*, in which he criticized Western scholars for seeing the Middle East through Eurocentric eyes. Now he argues that the imperialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was incredibly willful and arrogant in its subjugation of societies; worse, it was blind to the culture, experience and tradition of evolved civilizations.

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Said is far from being the only one to have argued this. But who else does so by using as evidence classical literature? The reader is taken through interpretations of Joseph Conrad, Jane Austen, Rudyard Kipling, Albert Camus and many others; he or she is invited to reinterpret Verdi's *Aida* as an example of cultural imperialism; many other cultural icons fall. The implication is clear: Western culture is ill-equipped for understanding that of others, such as Islam. This is a sweeping, highly erudite work, intellectually bold but also full of substantiated assertions and criticisms. It will both infuriate and enlighten.

Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century. BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993, 240 pp. $21.00.

As in *The Grand Failure*, his recent survey of the reasons for the collapse of communism, Zbigniew Brzezinski uses *Out of Control* to analyze current political thinking and give the reader a dependable and sober view of the crises to come: the problems of American hegemony, the potential rise of Japan as a diplomatic giant, the problems of moral and spiritual decline in the West. Read as a moderate-conservative survey, *Out of Control* is useful enough, yet it lacks the specificity of *The Grand Failure* and the comprehensiveness of that other Cassandra, historian Paul Kennedy; *Out of Control* is neither original nor graceful in its discussion of the more spiritual dimensions of the century to come. While Brzezinski's fear of a Western world grown fat and indulgent is clear enough, it is hard to discern what he is up to with this, other than a very stern, and very familiar, sermon.

DAVID REMNICK

Religious Perspectives on War: Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Force After the Gulf War. BY DAVID R. SMOCK. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1992, 63 pp. $6.95 (paper).

One year after the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Institute for Peace brought together 24 theologians and scholars to discuss the relationship between religious ethics and the use of force. Assembled were individuals who could authoritatively give Christian, Jewish and Islamic perspectives as well as pacifist ones. Not surprisingly, the discussion soon turned to the classical doctrine of the "just war" as a standard by which to judge the ethics of entering into conflict. Many views of high caliber are expressed in this interesting and original short work.

Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–89. BY DAVID HALLORAN LUMSDAINE. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1993, 355 pp. $49.50 (paper, $16.95).

Today Washington is reassessing the purpose and role of foreign aid. The consensus is that it has been very much an instrument of national policy. In the United States, foreign aid has usually been justified on national security grounds. Lumsdaine has a more benign view, arguing that donors have been motivated less by political and economic interests than by humanitarian ones. How refreshing! He rejects the realist explanation by marshaling an impressive amount of data and analysis on international aid efforts over a 40-year span. This work is both an interpretation of the international system and a study of aid programs for the Third World. On the latter score alone it merits a close reading.

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Women as National Leaders. BY MICHAEL A. GENOVESE. Newbury Park (CA): Sage Publications, 1992, 241 pp. $46.00 (paper, $23.95).

Do women achieve national leadership and then exercise political power differently than men? Case studies of Corazon Aquino, Benazir Bhutto, Violeta Chamorro, Indira Gandhi, Golda Meir, Isabel Peron and Margaret Thatcher seek to answer this question. The answer by and large is in the negative, and some of the authors seem disappointed by this. Most of these women are not seen as "transformational leaders" pursuing a feminist agenda. Whatever one's views on the gender issue, the individual case studies that form the core of the book are most informative.

Military, Scientific and Technological

ELIOT A. COHEN

The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military. BY WILLIAM J. CROWE WITH DAVID CHANOFF. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993, 367 pp. $25.00.

This memoir begins with a 1989 trip to a Soviet cruiser, complete with a teary Mike Wallace in attendance for the visit of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a Soviet warship. Crowe, who helped provide then-candidate Clinton with some military bona fides during the presidential campaign, recounts his career easily—a start in diesel submarines, three tours as an aide, a Ph.D. in politics at Princeton, service in Vietnam and a succession of staff tours leading to four-star rank. Most of the book, however, covers the last six years of his military career, from his service as commander in chief of Pacific Forces to his tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No startling revelations here, and Crowe underplays some stories, including his reservations about the use of force in the Persian Gulf War. Early in his career Crowe suggested (only partly in jest) that the chief of naval operations should be a lawyer, because a flag officer's powers of persuasion count more in Washington than combat skill. His book gives a sense of the cast of mind of one type of the new breed of American senior commanders, who sport doctoral degrees as well as medals, who make no bones about considering bureaucratic adroitness an essential virtue, and who have their own, fairly firm views about foreign policy.

Use of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy. BY FREDERICK S. CALHOUN. Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1993, 172 pp. $15.00 (paper).

A slender reminder that Woodrow Wilson had fewer compunctions about using force than the average pundit now thinks. The author examines Wilson's uses of force for "protection, retribution, solution, introduction, and association" in the Mexican interventions, World War I and the ill-fated postlude to the Bolshevik Revolut-ion. "Wilson," Calhoun writes, "embraced, perhaps too tightly, the Clausewitzian dictum that war was an instrument of policy." Not quite the usual view of the president who gave his name to a supposedly un-worldly view of international politics. Resting primarily on archival work, this study gives short shrift to the vast second-ary literature on Wilson. It suffers, perhaps, from a

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desire to be perverse, but it provokes the reader to rethink the foreign policy of a president whose views are so often caricatured, so rarely studied.

Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941-1945. BY CARL BOYD. Lawrence (KS): University Press of Kansas, 1993, 271 pp. $25.00.

Another entry in the excellent Modern War Studies series of the University Press of Kansas, this volume examines in detail what Allied intelligence learned from the intercepted communications of Japan's ambassador to Hitler. Having broken the cipher that the extremely well-connected General Oshima used to communicate home, American signals intelligence gained insight into a host of important strategic matters, including the fortification of Hitler's West Wall and conditions on the Eastern Front. Conceivably they might have learned more: Boyd suggests that a careful perusal of the Oshima traffic would have warned the Allies of the impending Ardennes offensive in December 1944. A careful monograph, rather focused for the general reader, but of considerable interest to students of intelligence and the Second World War.

Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects. BY JOSEPH J. ROMM. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, 122 pp. $10.95 (paper).

The title says it all. The author looks at U.S. drug interdiction policy and the new notions of environmental, energy and economic security, shrugging aside the older, military conception of national security as having declining relevance in the new world. Romm defines a threat as anything that could "narrow the range of policy choices available to government," a definition so sweeping that one wonders what important foreign policy problem would not constitute a threat. An expanded article rather than a book, written in the first person (both singular and plural, the identity of the "we" being rather vague), it expresses an increasingly common view, but not particularly incisively.

Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy and Military Technology. BY COLIN S. GRAY. Lawrence (KS): University Press of Kansas, 1993, 236 pp. $29.95.

A breezy swing through arms races, nuclear strategy and a miscellany of other contemporary strategic fare. Gray is a prolific writer on these subjects, and little here is new, but his theme—that technology does not drive strategy, but rather the other way around—may prove exceptionable to some. Gray acknowledges the end of the Cold War but does not dwell on it, and his writing draws on a generally conservative and pessimistic view of mankind's ability to wage peace.

The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. EDITED BY WILLIAM J. DURCH. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 509 pp. $45.00.

Traditionally trained students of national security scramble these days to learn about U.N. peacekeeping, a subject to which they paid scant attention during the heyday of the Cold War. They would do well to look

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at this volume of edited case studies, designed as a textbook for advanced undergraduate or graduate students. The book deals with general U.N. issues (including their financial aspects), then explores peacekeeping in the Middle East, South Asia and the Western hemisphere. Although Durch and his colleagues suggest that the United Nations may turn into "a global overwatch on government," they do not shirk from pointing out the many difficulties U.N. peacekeeping operations have encountered, including insufficient resources from member governments, bad faith among the parties served, and occasional incompetence on the part of the blue-helmeted soldiery in between. Amply footnoted and festooned with charts, maps and tables, this volume provides a very solid introduction to a peculiar but growing type of military operation.

The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics. BY EUGENE B. SKOLNIKOFF. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1993, 322 pp. $39.50.

An ambitious, if ponderously written, treatise on a subject of growing interest in the study of international relations. After a look at the theoretical and grand historical issues related to the subject, the author explores national security, economic and ecological issues, concluding with a discussion of how government organizations deal with science and technology in international affairs. As the author points out, science and technology do not of themselves cause anything; what counts is how individuals and organizations use them. This sensible point undermines the rationale for the book as a unified exposition on a single subject, rather than a series of discrete essays. The author concludes that the "quest for knowledge" will continue, that "nations will have to cope with the results," and that "the one predictable constant will be change." Probably correct, but not very exciting.

Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception. BY WILLIAM B. BREUER. Westport (CT): Praeger , 1993, 274 pp. $24.95.

Operation Fortitude was the Allied deception plan to fool the Germans as to the location and time of the 1944 invasion of France. It was critical to the D-Day victory. According to William Breuer, the author of a baker's dozen popular histories of spies and action in World War II, it was the "greatest hoax" in history. It was not. Pearl Harbor, the German invasion of Russia, and the German offensive at the Bulge were all successful surprise offensives on a larger scale. The "greatest" hyperbole is typical of Breuer's writing. Operation Fortitude deserves a good book, but this is not it: the research is inadequate, the errors far too many, the breathless writing inappropriate to the subject. A pity that the author, a D-Day veteran himself, did not take as much care in writing about Operation Fortitude as the men who executed the operation in doing their work.

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE

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The United States

STEPHEN E. AMBROSE

FDR: Into The Storm, 1937–1940. A History. BY KENNETH S. DAVIS. New York: Random House, 1993, 691 pp. $35.00.

Admirers of F.D.R. will enjoy the wealth of personal anecdotes in this beautifully written fourth volume of a highly acclaimed biography. The book is wholly sympathetic to F.D.R.; for example, his 1940 campaign pledge, "I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars," gets only the briefest mention, without analysis or criticism. Foreign policy students will wish Davis had dealt more directly with some of the outstanding questions about F.D.R.'s leadership, such as why it was that after eight years in command of the world's richest and most powerful nation, when America's potential enemies were arming themselves to the teeth and entering into pacts of steel, the United States was still unilaterally disarmed and had no allies. What Davis does do, mainly domestic politics, he does very well.

The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite. BY ROBERT A. DIVINE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 245 pp. $25.00.

When Sputnik went into orbit in 1957, America went into a panic. Only President Dwight Eisenhower retained his composure and understood that the United States was far superior to the Soviet Union in scientific research as well as in military firepower. Only Eisenhower realized that Nikita Khrushchev had done the United States a favor by setting a legal precedent for future reconnaissance satellites. Robert Divine, who has written extensively on the early Cold War, praises Eisenhower for his low-key, common-sense response to Sputnik, but faults him for failing to see the propaganda significance of the feat. He charges that by failing to convince the American people that they had nothing to fear, Eisenhower opened the way for a decade of arms races spurred by ignorance. Like all of Divine's work, well-researched, well-written, reliable.

Eisenhower and the Mass Media: Peace, Prosperity, and Prime–Time TV. BY CRAIG ALLEN. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993, 259 pp. $39.95 (paper, $14.95).

Although John F. Kennedy is generally regarded as the "first television president," in fact Dwight Eisenhower provided the precedents, including the first televised fireside chats and the first TV news conferences. Ike was the first president to hire a media consultant. He established the first White House TV studio and provided the first "photo-op." Professor Craig Allen of Arizona State has done some solid research and provides an excellent analysis of Eise-nhower's generally masterful manipulation of television, but he could have done a lot more with the way Eisenhower used his press conferences to confuse the Soviet, Chinese and other foreign governments. In other words, in his news conferences the president's tortured syntax was often deliberate, as his intended audience was overseas and his purpose was to affect policy rather than to promote his own popularity.

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Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy. BY ALEXANDER DECONDE. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992, 270 pp. $32.50.

One of America's senior diplomatic historians, DeConde provides a two-century survey of the impact of ethnic interest groups on U.S. foreign policy. This is a balanced and scholarly book that manages both to cover the various incidents in those 200 years and provide a theoretical framework. His general conclusion is that ethnic groups can have a limited effect on policy toward a specific country or region, but their effectiveness depends on many factors. American Jews obviously have a much greater impact on policy toward Israel than Afro-Americans have with respect to South Africa. Most refreshing in this thought-provoking volume is DeConde's inclusion of Anglo-Americans as an ethnic interest group supporting British interests, and by far the most successful, with Jewish-American support for Israel a distant second.

Icons of Democracy: American Leaders as Heroes, Aristocrats, Dissenters, and Democrats. BY BRUCE MIROFF. New York: Basic Books, 1993, 422 pp. $25.00.

Examining the leadership styles of nine Americans—Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Theodore Roosevelt, Eugene Debs, Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy and Martin Luther King—this study aims to "distinguish those types of American leadership that foster democratic political life from other types—often more prominent and heralded—that undermine it." It comes down solidly on the side of democratic leadership (sharing, teaching, nurturing, "feminine") versus aristocratic, heroic or elitist styles (handed down, "masculine"). It quotes Richard Nixon as the supreme example of the wrong way to lead: "To wish is passive; to will is active. Followers wish. Leaders will." Miroff disapproves of Nixon's statement and the style that went with it, but does not prove him wrong. Another addition to the continuing debate over leadership styles that tells us more about the author's politics than about the subject.

At The Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War. BY MICHAEL BESCHLOSS AND STROBE TALBOTT. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993, 498 pp. $24.95.

The coming together of one of Washington's top reporters, Strobe Talbott, and one of the nation's top historians, Michael Beschloss, has produced a remarkable work of instant history. Told in *Time* magazine's breezy style—short paragraphs, short sentences, lots of quotes (generally without attribution)—this is an insider's account of the most momentous years in world politics since 1945. The authors had unique access to the top players, so much so that reading the book is almost like being an interpreter at the summit meetings (indeed, Gorbachev's interpreter was one of the authors' informants). Long on narrative and anecdotes, wisely short on analysis, a gripping read ("novelistic detail and intimacy," as the dust jacket says), a source for future scholars of the Bush foreign policy, the book is a powerful reminder of just how tumultuous were the events of 1989–93.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. EDITED BY JAMES A. NATHAN. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 302 pp. $39.95.

Eight essays on the crisis, based more or less on information that has become available in the past five years, especially on the Soviet side, at various conferences held around the world. The best essays are by Raymond Garthoff, who does a superb summary, and Barton Bernstein, whose essay takes up nearly one-third of the book. Bernstein concludes that John F. Kennedy was more willing to compromise, more reasonable, than we ever knew. In the Ame-rican case the new information is based on new documentation and contemporary tape recordings; on the Soviet side only on statements by Soviet participants at the conferences.

Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Bomb. BY ALLAN WINKLER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 282 pp. $27.50.

"For all we know, we have created a Frankenstein!" declared H. V. Kaltenborn in one of the first public comments on Hiroshima. No one yet knows whether he was right or not. Allan Winkler, an accomplished historian from Miami University, Ohio, brings us from the dawn of the atomic age to the present in an engaging survey of the politics of the bomb. The ebb and flow of issues such as fear of fallout, civil defense, the role of the bomb in military strategy and nuclear power plants. Landmark works that helped shape public attitudes, ranging from serious tomes to movies, are also discussed. The theme is irony: the United States, in arming to defend itself, became less secure as a result. The tone is pessimistic: Winkler writes that "deep-rooted and corrosive fears of nuclear destruction have failed in the past fifty years to bring atomic weaponry under effective control." Half empty? Half full? For 50 years, the world has had effective control over the use of the weapon. But throughout that period, civilians have been targets and hostages, with who knows what psychological effects. The critical debate of our time is what to do about nuclear matters. Winkler provides an excellent survey of how we got to where we are.

A Not So Silent Envoy: A Biography of Ambassador Samuel David Berger. BY GRAENUM BERGER. New Rochelle (NY): John Washburn Bleeker Hampton, 1992, 221 pp. $13.50 (paper).

A frank and down-to-earth account of a remarkable career, drawing heavily on contemporary letters as well as extensive autobiographical material from the loyalty investigations to which Berger was subjected in the 1950s after running afoul of Richard Nixon while serving in Tokyo. Brought from the labor movement and economics into the federal government by Averell Harriman, Berger did yeoman work in the Lend-Lease mission in Britain during World War II, and then played a key part, with labor leader Irving Brown of the American Federation of Labor and others, in combating communists on the critical and underreported labor front in the post-war political struggle throughout Europe.

Eventually restored to full standing after the Nixon incident, Berger then served in Greece; as ambassador to Korea in the pivotal and fruitful early years of Park Chung

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Hee's presidency (with Philip Habib as a colleague and protégé); as deputy assistant secretary for East Asia in the mid-1960s (among other things, scheduling the assignments of China hands so that the United States would be ready when the inevitable reconciliation came); and from 1968–72 as deputy ambassador to Ellsworth Bunker in the Vietnam cauldron, where he worked skillfully with the American military command—this, ironically, in the Nixon presidency. At his funeral in 1981, Harriman and Bunker walked together behind the caisson.

No book better illuminates the great postwar days of the new-model foreign service and the wisdom and dedication of its members, who often worked under enormous pressure. No foreign service officer was stouter, more liberal and tough-minded, than Sam Berger. This book tells his life as it was.

WILLIAM P. BUNDY

Western Europe

FRITZ STERN

On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought. BY TZVETAN TODOROV. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1993, 440 pp. $49.95.

A leading European intellectual analyzes French thought on the multiplicity of peoples, customs and values. He traces the distortions of the humanism of Montaigne and of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinking in subsequent writers, treating their ideas in excessive isolation. The great protagonists are Montesquieu and Rousseau. Todorov, who himself experienced great transitions—from insufferable life under communism to working among French scholars—hopes that this inquiry will help the present generation attain a critical humanism, an appreciation of diversity without the simplicities of relativism.

Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. BY ROBERT PUTNAM. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1993, 258 pp. $24.95.

The timing for the title and subtitle of this book could hardly be more inappropriate, yet this excellent work may have relevance to today's unprecedented crisis in Italian politics. Putnam, a Harvard political scientist, and his collaborators studied the functioning of regional councils established in Italy in the early 1970s in a period of limited devolution. The book is the result of interviews and polling over two decades, done in meticulous social science fashion. Putnam's political intelligence and mastery of traditional and modern literature places the quantitative material in a splendid intellectual framework. Regional councils have had mixed results, "exacerbating ... the historical disparities between North and South." The recent success of the Lombard League is an important example of the centrifugal forces in Italian politics. The principal focus of the work is on the relation of civic culture to political life; the greater the civic commitment, the better the chances for responsible and responsive government. Putnam locates the greatest civisme in the north, where republican regimes flourished long ago. *Making Democracy Work* is intended as a close study of politics in contrasting regions of Italy, with persuasive theoretical conclusions that bear on the development of democracy elsewhere. The author did not predict the

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revelations of general corruption in Italian politics, but any student of contemporary affairs would do well to read this difficult but immensely rewarding work.

Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. BY LIAH GREENFELD. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1992, 576 pp. $49.95.

At once an attempt at a new interpretation of nationalism and a history of its development in England, France, Russia, Germany and the United States, ranging from the sixteenth century to the present. The author, a Harvard sociologist, regards nationalism as the fundamental fact of modernity and sees it arising from both a collective and individual desire for dignity. The book focuses on the major thinkers in these five countries and their responses to particular conditions. The exposition is clear, even when the sociological interpretation is a bit abstract and the history erroneous. The German section is particularly weak. The author's reach is far greater than her grasp.

Assassins of Memory: Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust. BY PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET WITH JEFFREY MEHLMAN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 205 pp. $27.50.

A collection of spirited essays from the 1980s, exposing the falsehoods of "revisionists," especially French revisionists, who deny the existence of the gas chambers. The author, a well-known French historian of ancient Greece, writes a polemic against falsifiers whom he thinks unworthy of rebuttal; a passionate, pessimistic book, useful at a time when receding memory may favor denial.

The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age. BY JOHN LUKACS. New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1993, 288 pp. $22.95.

Lukacs is a deeply cultivated, original, and somewhat self-indulgent conservative historian and a prodigious writer. This book, written after the liberation of Eastern Europe, is at once an analysis of Europe and America at the end of the century, an end also to what he regards as America's century, and an occasion for personal reflection. The historical insights are sound, especially about Eastern Europe, which the Hungarian-born observer knows intimately, and they are mixed with long sections of autobiographical notes, musings of a diarist. A pleasing mélange, with the theme that even as the Modern Age wanes, nationalism remains or becomes again the most powerful political force. He notes correctly, "There is no first-rate book about the history of nationalism."

Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. BY DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 200 pp. $19.95.

The senior U.S. senator from New York enlarges on a topic that has engaged him for many decades: the power of ethnicity and its resulting strife. He quotes his early apprehensions that ethnic conflicts might bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. The book—an enlarged lecture—is a pleasing hodgepodge of ideas and often banal facts, witty and literate.

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Western Hemisphere

ABRAHAM LOWENTHAL

Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean. BY PETER WINN. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992, 639 pp. $40.00.

Prepared by a distinguished social historian as a companion text for a public television series, this magisterial work provides an accessible and engaging introduction to the complex tapestry of contemporary Latin America and the Caribbean.

Americas: New Interpretive Essays. EDITED BY ALFRED STEPAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 327 pp. $14.95 (paper).

Fifteen leading academic specialists on contemporary Latin America from several different disciplines have contributed to this innovative collection, prepared in connection with a public television series. Three themes are discussed: the changing roles of the Latin American state; the place of new social and cultural movements (including feminist groups and the reconstituted Church); and emerging social identities in the Americas, including those of indigenous movements and of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants to the United States. A stimulating volume.

United States Economic Measures Against Cuba: Proceedings in the United Nations and International Law Issues. EDITED WITH COMMENTARY BY MICHAEL KRINSKY AND DAVID GOLOVE. Northampton (MA): Aletheia Press, 1993, 331 pp. $20.00 (paper).

Two lawyers with a New York firm that has wide-ranging experience representing states trying to cope with the impact of U.S. sanctions have compiled this interesting compendium of documents on the long-standing U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, recently further tightened by the provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 . The fundamental issue of law and policy, as Princeton professor Richard Falk notes in an introduction to the volume, is "whether it is ever appropriate to use economic coercion on a unilateral basis as a way of destabilizing the governing process of another country." A primary purpose of the book, neither hidden nor stridently argued, is to document the absence of legal justification, in the opinion of the editors and a majority of U.N. members, for the U.S. policy of economic warfare against Cuba.

Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948. EDITED BY LESLIE BETHELL AND IAN ROXBOROUGH. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 334 pp. $49.95.

These essays, 11 country reviews and two general essays prepared jointly by the editors, argue that the brief period from the end of World War II to the onset of the Cold War was a defining one in Latin America's political and social history. As the war ended, Latin America seemed poised to begin a period of democratic growth, involving greater working-class participation in politics, social and economic improvements for the poor, and industrial growth. But what seemed an auspicious moment for social democratic forces soon gave way in most countries to authoritarian repression, restrictions on the left, military coups and conservative consolidation. This illuminating volume analyzes why this occurred, concentrating on the interplay between domestic economic

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and social actors and the influence of U.S. policy.

Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru. BY SIMON STRONG. New York: Times Books, 1992, 286 pp. $18.00.
Yet another book on Peru's frightening Shining Path insurgency, this one by a British journalist who lived in Peru from 1988 to 1992. Illuminating, particularly on the Shining Path's international activities, but ultimately inconclusive, this volume ends with the September 1992 capture of the Shining Path's Marxist leader, Manuel Abimael Guzmán, by members of the antiterrorism unit of Peru's police.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin. BY YEGOR LIGACHEV. New York: Pantheon Books, 1993, 369 pp. $27.50.
In many ways this is the most interesting memoir yet produced by a leader from the Gorbachev era. Ligachev, at the outset a supporter of Gorbachev and his plans to reform the sclerosed Soviet system, became a conservative Cassandra warning of the dangers in what he saw as the excesses of perestroika: an unfettered press, the weakening of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as an effective political in-strument, and the like. Ligachev defends with stubborn rectitude the case that he doubtless made during the last six years of Soviet power. Better yet, he describes the inside power struggle over what perestroika was to be, which, in his version, has Alex-ander Yakovlev playing the role of the devil. Much of this is to defend his own actions in controversial episodes, rather than to retell systematically what happened at each of the key stages in the development of perestroika. He also offers sometimes acute, sometimes clumsy insights into the failings of Gorbachev as leader. (The Russian edition is entitled *The Riddle of Gorbachev.*) Stephen Cohen provides a fair-minded, meaty introduction.

The Church and the Left. BY ADAM MICHNIK. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, 301 pp. $24.95.
In the mid-1970s Adam Michnik, the gritty intellectual star of the Polish democratic opposition, authored a short book exploring the twentieth-century estrangement between the Catholic Church—primarily its hierarchy—and the Polish left. By retelling the wrongs on both sides while stressing their natural common ground, he helped to fashion a reconciliation and alliance that contributed much to the overthrow of communism. Because the values of the organized church and of the non-communist left maintain an uneasy relationship in the new Poland, the book has not lost its contemporary significance, as David Ost, the moving spirit behind its appearance in English, well appreciates. Michnik also provides probing, stimulating insights into the relationships between liberalism, secularism and Christianity.

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"The Strange Death of Soviet Communism," Special Issue of *The National Interest*, No. 31 (Spring 1993), 144 pp. $5.50 (paper).

Notable commentators attempt to explain the sudden collapse of the Soviet system. Many explanations are offered, from the effectiveness of the West's policies to the ineffectiveness of the regime's economic policies; from the effects of modernization to those of Gorbachev himself. The symposium's main purpose, however, is to expose the reasons why Sovietology so utterly failed to predict the end. The "Sins of the Scholars," as one section of the issue is entitled, tend to be those of the branch of Sovietology from which nearly all of these authors dissent—the branch that had rejected the totalitarian model as a way of understanding the post–Stalin Soviet Union. Despite the one-sidedness of the verdict, these essays are thought-provoking and sharply argued.

The Disintegration of the Monolith. BY BORIS KAGARLITSKY. London: Verso, 1992, 169 pp. $54.95 (paper, $17.95).

Kagarlitsky, a Russian politician from the left and an anti-Leninist socialist, does not really try to explain the disintegration of the Soviet Union. He is far more interested in laying out the deceptions, phony dreams and hypocrisies of those who brought about its demise, including the leaders and parliamentarians of the new states. "The plane," he writes, "has taken off and a section of the public still believes it will land in Paris or Stockholm. But, in fact, the course has been set for Brazil, or even Nigeria, since this airline and this make of plane does not fly to the West at all." He is speaking not only of Russia, but of Ukraine, Belarus and the other successor states. His assault on both liberals and neo-Bolsheviks would not be of interest, despite the lean force of his writing, were it certain that the future battle for Russia's soul would be fought only between free-marketeer liberals and the authoritarians (whether communist, fascist or nationalist).

Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism. BY ALEXANDER J. MOTYL. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, 202 pp. $17.95 (paper).

Motyl is a lively writer with a vigorous, spicy intellect, and the reader has the benefit of both in this first full-length study of independent Ukraine. He believes that Ukraine, like virtually all of the post-Soviet states, is the victim of the crosscutting effects of the collapse of both imperialism and totalitarianism. The first compels societies to change and leaves their population ready for change; the second makes it very hard for them to change, deprives leaders of the means for bringing about change and leaves their people too destitute to endure radical change. As a result, Motyl has a grim view of the misery and trouble facing Ukraine and other new states, particularly if they and their Western well-wishers persist in trying to build instant democracies and instant market-based economies.

This I Cannot Forget. BY ANNA LARINA. New York: W. W. Norton, 1993, 384 pp. $24.95.

In March 1938, when Stalin's regime shot Nikolai Bukharin, Anna Larina, his 24-year-old third wife and mother of his baby son, was already in the Gulag. In these spare, eloquent, intelligent, caring but unemotional memoirs—written in the Brez-

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hnev era, published in the Gorbachev era— Larina not only recounts her fate in the camps and that of the wives, mothers, sisters and daughters of the prominent Bolsh-eviks consumed in the purges, but provides vivid and fascinating accounts of her fam-ous husband and adoptive father, Yury Larin, one of Lenin's inner circle. As Step-hen Cohen notes in his fine introduction, apart from the books of Trotsky and Stalin's daughter, this is "the only uncensored memoir ever to appear from inside the highest levels of that historic and doomed world." It is an enthralling book.

Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia. BY ALEX N. DRAGNICH. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992, 202 pp. $22.95 (paper, $10.95).

As a further sad echo of the nightmare in the former Yugoslavia, outside experts on the region have increasingly been drawn into the maelstrom, some as willing warriors, some as the hapless targets of the warring sides. The author's purpose is to offer the appalled general observer a brief history of Yugoslavia in the twentieth century and to help make sense of the awful events of the moment. The book, however, serves only the first purpose. It is a basic history, and useful for that reason, but one in which there are few Croat heroes and few Serbian villains.

No Breathing Room: The Aftermath of Chernobyl. BY GRIGORI MEDVEDEV. New York: Basic Books, 1993, 213 pp. $20.00.

Medvedev is a nuclear engineer and a former senior figure in the Soviet nuclear power establishment. He helped design the Chernobyl plant, and he was among those sent in to assess the damage when it blew up. He wrote a chilling account based on what he found, published as *The Truth about Chernobyl.* This book is quite different. More than anything it is a case study of censorship in the former Soviet Union. Long before the explosion at Chernobyl, an alarmed Medvedev had written four short stories, warning a Russian audience in fictionalized form of the dangers awaiting them. Here he recounts in exquisite detail the blockheaded resistance of censors to their publication from 1979 until well after Chernobyl. Sadly, in the end, they were protecting nothing but misguided principle and the ineptitude of ministries and other parts of the bureaucracy responsible.

The Demise of the Soviet Union. BY G. R. URBAN. Washington (DC): American University Press, 1993, 238 pp. $21.95.

Rather like Bill Moyers' quality television interviews, Urban over the years has published his active dialogues with intellectuals who have been at the center of the East-West struggle. This collection—given false billing as about the demise of the Soviet Union—features Sydney Hook speaking autobiographically from the perspective of someone who once accepted socialism; Hugh Trevor-Roper reflecting on Wilhelmian Germany, the Soviet Union and other empires; Elie Kedourie on nationalism; Otto von Hapsburg on the difference between the Hapsburgs and the Bolsheviks; and Karl Popper jousting against both historical optimism and the predictability of history.

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Only Adam Ulam and Milovan Djilas are interviewed on the subject. The common thread is that Urban talked to them all during a remarkable period of time, from 1987–91.

Middle East

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World. BY FATIMA MERNISSI. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1992, 195 pp. $24.95.

Whoever says that modern Arab intellectuals have not engaged in intelligent analysis and criticism of their society, its values and its politics has not read the books of Fatima Mernissi. A Moroccan sociologist, she writes from a feminist perspective, this time about Islamic concepts of freedom, order and responsibility, and their compatibility with democracy. She argues that establishment Islam, that conveyed by the state, has stressed the importance of order and obedience. In this version of Islam, limits on individual freedom must be respected for the sake of communal interests, the past must be veiled and women must be secluded. Other strands of Islam have encouraged the exercise of reason, respected public opinion and valued compassion, but these sentiments have been discouraged by ruling elites anxious to protect their own privileges. The author is at her best when she identifies the origins of a concept in the early days of Islam and shows how it has survived into the present, with all the connotations that can make words like "freedom" seem dangerous. She conveys the social setting in which extremist Islamic movements wave the banner of revolt against oppression while ignoring the corresponding need for tolerance. There are moments of real brilliance and insight in this extended essay. At times the attempt to relate the current crisis to the recent Persian Gulf conflict seems strained, but her fundamental message is powerful and worth hearing.

Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World. BY KANAN MAKIYA. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1993, 256 pp. $19.95.

The author of *Republic of Fear*, now writing under his real name, has raised issues that are all too often ignored by Arab writers. Why is it, he asks, that the violence and oppression so common in Arab politics is seemingly tolerated by Arab intellectuals or blamed on outsiders? Why does the human tragedy that has befallen the Kurds get so little attention compared to the suffering of the Palestinians? The author draws heavily on the case of modern Iraq, and is at his most convincing when he describes Saddam Hussein's near-genocidal Anfal campaign against the Kurds in 1988. The first part of the book is largely a catalogue of horrors, the second part condemns the "politics of silence" on the part of the knowledgeable Arab intelligentsia that chooses not to speak. On occasion, the author seems to be settling old scores with his critics, but his general point is a serious one all the same. On balance, the book is less analytical and more passionate than his previous work, and succeeds better in raising issues than in explaining them. Bound to stir controversy among Middle East specialists, this book deserves to be read—and answered.

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Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman. BY JEHUDA REINHARZ. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 536 pp. $39.95.

This second volume of the author's biography of Chaim Weizmann concentrates on the years from 1914 to 1922, when Weizmann capitalized on his scientific achievements to become an "insider" in his relations with prominent British politicians. He was thus in a position to lobby for British support for the idea of a Jewish homeland in and Palestine. With the success of the 1917 Balfour Declaration to his credit, he became the leading figure in the Zionist movement, and from this position worked hard, in tandem with the British, to achieve his goals. More statesman than politician, Weizmann was often autocratic, elitist, condescending in his views of Palestinian Arabs, overly sensitive to slights and dismissive of his rivals. But he was masterful in his dealings with those who had the power to help or obstruct his quest for a Jewish state. He may not always have convinced his British interlocutors to become Zionists, but he usually persuaded them to become "pro-Weizmannites." The establishment of the British mandate for Palestine, incorporating the Balfour Declaration, is the end point of this volume. This masterful study is based on immense research, is gracefully written, and sets the stage for another volume on Weizmann's later years. The tone is admiring, although not reverential, and the scholarship is solid. The surprises come in the details, not in the overall picture of the man and the era.

Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait's Elusive Frontier With Iraq. BY DAVID H. FINNIE. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1992, 221 pp. $29.95.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had almost no positive side effects. But the writing of this fine book was one. Well-researched and well-written, this study traces the history of Kuwait's relations with Iraq, with emphasis on the border, from the late nineteenth century to the present. Finnie is scrupulously fair in his use of sources, has no ax to grind and acknowledges the frequent lapses and ambiguities in the positions of both Iraqis and Kuwaitis. His research establishes several points clearly. Kuwait, under the rule of the Sabah family, cannot be considered in historical terms to have been simply a province of Iraq. Although the precise location of the border has been elusive, the legitimacy of Kuwait as an independent state is no less than that of many other members of the United Nations. In addition, on at least three occasions Iraqi governments have officially recognized Kuwait, and its northern border has been delimited, although a precise demarcation is only now underway. The Iraqi prime minister signed an agreement in 1932 acknowledging the border; this was reaffirmed again by Iraq in 1963, after which diplomatic relations were established between Iraq and Kuwait; Iraq accepted U.N. resolution 687, which confirmed the 1963 agreement, after its defeat in Desert Storm. All of this suggests that Iraq's legal case against Kuwait has been extremely weak. When the next Iraq-Kuwait crisis erupts, this will be the book to take down from the shelf to refresh one's memory about how Kuwait came to be.

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The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State. BY HALIM BARAKAT. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 348 pp. $30.00.

The author of this broad survey of the contemporary Arab world is a Syrian-born sociologist and author. He is also a strong advocate of revolutionary transformation of the Arab world, which he believes has a future as a unified nation—democratic, secular and egalitarian. This vision of the future, and the glaring contrast between it and the present, creates the analytical framework of this ambitious book. Barakat is harsh both in his critique of virtually all Western scholarship on the Arab world and in his own assessment of Arab society (including the role of Islam). His differences with non-Arab scholars often seem to involve little more than his own good intentions. He criticizes Arab society in order to transform it, whereas others have done so to dominate and demoralize it. Apart from this irritating perspective, the book is often insightful concerning problems of the Arab world. But the author's adherence to class analysis and his belief in the liberating power of ideas seems to obscure and oversimplify the problem of actually bringing about change in Arab society. Little attention is paid, for example, to the role of education, or to what the state does or does not do to foster social change. The author seems to believe that change will come when his revolutionary ideas enter the consciousness of the Arab masses. For a sociologist, this is a remarkably idealistic view.

Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948. BY NUR MASALHA. Washington: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992, 235 pp. $24.95 (paper, $11.95).

The history of state formation is filled with cases of population exchanges, expulsions, "ethnic cleansing" and forced transfers. Zionist leaders, as this carefully researched study shows, were frequently outspoken in their belief that the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would be possible only if the existing Arab population could somehow be persuaded to leave. The debate over transfer, when it took place, was about feasibility and the effect that transfer might have on relations with other states. In light of the Turkish-Greek population exchange after World War I, few Zionist leaders questioned the morality of transfer. Instead, it was seen as a practical solution to an obvious problem of two peoples on one land. The narrative account of this debate, which peaked when the Peel Commission recommended partition in 1937, seems well-grounded. In a brief conclusion the author addresses the controversial issue of the origins of the Palestinian refugee crisis in 1948, and sees a clear link between the long-standing advocacy of transfer and the flight of the refugees. Whether or not one accepts this conclusion, it seems clear that the prolonged discussion of the merits of transfer that preceded 1948 convinced many Zionists that Palestinian refugees, whatever the cause of their departure, should not be allowed to return.

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Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb. BY AHMAD S. MOUSSALLI. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992, 262 pp.

Radical Islamic politics seems destined to be part of the Middle East landscape for years to come. Thus, any serious study of the ideological origins of today's militant movements is welcome. The author focuses on the Egyptian Islamic thinker Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who became a fierce critic of traditional Islamic scholars, Islamic "modernists," the West and secular nationalist governments in the Middle East. Qutb sometimes comes across as simply an obscurantist, but the virtue of this study is that it shows the evolution of his thought, the targets of his polemics, the intellectual content of his philosophy and where he differs from other Islamic thinkers. The author is better at describing Qutb's thought than analyzing it, but Qutb's stark insistence on his interpretation of the Koran comes through, along with the political implications of rejecting all sources of authority that stand between man and God.

The Gulf, Cooperation and the Council: An American Perspective. BY JOSEPH WRIGHT TWINAM. Washington: The Middle East Policy Council, 1992, 294 pp. $16.95 (paper).

The author served in the State Department as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was being formed in the early 1980s. As a result, he has an insider's perspective on the early years of the GCC. Much useful information is provided on the council and its member states. The U.S. role is emphasized, and recent history, such as Desert Storm, is included. As a handbook and reference, this book is very useful, but one should not look for information that is not in the public domain, nor does the author critically examine some of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the GCC. This study is at its best in showing how the GCC has dealt with the United States, not on how the member states have dealt with one another and with their almost unmanageable problem of regional security.

The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard. BY KENNETH KATZMAN. Boulder (CO): Westview, 1993, 192 pp. $42.50.

In recent years it has been fashionable to note that the Iranian Revolution is once again turning inward. Many have noted that Islamic ideology is making way for traditional Iranian nationalism. But this study concentrates on the organization that seems most immune to these trends: the Revolutionary Guard. Unlike some other revolutionary armies, the guard has resisted professionalization; it remains a source of revolutionary zeal, concentrating its efforts now on the export of the revolution. This case study is well-researched, and the argument seems valid. Inevitably for a topic of this sort, evidence is hard to come by, and the author sometimes seems to be relying too heavily on press accounts of events. Also, the future may not resemble the past; it still seems possible that at some point the political leadership will confront the guard. Nonetheless, this is a valuable study of a neglected topic.

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Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom. BY LESLIE MCLOUGHLIN. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 240 pp. $39.95.

The founder of the Saudi kingdom, known in the West as Ibn Saud, is often treated as larger than life. This biography follows the tradition of highlighting the remarkable personal qualities of King Abd al-Aziz, but does so from a standpoint of well-researched historical narrative. The author draws on a wide variety of sources, including those in Arabic, to produce a readable introductory account.

Egypt's Bid for Arab Leadership: Implications for U.S. Policy. BY GREGORY L. AFTANDILIAN. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, 99 pp. $10.95 (paper).

The remarkable growth of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship from the mid-1970s to the present is, by most standards, a success story. The building blocks were the peace process, strategic cooperation in the Cold War and, most recently, Desert Storm. Now that the Cold War is over, the peace process is no longer Cairo-centric, and the Persian Gulf Arabs are looking to the United States, not Egypt, for protection. What are the consequences for U.S.-Egypt relations? The author of this thoughtful essay is right to raise questions about the ties between Cairo and Washington, and correctly notes that there will be divergences over policy, especially as Egypt seeks to restore its leadership role in the Arab world. One may question whether the Arab dimension of Egypt's foreign policy will count for quite so much, and the author's pessimistic tone does not always seem warranted. Still, this book should be welcomed, as a warning against complacency in the conduct of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship.

Scuds or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East. BY YAHYA M. SADOWSKI. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993, 116 pp. $8.95 (paper).

This short monograph makes a vigorous and well-argued case for the possibility of Middle East arms control. That possibility, difficult to imagine in a region suffused with conflict and already stuffed to the gills with arms, springs from the financial stringencies facing all Middle East combatants in the post-Persian Gulf War period. Sadowski's premise, that economic constraints can be more compelling than perceived security demands and the vested interests of those who benefit from military spending, can be contested. His argument, that the United States and its closest allies have been primarily responsible for scuttling Middle East arms control prospects, cannot be.

GREGORY GAUSE

Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. BY WILLIAM B. QUANDT. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 480 pp. $39.95 (paper, $14.95).

This book builds on Quandt's well-regarded *Decade of Decisions* (1977), which covered the years 1967–76, extending the story through 1992. It is, however, much more than an updating of the earlier book. Coverage of the Six Day War period is greatly enriched by research on materials now available, and treatment of the later period deftly incorporates into a coherent whole the findings of other studies by Quandt. The result is a major work,

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whether judged by the standards of classical diplomatic history (with careful narrative treatment) or modern political science (emphasizing structure and system). The author is especially successful in blending the experience of an insider (he served on the National Security Council during much of the 1970s) with the above-the-fray perspective of the scholarly outsider. Without a trace of an apologia or polemic, Quandt reconstructs the attitudes and actions of American officialdom wrestling with the Arab-Israeli confrontation. His findings are sobering at best. The U.S. political system leaves little scope for bold breakthroughs, or perhaps better, consistent follow-through. Even the real differences in approach from Presidents Johnson to Bush have not produced systemic change. It is more process than peace.

L. CARL BROWN

Asia and the Pacific

DONALD ZAGORIA

Doing Good or Doing Well? Japan's Foreign Aid Program. BY MARGEE ENSIGN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, 198 pp. $24.50.

The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power. BY ROBERT M. ORR, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, 178 pp. $12.50 (paper).

These two detailed studies of Japan's foreign aid program reach different conclusions. Ensign, an American academic, contends that Japanese aid remains substantially tied to Japanese business interests, despite assertions of Japanese officials that aid has been "untied." Orr, an academic who formerly worked for the U.S. Agency for International Development, says that foreign pressure has been effective in reducing the tied nature of Japanese aid since 1989, and that yen loans are increasingly open to outside bidders. Orr also says that there has been a globalization of Japanese aid recipients. By 1987 Japan was the largest donor in 29 countries, in contrast with 1970, when Japan was the preeminent aid giver in only six.

Orr's volume is particularly informative about the bureaucratic struggles underlying the distribution of Japanese aid. Four ministries are responsible for yen loans to other nations, and they have conflicting objectives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs consistently argues for close relations with the United States. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, on the other hand, has the strong support of business circles and prefers aid that will help promote Japanese commerce rather than the advancement of underdeveloped countries.

Real Reciprocity: Balancing U.S. Economic and Security Policies in the Pacific Basin. BY DAVID B. H. DENOON. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, 100 pp. $14.95 (paper).

American Power, the New World Order, and the Japanese Challenge. BY WILLIAM R. NESTER. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 492 pp. $39.95.

The huge and chronic U.S. trade deficit with Japan has given rise to a cottage industry of books on U.S.-Japan relations. Denoon's contribution to the discussion is important because he lays out the connections between U.S. security and economic

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policy in Asia in a fashion that has rarely been attempted before. The author, a former government official and an academic, argues that the United States will endanger its future if it continues its past largesse toward the Pacific—that is, taxing itself to support a major defense establishment in Japan, South Korea and elsewhere while allowing current trade imbalances to persist. He is particularly disturbed at the trend of rising imbalances with East Asia while the United States has managed to accumulate a trade surplus with the rest of the world.

But Denoon does not favor withdrawal from the Pacific. He argues the case for what he calls "real reciprocity." This means being tougher in demanding the resolution of current trade imbalances; protecting the U.S. lead in high-technology industries, getting a more equitable sharing of defense burdens from U.S. allies in the Pacific; beginning the long, slow process of forming a regional security organization that will reduce the perceived need for high-visibility U.S. security protection; and having U.S. firms gain access to Asian, particularly Japanese, technology on a much larger scale than heretofore.

Nester's volume, on the other hand, is much too long and lacks originality. Some of his "solutions" to the problem are draconian, such as, imposing a 100 percent tariff on Japanese products unless the trade deficit declines annually by $10 billion.

Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia. BY RONALD L. MCGLOTHLEN. New York: Norton, 1993, 352 pp. $27.95.

This volume, a detailed, narrative history of Dean Acheson's policy toward East Asia in the early postwar period, won an award from the American Historical Association in 1990. The author concludes that Acheson's primary concern in East Asia was the reconstruction of Japan, which he viewed as "the real prize in Asia" and the only nation with any "real strategic importance." Acheson therefore worked to secure Japan's economic and political future by developing a U.S.-sponsored recovery program, revising Japan's reparations obligations, negotiating a peace treaty and rebuilding Japan's Asian trade. The last was by far the most important. The author also points out that if others had been in charge at the time, U.S. policy might have been quite different. George Kennan, for example, wanted to neutralize Japan, accept Soviet domination of Korea, seize Taiwan, allow the People's Republic of China into the United Nations and abandon all of Indochina.

Acheson's Japan-centered strategy involved risks—witness the Korean and Vietnam wars and a long feud with the People's Republic of China. But the author concludes that on the whole Acheson and his group were remarkably successful.

Driven by Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region. EDITED BY JAMES W. MORLEY. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992, 200 pp. $39.95.

This collection of essays by reputable scholars explores the relationship between economic growth and political change in East Asia. Unlike many volumes of this type, there is a stimulating final chapter that seeks to integrate the findings. It concludes that there is a broad pattern, something like flying geese, in which democracy correlates with the level of development achieved. If the two exceptions to the rule, Singapore and the Philippines, are removed, the pat-

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tern holds. Japan is the economic leader and the most established democracy; Taiwan and South Korea have relatively high per capita incomes and are both at the early stages of democracy; Malaysia and Thailand, with smaller per capita incomes, are still only quasi-democratic; Indonesia and China, with the lowest per capita incomes, are the most authoritarian. The authors convincingly explore the dynamics involved in the relationship and the reasons for the exceptions.

Vietnam at the Crossroads. BY MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, 104 pp. $14.95 (paper).

This is a thorough and readable account of the changes in Vietnam's economic and foreign policies in recent years. The author, a British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent, concludes that Vietnam has made a decisive shift toward a market economy and that even party leaders no longer appear able to distinguish between communism and capitalism. He speculates that the Communist Party of Vietnam, if it is to survive, may end up like the Kuomintang in Taiwan or the Golkar in Indonesia, models that many Vietnamese now speak favorably of in private.

Africa

GAIL GERHART

High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. BY CHESTER A. CROCKER. New York: Norton, 1992, 533 pp. $29.95.

If one gives a sympathetic reading to this memoir by the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa in the Reagan years, it is an engaging and impressive story of restraint, logic and dogged persistence in the pursuit of a negotiated peace in Angola and Namibia in the 1980s. Though repeatedly frustrated by the obstruction of political opponents (Russians, Democrats, ultraconservatives) and the wrongheadedness of slow learners (Angolans, President Reagan), virtue and intelligent diplomacy prevailed to produce a remarkable success for American policy and a "no losers" outcome for the parties in conflict. Skeptics, however, may find Crocker's account a touch Orwellian. Does it describe an eight-year process of peacemaking, or a period when conservative governments in the United States and Britain demurred as hard-line militarists in South Africa pursued increasingly brutal wars of destabilization against neighboring states? When the climate finally ripened for a settlement within the framework of "linkage" (tying Namibian independence to Cuban withdrawal from Angola), seven years behind the optimistic schedule of Crocker's initial scenario, should the weight of explanation fall on inspired diplomacy? Or should it fall on the geopolitical turnabout in Soviet thinking and the reassessment forced on Pretoria by this and by its own deepening economic and political crises? Crocker often mentions the diplomatic skill required to put a good face on controversial policies, and no doubt some readers will see this book as the best evidence yet of its author's mastery of the art of spin.

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Ghana: In Search of Stability, 1957-1982. BY YOURY PETCHENKINE. Westport (CT): Praeger, 1993, 242 pp. $49.95 (paper).
The first half of this valuable analysis of Ghanaian politics traces the succession of three civilian and five military governments from the country's independence to the late 1980s, emphasizing the reasons democratization efforts repeatedly failed. The book's second half more systematically considers these reasons, especially the ways in which political instability and economic mismanagement have been mutually reinforcing. The author, a Russian diplomat, combines subtlety with a refreshing bluntness too often missing in Western academic writing. He defends genuine parliamentary democracy as the best form of government for Ghana and, more problematically, argues that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund-imposed structural adjustment efforts have been an unqualified success. Unfortunately, the book is flawed by abysmal copy editing.

Land Mines in Angola. BY AFRICA WATCH. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993, 69 pp.
This brief study examines one of the less-known but major features of the ruinous Angola civil war: the human and economic cost of indiscriminate laying of hundreds of thousands of land mines. The author's research makes clear that even if peace had followed the defeat of the rebel National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola in last year's election, massive disruption and high casualties caused by mines would have continued to plague Angola for many years. The report gives South Africa higher marks than the United States or Britain for efforts to assist clearance during the 1992 cessation of hostilities.

South Africa's Other Whites: Voices for Change. BY ROBERT SCOTT JASTER AND SHIRLEY KEW JASTER. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 151 pp. $45.00.
Not all South African whites approved of apartheid, but only a small fraction of those who disapproved worked for fundamental change. This book profiles 13 such individuals and their work in diverse fields including mental health, peace, rural development, formal politics and business. Lawyers and clergy seem passed over for recognition, but perhaps the authors will bring us a sequel.

At the Hand of Man: Peril and Hope for Africa's Wildlife. BY RAY BONNER. New York: Knopf, 1993, 336 pp. $24.00.
This provocative study by an investigative journalist tackles conservation in political and social dimensions, underscoring its complexity as an international issue. Bonner argues that the international ban on trade in ivory ignores expert consensus that the elephant is not an endangered species. Africa's game resources are heavily controlled and manipulated by eco-colonialists in Europe and North America, but Africans are expected to bear the main costs of conservation. "Saving the elephant" has filled coffers of international conservation and animal rights groups, but placed increased hardship on the precarious subsistence of impoverished peasants. Trophy hunting is more beneficial to animals than tourism. Western opinion is an obstacle to conservation because the public cannot grasp the principle of sustainable use of animals. Read on if you thought saving wildlife was one of the world's simpler problems.

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Letters to the Editor

FUNDAMENTALISM'S MODERN ORIGINS

To the Editor:

If Washington policymakers accept a one-to-one identification of Islam and fundamentalism, then they will interpret the recent coordination of efforts among the leaders of radical Islam as the ominous portent that Judith Miller (Spring 1993) describes.

Radical Islamists in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria and even Saudi Arabia have challenged the Islamic legitimacy of the state. In regions where Islam alone provides the necessary cohesion to develop the most basic prerequisite of nation-building—the transference of primary identification from local tribe to the nation state—fundamentalist leaders like Sudan's Hasan al-Turabi play upon Muslim loyalty to the transnational community of believers. They pose their ideal of a transnationalism as a potent counterpart to the invasive West; in so doing, they also promote a streamlined version of Islam, simplified for pragmatic purposes and sharply critical of traditional belief and local custom. Like fundamentalisms in Hinduism, Christianity and Judaism, this is a very innovative, modern version of religion—one which can be challenged with much the same vigor that the secular Arab states are challenged for their impiety.

"Fundamentalism" in this comparative (and ironic) sense describes the central process involved in constructing a late-twentieth-century mode of militant political religion. Fundamentalists in Islam or Christianity or Judaism or Hinduism—often graduates of secular academies—are quite at home with modern technologies, political processes and the latest strategies of mass marketing and mobilization. The people they presume to represent feel enormously threatened by secular elites. The elite classes—educators, scientists, politicians—have manifestly failed either to share the wealth or preserve "traditional" markers of home, family and communal identity, be these prayer in the school, an exclusively domestic role for women, or literal belief in things unseen.

Thus the fundamentalists reach back to retrieve elements of the sacred tradition which they claim to be absolutely fundamental or essential to the faith. The religious fundamentals are interpreted or "constructed" in a way most useful to the ideological and organizational goals of the movement.

In fundamentalism, then, a new type of religious activity emerges—the Sorbonne-trained scholar who dons the *galabiyya* and falls to his knees beside fellow worshipers in the mosque, even as he develops eco-

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nomic and political strategies for the Islamic Awakening. Precisely because Islam is his base of authority and legitimacy, however, the new Islamic activist may be vulnerable to attacks from fellow Muslim scholars who see the radical, anti-Western version of "fundamentalism" as a spurious and scandalous misrepresentation of their historic tradition.

The general commitment to the implementation of Islamic law across the board does not lead all Muslims down the same path. Like any complex legal code developed over time, the Shari'a admits of many interpretations and diverse applications, each of which is unavoidably selective. Even "progressives" are dedicated to the proper interpretation and application of the Shari'a.

It is in the radical fundamentalist's interest to characterize such progressives as kafir—infidels or secularized Muslims in the service of the West—and to brandish any deviations from "the straight path" (as paved by the radicals, that is) as apostasy. Against such characterizations stands Islam as it is—localized, diverse, and, in Leon T. Hadar's words (Spring 1993), "a mosaic of many national, ethnic and religious groups competing for power and influence...a vital religion that provides spiritual support for a broad spectrum of people, some liberal, some orthodox." This description of Muslim peoples is as accurate as Miller's description of some of their leaders. The gap between the two descriptions is the place where radical Islamists are most vulnerable as leaders of broad-based populist movements; and it is this vulnerability on religious grounds which must be exploited by Muslims acting with equal fervor in the name of religion.

The strength of Islam as a complex, rich and vital world religion is the best safeguard against the possibility of an enduring, popularly supported "Islamic threat." It is in the interest of the United States that Islam's richness be celebrated and reinforced by policies to erode the radical fundamentalists' corner on the market of religious orthodoxy.

R. SCOTT APPLEBY
Associate Director
The Fundamentalism Project
American Academy of Arts and Sciences

SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY

To the Editor:

Leon Hadar's article on the nature of Islam (Spring 1993) is well-timed. If all "fundamentalist" Muslims were like the late Ayatollah Khomeni of Iran, of course fundamentalist Islam would be a regional threat. But are Sufi mystics a threat? If all fundamentalist Jews were bloodthirsty rabble-rousers like Meir Kahane, they would be a threat; but are the Hasidim a threat to anyone except the unwary tourist who actually drives through Mea Shearim on a Saturday? If all fundamentalist Christians were like David Koresh, there would be reason to worry; but are the Amish and the Mennonites a threat? As ideologies falter, piety and self-discipline could be an asset to be courted. To include Islam in the search for enemies could be, as Hadar says, a self-fulfilling prophecy, like the Crusades (which, one should remember, the Christians lost).

RUSSELL WARREN HOWE
Washington, D.C.

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DEMOCRACY IN CUBA

To the Editor:

Jorge Domínguez's article (Spring 1993) on Fidel Castro's staying power implies that the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), of which I was the principal author, has unwittingly contributed to Castro's longevity. In his characterization of its effects, Professor Domínguez does not reflect what we know about how the CDA is working.

The CDA has had the most economic impact on Cuba through its shipping provisions. These provisions force shippers doing business with Cuba to exclude other ports of call on their way to or from the island, thus raising the cost of transportation. Cuban officials are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain transportation and/or are paying premium prices for it.

Second, the bill's prohibition against third-country U.S. subsidiary trade with Cuba is more effective than Domínguez believes. Before the CDA, the number of licenses being issued to such subsidiaries—the only way we have to measure the volume of trade—has expanded dramatically since 1989. Thus, with no change in the Castro regime's behavior towards its own people, the U.S. embargo against Cuba was being gradually eroded. The CDA makes it clear that the economic embargo will remain until meaningful progress toward democratic rule is made.

The principal effect of the ban has been to add about a 15 percent surcharge to Cuba's cost of doing international business. This is about what the U.S. embargo cost Cuba's economy when it was dependent on the Soviet Union for massive annual subsidies and for most of its trade. Before 1989 this surcharge affected 15 percent of Cuba's trade outside the Soviet bloc. Today the surcharge falls on 85 percent of Cuba's trade, the proportion of its trade no longer based on special arrangements with former Soviet bloc members. The cost to the overall economy is, therefore, very significant.

Many of the steps to open up communications with Cuba recommended by Domínguez are either included in or made more politically viable by the CDA. For example, the CDA excludes trade in telecommunications services from the prohibition on subsidiary trade. This means that many U.S. telecommunications companies with overseas subsidiaries will now be able to receive licenses to provide telecommunications services to Cuba. The significance of the exemption for overseas subsidiaries is that none of these companies has any stake in the blocked account containing U.S. funds due Cuba for past phone services, but not paid because of the U.S. embargo. If Cuba really wants to do business with U.S. companies, it can sign with the subsidiaries and avoid the sensitive political question of the blocked account.

American companies have responded enthusiastically to this change in the policy and politics of telecommunications services with Cuba, and I have encouraged them and the State Department to move expeditiously to sign agreements and license increased telecommunications services with Cuba. This will be a tremendous benefit to families separated by the Castro regime and give new sources of information to those inside Cuba yearning for news about the important changes taking place in the rest of the world.

Other provisions of the bill encourage institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy to become more active in supplying non-governmen-

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tal organizations working to promote peaceful change in Cuba with fax machines and desktop publishing capability, as it did so effectively in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Licenses by other nongovernmental groups to sell and donate such items to nongovernmental organizations in Cuba are also easier to obtain.

I disagree with Domínguez that flooding Cuba with American tourists is a positive step toward ending Castro's dictatorship. For this small island, so close to the United States, unrestricted U.S. tourism would provide a financial boon to Castro. A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies also concluded that such a change in the embargo was more likely to slow rather than accelerate the pace of change in Cuba.[1]

THE HON. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI
D-NJ

Jorge Domínguez replies:

Congressman Torricelli's defense of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) calls attention to the costs to Cuba of U.S. shipping regulations that have the effect of raising the cost of transportation to Cuba. In fact, those regulations were implemented by President Bush through executive order prior to the enactment of the CDA. The shipping regulations and the CDA's prohibition of third-country U.S. subsidiary trade with Cuba are counterproductive. The CDA has already played a "starring role" in Fidel Castro's political campaign to persuade Cubans to continue to support him. No doubt the Cuban government will cite Congressman Torricelli's letter to *Foreign Affairs* as proof that Cubans suffer today because of U.S. policy. However false that "proof" is, the Cuban government has been assisted by these U.S. policies in rallying domestic support and in evading its responsibility for the Cuban economy's collapse. Had Bush not instituted additional penalties and had the CDA not been enacted, Fidel Castro's government would have been much less able to rally patriotic support.

Thanks to the CDA, the greatly isolated Cuban government has rallied support from governments that are otherwise U.S. allies. These governments object to the extraterritorial reach of the CDA. For the first time ever, in late 1992 the U.N. General Assembly condemned the U.S. trade embargo toward Cuba. Only Israel and Romania voted with the U.S. government.

I urge Congressman Torricelli to focus less on punishing the Castro government and more on the question I am sure motivates him: How to bring peaceful, democratic change to Cuba? My article suggested that one way to begin is by dismantling forthwith all U.S.-imposed obstacles to the free flow of ideas between the United States and Cuba. If I read the congressman's letter correctly, I think that he, too, believes that moving in this direction will contribute in due course to making Cuba free.

BEYOND THE BALKANS

To the Editor:

Lord Owen's distress (Spring 1993) at charges that the plan for Bosnia proposed by Cyrus Vance and himself endorses ethnic cleansing and rewards Serbian aggression is understandable. There is no way to

[1]Ernest Preeg, *Cuba and The New Caribbean Economic Order,* Washington: CSIS, 1993.

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turn back the clock and undo serious international mistakes, but a way must be found to end the bloodshed. The main trouble with the peace plan is that it doesn't go far enough. It offers no real incentive to stop fighting before the protagonists' irreconcilable goals are met. If it can be implemented, there is no reason to expect it to endure any longer than until one side or another feels it has a better chance for victory.

In fact, the plan further "Balkanizes" the area, creating ever more hostile fragments. This is not only unsuitable in itself, it is a pernicious precedent for the region if it is to be considered the formula for resolving disputes. Not long ago, Nevzat Halili, leader of the ethnic Albanian party in Macedonia which claims to represent over 40 percent of the population of that country but is probably closer to 25-30 percent, told me of his people's grievances. They are in the coalition government and the parliament, with minority guarantees, so I asked him what more he wanted. "I would like a map like the one for Bosnia," he said, adding after a pause, "of course without going through what they did to get it."

The aim of international diplomacy and pressure should be the opposite—to reverse the disastrous course of events and offer mutual advantages of security and development within an expanded framework. In a word, the effort must be to de-Balkanize through a broad regional approach. The one thing everybody in the area seeks is to escape the historical trap of backwardness, underdevelopment and isolation, and move toward the European mainstream. Of course, this need not mean loss of nationality or cultural distinctiveness, as the experience of the European Community makes clear. But the present direction reflects a belief that the way to advance is for each group to push aside others they feel are holding them down or dragging them back, and get to the head of the line on their own.

No piecemeal, step-by-step solution will work. There needs to be a security network with assured borders and minority rights covering all the countries involved—Albania, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, probably Romania, possibly Hungary and all the states arising from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This should be launched at a great nineteenth-century style conference, to be convened by the United States. Only in this way is there a chance of accommodating everyone, of convincing participants that each gains more in security than it is asked to give up in concessions. It is necessary to assure that there will be long-term regional planning, focused on infrastructure needs—transportation, telecommunications, energy and a base for tourism—which would bring common benefits.

FLORA LEWIS, *Senior Columnist*
The New York Times

THE RUSSIAN WORK FORCE

To the Editor:

As Kyril Tidmarsh points out (Spring 1993), Russia has a massive work force, conditioned by its historical experience in the pre-Soviet periods and which is a questionable fit to the sort of economy President Boris Yeltsin's government has sought to create. What can be done with that workforce depends not only on its characteristics, but on how the government deals with workers and their employers, and with trade unions and those who claim to speak for the employers.

The Yeltsin government's early answer to the anticipated tensions of market tran-

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sition was a corporatist "social partnership" begun in January 1992. In a "trilateral commission for regulating social-labor relations," representatives of labor, "employers" and the government would meet regularly, with the latter assuming an arbiter's role.

On the employer side, plant directors were combined with representatives of industrial lobbies, heftiest among these Arkady Volsky's Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP). RSPP and similar bodies drew their clout from old-style heavy defense industries, with their massive plant and large workforces. With the government committed at least in theory to hard budget constraints, demonopolization and privatization, and the closure of the loss-making plants, the "employers" sought survival through credits and subsidies. Accepting the market "eventually," they demanded meanwhile a large government role in a "regulated transition" to it. This left them opposed to Yeltsin's free marketeers.

On labor's side, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR) occupied 10 of the commission's 14 seats. Lineal successor to the old "official" unions, FNPR claimed some 50 million members (about two-thirds of the workforce). It, and the other unions, represented a constituency in its vast majority employed by the state.

Given these constraints, the government gained little from the trilateral. Even so, it was recommissioned for 1993. However, without real structural change in the economy, it seems doomed to the marginality of a "talking shop."

The labor picture is anything but monochromatic. Militancy is mixed with quiescence, long-term hope with near-term apprehension. Private-sector employment is growing rapidly, but labor unions still essentially represent, and contend for, workers in the state sector.

Labor, simply (and understandably) wants "more." The government, fearful, has temporized, then greased the wheels that squeaked loudest. Here, it has been complicit with the central bank it criticizes for massive credit flows. The result has been high wages for some, but poverty for many more. Massive unemployment, deferred thus far, impends as a crash threatens. How, and whether, any of the G-7 $28 billion aid package may be used to ease workers' pains with support and retraining while helping the government to shut down loss-makers remains to be seen.

Given the nature of the economic "heritage," industrial privatization cannot be rammed through. But it will be stalled at an even greater eventual cost to the future. It represents the potential for making parts of a desired revolution in economic culture irreversible.

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